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I. PREFACE
2016 Edition
This toolkit is a compilation of information about INA § 240A(a), or Cancellation of
Removal for lawful permanent residents (LPR). The toolkit is intended to serve as a
resource for immigration attorneys representing LPR clients facing removal from the
United States. In addition to describing the LPR Cancellation statute, the toolkit also
provides information about aggravated felonies, the discretionary component of
Cancellation, individuals who are ineligible for LPR Cancellation, options available to
those who are ineligible for LPR Cancellation, applicable regulations, the Florence
Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project Pro Se packet, sample documents from
government entitles, and immigration court citation guidelines.
This toolkit is an update of the 2010 edition. The 2016 edition provides the reader with
updated case law and government forms, alternative remedies, information on
obtaining client records, new evidence section, and additional suggested litigation
strategies and briefs from practitioners. This toolkit was created by Laura Lopez
Ledesma and Lauren Picciallo, second year law students of Penn State Law’s Center for
Immigrants’ Rights Clinic (Center), under the supervision of Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia,
Samuel Weiss Faculty Scholar and professor of clinical law at Penn State Law-University
Park. Invaluable feedback was provided by Matthew Lamberti, Esq., managing attorney
at Pennsylvania Immigration Resource Center (PIRC). The Center is thankful to the
following practitioner’s for their advice, briefs, and other supporting documents:
Anna M. Gallagher, Esq., Maggio-Kattar P.C. (2009).
Christina Powers, Esq. (2009).
George M. Baurkot, Esq., Baurkot & Baurkot (2016).
Jack Herzig, Esq. (2009).
Jeff Joseph, Esq., Joseph Law Firm P.C. (2009).
Joyce Antila Phipps, Esq., Casa de Esperanza, Bound Brook, NJ (2009).
Julie C. Ferguson, Esq. (2009).
Lisa Brodyaga, Esq., Refugio Rio Grande Law Office (2009).
Maria Baldini-Potermin, Esq., Maria Baldini-Potermin & Associates, P.C. (2009).
Matthew Lamberti, Esq., Pennsylvania Immigration Resource Center, York, PA
(2016).
• Raymond G. Lahoud, Esq., Baurkot & Baurkot (2016).
• Rosina Stambaugh, Esq., The Law Office of Christopher A. Ferro, LLC (2009).
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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• Shelley Wittevrongel, Esq. (2009).
• Siobhan Waldron, Esq., formerly at Immigration Center for Women and Children
(Los Angeles, CA), currently at Centro Legal de la Raza (Oakland, California)
(2016).
• Susan Compernolle, Esq. (2009).
• Toni Maschler, Esq., Bromberg, Kohler Maya & Maschler, PLLC (2009).

About the Center

Penn State Law’s Center for Immigrants’ Rights Clinic is directed by Professor Shoba
Sivaprasad Wadhia. At the Center, students produce white papers, practitioner toolkits,
and primers of national impact for institutional clients. Students at the Center also
engage in community outreach and education on immigration topics such as
immigration enforcement and prosecutorial discretion. Finally, the Center provides legal
support in individual cases of immigrants challenging deportation (removal) or seeking
protection by the Department of Homeland Security and in the courts.

About the Pennsylvania Immigration Resource Center

The Pennsylvania Immigration Resource Center (PIRC) is located less than a mile from
York County Prison and has become the leading source of legal services to immigrants
detained by the Department of Homeland Security in Pennsylvania. PIRC offers pro bono
representation to the most vulnerable immigrant detainees. In providing legal and
educational resources to detained populations, PIRC seeks to empower unrepresented
immigrants to evaluate and manifest their defenses against deportation from the U.S..

About the Redacted Version (Available Upon Request)

In creating the toolkit, we spoke to immigration ‘stakeholders’ and collected suggested
litigation strategies and sample documents included the toolkit. Part 2 of the toolkit is
available only upon request from the Center for Immigrants’ Rights at
centerforimmigrantsr@pennstatelaw.psu.edu. Part 2 contains suggested litigation
strategies and best practices and other sample documents. The sample documents
include motions, memoranda, briefs, exhibit lists for supporting documents, certificates
of service, and direct examination questions.
Throughout this toolkit, we will use the following acronyms to refer to specific
terminology:
•
•
•
•

AEDPA – Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
BIA – Board of Immigration Appeals
DHS – Department of Homeland Security
EOIR – Executive Office for Immigration Review
Page 9 of 327
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IIRIRA – Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
INA – Immigration and Nationality Act
LPR – Lawful Permanent Resident
IJ – Immigration Judge
NTA – Notice To Appear
USCIS – United States Citizenship and Immigration Services

Methodology
This toolkit is an update of the 2010 edition. There are several additions and changes to
the 2016 version of the toolkit. Below you will find the methodology and significant
changes to the sections of the toolkit.

Statutory Section

The statutory section of the toolkit, Part 1, Roman Numeral III, describes each statutory
element of LPR Cancellation of Removal. Each statutory element in LPR Cancellation of
Removal is a subheading and contains a brief description of critical case law
developments for that element. We have included hyperlinks to helpful practice
advisories throughout the statutory section and hypotheticals addressing more complex
issues of that element. While most of the case law is applicable to all circuits, this toolkit
is specifically geared towards the Third Circuit. For example, Section 3, which covers the
element “has not been convicted of any aggravated felony,” contains the entirety of
§ 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in plain English. In addition to
the statute, we have included case law specific to the Third Circuit that addresses issues
applicable to the specific statutory subsection of 101(a)(43).

Case Law

The case law section of the toolkit, Part 1, Roman Numeral V, includes the case law that
addresses the most critical components of the statutory elements. All case law in the
2016 edition was Shepardized and screened for additional developments.
Additionally, the case law section is arranged in two fashions: (1) arranged by court
authority and (2) arranged by statutory element. In the case law section arranged by
statutory element, we have further split each statutory element into sub-topics. For
example, in the case law section which addresses the statutory element “has been an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years” the subtopics include: (A) Conditional Lawful Permanent Residents, (B) Burden of Proof for
Abandonment of Lawful Permanent Resident Status, and (C) Ability to Impute a Parent’s
Lawful Permanent Resident Status. All case law we have included is precedent in the
Board of Immigration Appeals or Third Circuit.
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Practice Advisories

The Practice Advisory section of the toolkit, Part 1, Roman Numeral VI, includes “how
to” instructions and additional helpful information on how to help get your client out of
detention. This section has three subheadings. Section (a) includes information about
how to prepare an LPR Cancellation of Removal application, supporting documents,
required biometric and biographical information, fees, and serving and filing the
application. Section (b) contains information about release from detention, which
includes a brief description on bond and habeas corpus. Section (c) includes instruction
on how to obtain client’s records from the federal government and the states of New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware.

Advice from Practitioners
The Advice of Practitioners section, Part 2, Roman Numeral II, Section (a), includes
suggested litigation strategies, best practices, and helpful tips in preparing the
application and for court hearings. This section has been split up into subtopics that
address different issues ranging from alternative remedies to the use of affidavits.
Additionally, this section includes interviews from 2009 and 2016. Practitioners who
were added to the section responded to our request for participation, which was sent to
a variety of immigration listservs. The 2009 interviews have all been vetted to make sure
each points are still relevant as of 2016.

Evidence

The Evidence section, Part 2, Roman Numeral I, Section (b), includes a consolidation of
evidence that was suggested by different attorneys. Attorneys who participated were
those who responded to our immigration listserv inquiries in 2016 and past attorneys
who participated when the 2010 LPR Cancellation of Removal edition was developed.

Sample Legal Documents

The Sample Legal Documents Part 2, Roman Numeral 1, Section (c), includes briefs and
other documents submitted to the Immigration Court. At the beginning of the sample
legal documents section is a brief description of each legal document contained. Briefs
that were included were obtained from those who responded to the listserv inquiries.
Additionally, all briefs were vetted for relevancy and accuracy.

Legal Disclaimer
This Toolkit is limited in its scope as it is primarily focused on Cancellation of Removal
for Lawful Permanent Residents. Moreover, it is not a substitute for reading the primary
sources of law that pertain to such remedy. This Toolkit is for informational purposes
only and not for the purpose of providing legal advice. Although we have gone to great
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lengths to make sure our information is accurate and useful, we recommend you
conduct further research based on your client’s specific circumstances and circuit
law governing your client’s case. Questions or corrections to this toolkit should be sent
to centerforimmigrantsr@pennstatelaw.psu.edu.
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II. INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Congress enacted two major pieces of legislation that modified the
statutory requirements of relief from removal. The 1996 enactment of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) merged the former
§ 212(c) waiver-of-deportation and suspension-of-deportation methods of relief, and
consolidated them into a statutory scheme called “Cancellation of Removal.”1 One
form of relief is Cancellation of Removal for Lawful Permanent Residents (LPR) and
another form of relief is Cancellation of Removal for Non-LPRs. The other major
piece of legislation was the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).2
Both IIRIRA and AEDPA greatly expanded the enumerated crimes falling under
“aggravated felony,” thereby limiting relief for many noncitizens who would
otherwise be eligible. IIRIRA applied special provisions and restrictions on
noncitizens charged with aggravated felonies. For instance, an LPR charged with an
“aggravated felony” after April 1, 1997 is ineligible for § 240A(a) Cancellation of
Removal. 3 Though Congress repealed § 212(c) relief, § 212(c) relief still can be
invoked in some instances by noncitizens whose convictions were obtained through
plea agreements and who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been
eligible for § 212(c) relief at the time of their plea.4
Under IIRIRA, two forms of Cancellation of Removal were devised, INA §§ 240A(a) and
240A(b). Cancellation of Removal for non-LPRs is available to “an alien who is
inadmissible or deportable.”5 Unlike § 240A(a), which applies only to LPRs, § 240A(b)
applies to all noncitizens who may qualify.6 However, the focus of this toolkit is
limited to § 240A(a): LPR Cancellation of Removal. § 240A(a) reads as follows:

1

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C; 110
Stat. 3009, 3009-46 to 724 (1996); H.R. Rep. 104-863 (1996). 104th Cong. 2d Sess,; H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
104-828, 104th Cong. 2d See. (1996); S. Rep. 104-249, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. (1996); 142 Cong. Rec.
S4730-01, § 150 (1996); 142 Cong. Rec. H2378-05, § 309 (1996); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a), 1229b(b) (2016);
INA §§ 240A(a) and 240A(b).
2
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, title IV; 110 Stat. 1214,
1258-81, § 440(e) (1996); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2016).
3
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2016); INA § 240A(a)(3).
4
8 C.F.R. §§§ 1003, 1212, 1240 (2016); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001).
5
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2016); INA §240A(b)(1).
6
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2016); INA §240A(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2016); INA § 240A(b)(1).
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The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of an alien who is
inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less
than 5 years,
(2) has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having
been admitted in any status, and
(3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.7
The relief of Cancellation of Removal under INA § 240A(a) applies to eligible
noncitizens placed in removal proceedings on or after April 1, 1997.8 As with most
forms of relief, Cancellation of Removal is granted or denied at the discretion of the
Immigration Judge.

7

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2016); INA § 240A(a).
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C; 110
Stat. 3009, 3009-46 to 724 (1996); H.R. Rep. 104-863 (1996). 104th Cong. 2d Sess,; H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
104-828, 104th Cong. 2d See. (1996); S. Rep. 104-249, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. (1996); 142 Cong. Rec.
S4730-01, § 150 (1996); 142 Cong. Rec. H2378-05, § 309 (1996).
8
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III. STATUTE- LPR Cancellation of Removal:
INA § 240A(a) & 8 U.S.C. § 1229b
“The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or
deportable from the United States if the alien –
(1) Has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5
years,
(2) Has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been
admitted in any status, and
(3) Has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.”

Burden of Proof

While the government has the burden of proving removability by clear and convincing
evidence, 9 the applicant has the burden of proving that s/he qualifies for LPR
Cancellation of Removal.10 For example, if charging that the noncitizen is removable for
conviction of an aggravated felony, during the removal proceeding the government has
to prove that the conviction is an aggravated felony. However, for purposes of
establishing eligibility for relief, a noncitizen may have to show that the conviction is not
an aggravated felony.
For a practice advisory about burden of proof for aggravated felonies, please see:
National Immigration Project, Practice Advisory: The Burden of Proof to Overcome the
Aggravated Felony Bar to Cancellation of Removal (Mar. 22, 2007),
https://nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/practitioners/practice_advisories/crim/20
07_22Mar_proof-burden-agfel.pdf.

9

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2016); INA § 240(c)(3)(A) (2016).
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A) (2016); INA § 240(c)(4)(A) (2016).

10
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SECTION 1 (1) Has Been an Alien Lawfully Admitted for Permanent Residence for
Not Less Than 5 Years
The key terms under this provision are "lawfully admitted for permanent residence."
"Lawfully admitted for permanent residence" means having been lawfully accorded
the entry into the “United States after inspection and authorized by an immigration
officer.”11 A person who obtains lawful permanent residence by fraud or mistake is
deemed to have not been "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" and thus is
ineligible for Cancellation of Removal.12 Attorneys should note that a child of an LPR
may not impute the parent’s years of lawful permanent residency in order to achieve
the five year requirement.13
Hypothetical

Assessment

• In January of 2000, a noncitizen was admitted into the U.S.
as a Conditional Permanent Resident.
• In March of 2005, the noncitizen was convicted of theft.
For purpose of LPR Cancellation of Removal, this noncitizen has
been admitted as a Permanent Resident although the admission
was on a conditional basis. Thus, this noncitizen has accrued 5
years and two months as a lawfully admitted permanent resident.14

11

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2016); INA § 101(a)(20) (2014).
See Gallimore v. Attorney General, 619 F.3d 216, 223 (3rd Cir. 2010) (citing Matter of Koloamatangi,
23 I. & N. Dec. 548 (BIA 2003)); See also, Ijomah-Nwosa v. Holder, Civ. No. 14–2527 (WJM), 2015 WL
5097925 at *2 (D.N.J. 2015) (“Even though the Government mistakenly admitted and granted Petitioner
lawful permanent resident status as the unmarried child of a U.S. citizen, such status is deemed void ab
initio because it did not comply with the relevant substantive legal requirements that supported
Petitioner's eligibility”).
13
Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S.Ct. 2011, 2018 (2012).
14
See generally, Gallimore v. Attorney General, 619 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2010).
12
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SECTION 2 (2) Has Resided in the United States Continuously for 7 Years After
Having Been Admitted in Any Status
An "admission" is the lawful entry of a noncitizen into the United States after
inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.15 A noncitizen who is present in
the U.S. without inspection has not made a lawful admission.16 Likewise, a noncitizen
who was paroled into the U.S. has not made a lawful admission.17 Hence, a noncitizen's
entry without inspection or by parole does not commence continuous residence.
Importantly, § 240A(a)(2) does not require a noncitizen to have resided in the U.S. in a
lawful immigration status; rather it requires an admission in "any status.”18 Also, the
continuous residence requirement does not apply to a noncitizen who has served 24
months in active-duty status in the U.S. armed forces, was in the U.S. at the time of
enlistment or induction, and was honorably discharged. 19

Stop Time Rule

Additionally, § 240(A)(d)(1), also known as the Stop Time Rule, sets forth that
continuous residence stops at the earlier of one of the following: (1) the date of the
commission of the crime which makes the noncitizen inadmissible or deportable or (2)
the date the noncitizen received the most current Notice to Appear (NTA).20 An attorney
should be aware that service of an NTA in a previous proceeding does not serve to bar
accrual of more time of continuous residence with concern to “an application for
Cancellation of Removal filed in the current proceeding.”21 Further, an attorney should
be aware that children applying for LPR Cancellation of Removal must also meet the 7
year continuous residency requirement and may not impute their parents’ continuous
residency to meet the requirement.22

15

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (2016); INA § 101(a)(13).
8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(6)(A) (2016); INA § 212(a)(6)(A).
17
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(B) (2016); INA § 101(a)(13)(B).
18
Matter of Perez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 689, 692 (BIA 1999).
19
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(3) (2016); INA § 240A(d)(3).
20
Matter of Ordaz-Gonzalez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 637, 638 (BIA 2015).
21
Matter of Cisneros-Gonzalez, 23 I. & N. Dec. 668, 668 (BIA 2004).
22
Holder v. Martinez Guitierrez, 132 S.Ct. 2012, 2018 (2012).
16
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• On January 15, 1999, a noncitizen was admitted into the U.S. as
a tourist.
• On January 15, 2000, the noncitizen married a U.S. citizen and
adjusted to Lawful Permanent Residency.
• On January 30, 2006, the noncitizen was arrested for possession
of cocaine.
• On January 31, 2006, the noncitizen pled guilty for possession of
cocaine.
• On January 31, 2010, the noncitizen was served with a Notice to
Appear.
For purposes of LPR Cancellation of Removal, this noncitizen’s
continued residence clock stopped on January 30, 2006, when the
crime was committed.23 The stop-time rule was triggered 7 years
and 15 days after the noncitizen was admitted as a tourist into the
U.S.. Thus, this noncitizen has accrued the required 7 years of
continuous residency after having been admitted into the U.S. in
any status.

See generally, Matter of Perez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 689 (BIA 1999).
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SECTION 3 (3) Has Not Been Convicted of Any Aggravated Felony
A lawful permanent resident is deportable if convicted of an aggravated felony at any
time after admission.24 Furthermore, under INA § 240A(a)(3), an LPR convicted of an
aggravated felony is ineligible for Cancellation of Removal relief. The list of aggravated
felonies under INA § 101(a)(43) expanded as a result of two pieces of legislation: the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). As one scholar
notes, “The definition of aggravated felony encompasses a range of offenses from very
serious to relatively minor offenses and imposes harsh consequences for a noncitizen
convicted of qualifying crimes.”25

Retroactivity

An attorney representing an applicant for LPR Cancellation of Removal should be aware
of the extensive list of aggravated felonies under INA § 101(a)(43). An attorney should
also be aware that the aggravated felony definition applies retroactively, which means
that a crime that did not constitute an aggravated felony at the time of an applicant’s
conviction may be classified as such at the time of application for LPR Cancellation.
When this retroactivity occurs, the previous crime will be considered an aggravated
felony and will prevent the LPR from successfully obtaining Cancellation of Removal.
Further, the attorney should be aware that some sections contain a term of
imprisonment. A suspended sentence counts towards the one-year requirement for
immigration purposes.26

Aggravated Felony Determination

The attorney should be cognizant that not all state convictions will fall within the
meaning of the comparable federal definition of aggravated felony under INA
§ 101(a)(43). That is, some state criminal statutes will not be a close enough
comparison to the INA definition of aggravated felony for the applicant to be
considered an aggravated felon for immigration purposes.27 To determine whether the
state conviction falls within the meaning of the aggravated felony for immigration
24

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2016); INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii).
Erica Steinmiller-Perdomo, Consequences Too Harsh For Noncitizens Convicted of Aggravated
Felonies?, 41 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1173, 1173 (2014).
26
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B) (2016); INA § 101(a)(48)(B).
27
See generally, Moncreiffe v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013).
25
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purposes, the attorney should apply the categorical approach and, when necessary,
should apply the modified categorical approach.
Categorical Approach
Under the Categorical Approach28, the attorney should look to the state statute to see if
the state statute’s elements fit within the “generic” federal definition of the
corresponding aggravated felony.29 A state offense is a categorical match to a federal
offense only if the state offense conviction “necessarily involved… facts” that would
equate to the generic federal offense.30 Notably, the adjudicator will not consider the
factual circumstances of the respondent’s case, and will only look to whether the
statute’s elements are comparable.31 Additionally, the respondent must show that there
was a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the state would apply its
statute to conduct that falls outside of the generic definition of the applicable federal
statute. 32 In order to show a realistic probability, the attorney should provide the
adjudicator with case law showing that circumstances exist in which the state statute
would not be applied in the same manner in which the federal statute was applied.
An example of the application of the Categorical Approach appears in Moncreiffe v.
Holder. 33 There, the respondent pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute
marijuana.34 However, the Supreme Court held that the state statute did not fit within
the meaning of an aggravated felony because the state statute did not reveal whether
the respondent obtained remuneration nor did the state statute reveal the amount of
marijuana necessary for a conviction. Therefore, no way existed to determine whether
every possible scenario of conviction under the state statute would necessarily fall
within the bounds of the federal statute.35
Modified Categorical Approach
The Modified Categorical Approach is a tool of the Categorical Approach and must be

28

For more information about the categorical approach see, Immigration Defense Project,
http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Moncrieffe-PA-5-1-13-FINAL.pdf
(last visited May 12, 2016).
29
Moncreiffe v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 1680 (2013).
30
Id. at 1680.
31
Moncreiffe v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 1680 (2013).
32
Moncreiffe v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. at 1684.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 1683.
35
Id. at 1680.
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applied if the state statute is divisible into subsections, at least one of which contains
elements that trigger a match with the generic definition.36 A state statute is divisible if
the statute can be divided into more than one section so as to see whether an
alternative portion of the statute would align with the federal statute.37
A case example of the when the Court has applied the Modified Categorical Approach is
Descamps v. U.S.. 38 There, the Supreme Court found that a California burglary statute
was indivisible.39 The California statute would have allowed for lawful and unlawful
entries to be considered burglary, unlike the federal statute that was only applicable to
unlawful entries. 40 Because the statute did not require that the jury decide which
alternative, lawful or unlawful entry, satisfied a conviction, the Supreme Court found
that the statute was indivisible.41 If the statute is determined to be divisible, then the
court may consult a limited group of documents in the record of conviction to
determine which of the multiple crimes covered by the divisible statute corresponds to
the Respondent’s conviction.42
For more information about the Modified Categorical Approach see the following:
• Immigration Defense Project, Practice Advisory: Descamps v. United States and
the Modified Categorical Approach (July 17, 2013),
http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Descampsadvisory-7-17-FINAL.pdf.
• Immigration Defense Project, Practice Advisory: Matter of Chairez-Castrejon: BIA
Applies Moncrieffe and Descamps to Modify and Clarify its Views on Proper
Application of the Categorical Approach (July 31, 2014)
https://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/practitioners/practice_adviso
ries/crim/2014_13Jul_chairez-castrejon.pdf.

36

Descamps v. US, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 2279 (2013).
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
37
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List of Aggravated Felonies Under INA § 101(a)(43)43:
(A) murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor;44

• In determining whether a crime involving sexual abuse of a minor falls within
INA § 101(a)(43)(A), the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) finds it useful
to look to 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8), which defines sexual abuse as “the
employment, use persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child
to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexually explicit conduct
or the rape, molestation, prostitution or other form of sexual exploitation of
children, or incest with children.”45
(B) illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (see Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.

802), including a drug tracking crime (see 18 U.S.C. 924(c));46

(C) illicit trafficking in firearms or illicit trafficking in destructive devices

(see Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. 921) or illicit trafficking in explosive

43

See http://uscode.house.gov/.
Restrepo v. Attorney General 617 F.3d 787, 800 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14–
3(a) is a categorical match to INA § 101(a)(43)(A)); Stubbs v. Attorney General, 452 F.3d 251, 256 (3d
Cir. 2006) (finding that the New Jersey statute N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4(a) is not a categorical match to
INA § 101(a)(43)(A); Matter of Small, 23 I. & N. Dec. 448, 450 (BIA 2002) (finding that sexual
abuse of a minor includes people charged with misdemeanor sexual abuse).
45
Matter of Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991, 995 (1999); see also Stubbs v. Attorney
General, 452 F.3d 251, 256 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that in order for a crime to fall within INA
§ 101(a)(43)(A), the crime necessarily needs to involve a “past act with a child”).
46
Bautista v. Attorney General 608 Fed. Appx. 83, 86 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that N.J. Stat. Ann §§ 2C:355 and 2C:35-5(b)(8) are aggravated felonies under the INA) (3d Cir 2015); Oliveira v. Attorney General,
618 Fed. Appx. 126, 130 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C: 35-10(a)(1) is an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(B)); Mattie v. Attorney General, 585 Fed. Appx. 821, 822 (3d Cir. 2014)
(holding that the noncitizen failed to show that N.J. Stat. Ann § 2C:35-5(b)(11) was not an aggravated
felony); Lepianka v. Attorney General, 586 Fed. Appx. 869, 871 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2C:35-5(a)(1), and (b)(2) are aggravated felonies under the INA); Kporlor v. Attorney General, 529
Fed. Appx. 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(2) was an
aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(B)); Cadet v. Attorney General, 339 Fed. Appx. 273, 275 (3d
Cir. 2009) (holding that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5(b)(3) is an aggravated felony within the INA); Marte v.
Attorney General, 339 Fed.Appx. 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-7 is an
aggravated felony within the INA); Drakes v. Attorney General, 266 Fed. Appx. 184, 186 (3d Cir. 2008)
(holding that New York State Penal Law 220.16(1) is an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(B)); In
re: Francisco Rodriguez-Trinidad, A044 892640, (BIA Feb. 24, 2016) (finding that 35 Pa. Cons. Stat § 780113(a)(30) is not a categorical match with INA § 101(a)(43)(B)).
44
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materials (see Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. 841(c));
(D) an offense relating to laundering of monetary instruments (see 18 U.S.C. 1956) or

relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specific
unlawful activity (see 18 U.S.C. 1957) if the amount of the funds exceeded
$10,000;
(E) an offense described in the following:

a. relating to explosive materials offenses:47
• It shall be unlawful for any person to receive, possess, transport, ship,
conceal, store, barter, sell, dispose of, pledge or accept as security for a
loan, any stolen explosive materials which are moving as, which are part of,
which constitute, or which have been shipped or transported in, interstate or
foreign commerce, either before or after such materials were stolen,
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the explosive materials
were stolen. (see 18 U.S.C. 842(h));
unlawful for a person who: is convicted of a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; who is a fugitive from justice;
who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance; who has
been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a
mental institution; an alien (unless admitted as an LPR (INA § 101(a)(20), a
refugee (INA § 207), in asylum status (INA § 208)); and - is a foreign law
enforcement officer of a friendly foreign government; or
is a person having the power to direct or cause the direction of the
management and policies of a corporation, partnership, or association
licensed, and the shipping, transporting, possession, or receipt of explosive
materials is in furtherance of such power. (see 18 U.S.C. 842(i));
• Whoever transports or receives, or attempts to transport or receive, in
interstate or foreign commerce any explosive with the knowledge or intent
that it will be used to kill, injure, or intimidate any individual or unlawfully to
damage or destroy any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property
will be imprisoned or fined, or both; and if personal injury results to any
person will be imprisoned or fined, or both; and if death results to any
person will be imprisoned or fined, or both (see 18 U.S.C. 844(d));

47

Bautista v. Attorney General, 744 F.3d 54, 74 (3d 2015) (finding that New York Penal Law §§ 110
and 150.10. is not a categorical match to § 101(a)(43)(E)(i) because the New York Statute lacked the
Federal Statute’s jurisdictional element).
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• Whoever, through the use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, or other
instrument of interstate or foreign commerce, or in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce, willfully makes any threat, or maliciously conveys false
information knowing the same to be false, concerning an attempt or alleged
attempt being made, or to be made, to kill, injure, or intimidate any
individual or unlawfully to damage or destroy any building, vehicle, or other
real or personal property by means of fire or an explosive shall be
imprisoned or fined, or both. (see 18 U.S.C. 844(e));
• Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or
destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other
personal or real property in whole or in part owned or possessed by, or
leased to, the U.S., or any department or agency thereof, or any institution
or organization receiving Federal financial assistance, shall be imprisoned or
fined or both; or directly or proximately causes personal injury or creates a
substantial risk of injury to any person; or directly or proximately causes the
death of any person (see 18 U.S.C. 844(f));
• Whoever possesses an explosive in an airport or building in whole or in part
owned, possessed, or used by, or leased to, the U.S. or any department or
agency, except with the written consent of the agency, imprisoned or fined,
or both; see exceptions. (see 18 U.S.C. 844(g));
• Whoever- (1) uses fire or an explosive to commit any felony which may be
prosecuted in a court of the U.S., or (2) carries an explosive during the
commission of any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the U.S..
(see 18 U.S.C. 844(h));
• Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or
destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other
real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any
activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned or
fined or both; and if personal injury or death results to any person, shall be
imprisoned or fined or both (see 18 U.S.C. 844(i));
b. relating to firearms offenses:
It shall be unlawful for any person• who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year. (see 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1));
• who is a fugitive from justice (see 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(2));
• who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (as
defined in (21 U.S.C. 802 § 102)) (see 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3));
• who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been
committed to a mental institution (see 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4));
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• who, being an alien- is illegally or unlawfully in the U.S.; or except as
provided in subsection (y)(2), has been admitted to the U.S. under a
nonimmigrant visa. (see 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5));
• It shall be unlawful for any person to receive, possess, conceal, store, barter,
sell, or dispose of any stolen firearm or stolen ammunition, or pledge or
accept as security for a loan any stolen firearm or stolen ammunition,
which is moving as, which is a part of, which constitutes, or which has been
shipped or transported in, interstate or foreign commerce, either before or
after it was stolen, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the
firearm or ammunition was stolen (see 18 U.S.C. 922(j));
• It shall be unlawful for any person who is under indictment for a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to ship or
transport in interstate or foreign commerce any firearm or ammunition or
receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce (see 18 U.S.C. 922(n));
• This subsection does not apply with respect to- a transfer to or by, or
possession by or under the authority of, the U.S. or any department or
agency thereof or a State, or a department, agency, or political subdivision
thereof; or any lawful transfer or lawful possession of a machinegun that
was lawfully possessed before the date this subsection takes effect. (see 18
U.S.C. 922(o))
• It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, import, sell, ship,
deliver,
possess,
transfer,
or
receive
any
firearm(1)(A) that, after removal of grips, stocks, and magazines, is not as
detectable as the Security Exemplar, by walk-through metal detectors
calibrated and operated to detect the Security Exemplar; or (B) any major
component of which, when subjected to inspection by the types of x-ray
machines commonly used at airports, does not generate an image that
accurately depicts the shape of the component; (2) See for term definitions
and exception. (see 18 U.S.C. 922(p));
• It shall be unlawful for any person to assemble from imported parts any
semiautomatic rifle or any shotgun which is identical to any rifle or shotgun
prohibited from importation under 18 U.S.C. 925(d)(3) (see 18 U.S.C. 922(r));
• Whoever, with intent to commit therewith an offense punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or with knowledge or
reasonable cause to believe that an offense punishable by imprisonment for
a term exceeding one year is to be committed therewith, ships, transports,
or receives a firearm or any ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce
shall be imprisoned or fined or both (see 18 U.S.C. 924(b));
• Whoever knowingly transfers a firearm, knowing that such firearm will be
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used to commit a crime of violence (as defined in subsection (c)(3)) or drug
trafficking crime (as defined in subsection (c)(2)) shall be imprisoned or fined
or both (see 18 U.S.C. 924(h)).

c. relating to firearms offenses (Prohibited Acts, Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
26 U.S.C. 5861)
(F) a crime of violence (as defined in 18 U.S.C. 16 of Title 18, but not including a purely

political offense) for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year.
• Under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), “The term ‘crime of violence’ means an offense that
has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person or property of another.”48
• Under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), “The term ‘crime of violence’ means any other
offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that
physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the
course of committing the offense.”49
• Under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), a crime of violence is a crime which require a mens
rea that “suggests a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely
accidental conduct.”50 In this regard, a crime of violence necessarily involves
“violent force - that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to
another person.”51
• Although 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) sweeps more broadly than § 16(a), whether a
reckless mens rea can amount to a crime of violence under § 16(b), depends
on whether the statute encompasses “a person acting in disregard of the risk

48

18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2016).
18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2016).
50
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 1 (2004)(finding that Florida’s Driving while Under the Influence statute
did not require a mens rea requirement other than negligence; therefore, the Florida Statute did not
necessarily involve facts that would be a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 16); See also, Aguilar v. AG, 663
F.3d 692, 700 (3rd Cir. 2011)(finding that a reckless crime could be a crime of violence under § 16(b) as
both statute and case law focus on the risk of the intentional use of force, not merely on mens rea); But
see, Jimenez-Gonzalez v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 557, 560 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that criminal recklessness
was not a crime of violence under U.S.C. § 16(b)).
51
Johnson v. US, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010) (emphasis added); see also, Matter of Guzman-Polanco, 26 I.
& N. Dec 713, 716-718 (BIA 2016) (Here, the Board affirmed the “violent force” language of Johnson v.
US to hold that a statute which states that infliction of bodily injury by “any means or form” does not
necessarily require the use of violent force and so is not a categorical match to § 16(a). However, the
Board did not resolve the question of whether such a statute may be encompassed by § 16(b).).
49
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that the physical force might be used against another in committing an
offense.”52
• However, a recent development concerning the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C.
§ 16, and particularly § 16(b) has arisen in the Federal Circuit Courts of
Appeal.53
(G) a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for which

the term of imprisonment is at least one year.
• A misdemeanor of theft under the state law, may be deemed an aggravated
felony for immigration purposes, so long as the term of imprisonment is at
least one year.54
(H) an offense relating to the demand for or receipt of ransom as described in the

following sections: Interstate Communications (see 18 U.S.C. 875); Mailing
threatening communications (see 18 U.S.C. 876); Mailing threatening
communications from foreign country (see 18 U.S.C. 877); Ransom Money (see 18
U.S.C. 1202).
(I) an offense relating to child pornography: Sexual exploitation of children (see 18

U.S.C. 2251), Selling or buying of children (see 18 U.S.C. 2251A), or Certain
activities relating to material involving the sexual exploitation of minors (see 18
U.S.C. 2252).
(J) an offense relating to racketeer influenced corrupt organizations (see 18 U.S.C.

1962), or if it is a second or subsequent offense (see 18 U.S.C. 1084); relating to
gambling offenses (see 18 U.S.C. 1955), for which a sentence of one-year

52

Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. at 10.
See, United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, No. 15–40041, 2016 WL 537612 at *235 (5th Cir. 2016)
(holding that 18 U.S.C. § 16 definition of “crime of violence” was unconstitutionally vague for sentencing
enhancement purposes); United States v. Vivas-Cejas, 808 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding that 18
U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague as the phrases “by its nature” and “substantial risk” provided
no guidance to the courts); Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that 18 U.S.C.
§ 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague, therefore INA § 101(a)(43)(F), which cites to 18 U.S.C. § 16 is
unconstitutionally vague). For the standard for determining whether a residual clause is
unconstitutionally vague, see Johnson v. U.S., 135 S.Ct. 2251 (2015).
54
See, e.g., Brooks v. Attorney General, 297 Fed. Appx. 205, 216 (3rd Cir. 2006) (holding that the
noncitizen’s conviction under New York’s law for possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, a
misdemeanor, was an aggravated felony for immigration purposes).
53
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imprisonment or more may be imposed;
(K) an offense that –

(i)

relates to the owning, controlling, managing, or supervising of a
prostitution business;
(ii) is relating to transportation for the purpose of prostitution if committed for
commercial advantage: Transportation generally (see 18 U.S.C. 2421);
Coercion and enticement (see 18 U.S.C. 2422), or Transportation of minors
(see 18 U.S.C. 2423); or
(iii) relating to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, and trafficking in
persons: Peonage; obstructing enforcement (see 18 U.S.C. 1581), Vessels
for slave trade (see 18 U.S.C. 1582), Enticement into slavery (see 18 U.S.C.
1583), Sale into involuntary servitude (see 18 U.S.C. 1584), Seizure,
detention, transportation or sale of slaves (see 18 U.S.C. 1585),
Transportation of slaves from U.S. (see 18 U.S.C. 1588), Forced labor (see
18 U.S.C. 1589), Trafficking with respect to peonage, slavery, involuntary
servitude, or forced labor (see 18 U.S.C. 1590), Sex trafficking of children or
by force, fraud, or coercion (see 18 U.S.C. 1591).
(L) an offense from the following:

(i)

Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information (see 18 U.S.C. 793),
Disclosure of classified information (see 18 U.S.C. 798), Destruction of war
material, war premises, or war utilities (see 18 U.S.C. 2153), Treason (see
18 U.S.C. 2381), or Misprision of treason (see 18 U.S.C. 2382);
(ii) Protection of identities of certain U.S. undercover intelligence officers,
agents, informants, and sources (National Security Act, see 50 U.S.C. 3121,
formerly 50 U.S.C. 421); or
(iii) Currently 50 U.S.C. 3121, formerly at 50 U.S.C. 421)
(M) an offense that –

(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds
$10,000;55 or
(ii) is relating to tax evasion (see section 7201 of Title 26) in which the revenue
loss to the Government exceeds $10,000.

55

Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 42-43 (2009) (Finding that the IJ was able to consider the applicant’s
sentencing-related material to determine if the fraud amounted to $10,000 to fall within INA
§ 101(a)(43)(M)).
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(N) an offense relating to bringing in and harboring certain aliens [see paragraph

(1)(A) or (2) of section 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)], except in the case of a first offense for
which the alien has affirmatively shown that the alien committed the offense for
the purpose of assisting, abetting, or aiding only the alien's spouse, child, or parent
(and no other individual) to violate a provision of this chapter;
(O) an offense of Improper Entry by Alien: Improper time or place; avoidance of

examination or inspection, misrepresentation and concealment of acts (INA
§ 275(a); 8 U.S.C. 1325(a)) or of Reentry of Removed Aliens (INA § 276; 8 U.S.C.
1326) committed by an alien who was previously deported on the basis of a
conviction for an offense described in another subparagraph of this paragraph;
(P) an offense (i) which either is falsely making, forging, counterfeiting, mutilating, or

altering a passport or instrument in violation of Forgery of false use of passport
(see 18 U.S.C. 1543), or Fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents
(see 18 U.S.C. 1546(a)) and (ii) for which the term of imprisonment is at least 12
months, except in the case of a first offense for which the alien has affirmatively
shown that the alien committed the offense for the purpose of assisting, abetting,
or aiding only the alien's spouse, child, or parent (and no other individual) to
violate a provision of this Act;
(Q) an offense relating to a failure to appear by a defendant for service of sentence if

the underlying offense is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 5 years or more;
(R) an offense relating to commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, or trafficking in

vehicles the identification numbers of which have been altered for which the term
of imprisonment is at least one year;
(S) an offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation of perjury, or

bribery of a witness, for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year;
(T) an offense relating to a failure to appear before a court pursuant to a court order

to answer to or dispose of a charge of a felony for which a sentence of 2 years'
imprisonment or more may be imposed; and
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(U) an attempt or conspiracy56 to commit an offense described in this paragraph.

The term applies to an offense described in this paragraph whether in violation of
Federal or State law and applies to such an offense in violation of the law of a foreign
country for which the term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15
years. Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including any effective date), the
term applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before, on, or after the
date of enactment of this paragraph.

56

In Matter of Richardson, 25 I. & N. Dec. 226, 226 (BIA 2010), the Board found that “conspiracy” is “not
limited to conspiracies that require the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy by
one of the conspirators.” Further, the Board found that “[a]n alien who was only convicted of conspiracy
to commit an aggravated felony is removable on the basis of the conviction section 101(a)(43)(U) of the
Act may not also be found removable for the underlying substantive offense, even though the record of
conviction shows that the conspirators actually committed the substantive offense.”
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SECTION 4 Discretionary Component of LPR Cancellation of Removal
In addition to satisfying the three statutory eligibility requirements under INA § 240A(a)
which are that the applicant (1) has been an alien admitted for permanent residence for
not less than 5 years, (2) has resided in the U.S. continuously for 7 years after having
been admitted in any status, and (3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony),
an applicant for LPR Cancellation of Removal must establish that s/he warrants relief
as a matter of discretion. An Immigration Judge (IJ) has discretion to determine
whether a particular applicant should be granted Cancellation of Removal relief. An IJ
must balance the adverse factors evidencing the individual's undesirability as a lawful
permanent resident with the social and humane considerations presented on his or her
behalf to determine whether the granting of relief appears to be in the best in interest
of the United States.57

Positive Factors
When exercising discretion in an LPR Cancellation of Removal case, an IJ may consider
positive factors. The Board described the following positive factors in Matter of C-V-T,
22 I. & N. Dec. 7 (BIA 1998):
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Family ties within the U.S.;
Residency of long duration in the U.S.;
Evidence of hardship to the respondent and family if deportation occurs;
Service in Armed Forces;
History of employment;
Existence of property or business ties;
Existence of value and service to the community;
Proof of genuine rehabilitation if a criminal record exists;
Evidence attesting to a respondent's good character.

The existence of minor U.S. citizen children is a positive factor that an IJ may consider.58
It is important to note that equities that accrue after a final order or after knowledge of
potential deportation are diminished.59 In addition, the Board may give less weight to a

57

Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584 (BIA 1978).
Matter of Arreguin, 21 I. & N. Dec. 38 (BIA 1995).
59
Matter of Correa, 19 I. & N. Dec. 130, 130 (BIA 1984).
58
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record of employment, where employment was unauthorized, and long residence in the
U.S., where status was undocumented.60

Negative Factors
When exercising discretion in an LPR Cancellation of Removal case, an IJ may also
consider negative factors such as:61
•
•
•
•

Nature and underlying circumstances of grounds of removal;
Additional significant immigration violations;
Existence of criminal record;
Other evidence of bad character or undesirability

If an attorney has prepared documents in support of the positive factors relating to
discretion, s/he may be able to refute any negative factors that an IJ considers. In
addition to submitting supporting documents, an attorney should prepare his or her
client to discuss negative factors in a hearing before the IJ, in case these factors are
brought up. An applicant should be prepared to speak honestly about negative factors,
to take responsibility for past actions, and to emphasize rehabilitation. 62
It is important to note that an IJ may consider all crimes that an applicant has

committed, including crimes that are not aggravated felonies, for the purpose of
determining whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. While considering
such crimes, an IJ may inquire into circumstances surrounding the commission of the
crimes. However, an IJ may not look to an applicant's criminal record in order to
reassess his or her ultimate guilt or innocence.63
For examples of evidence which support the discretionary component please request
the redacted version of the LPR Cancellation of Removal Toolkit.

60

Varela-Blanco v. INS, 18 F.3d 584, 587-588 (8th Cir. 1994).
Matter of Edwards, 10 I. & N. Dec. 506, 195 (BIA 1964); Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 585 (BIA
1978).
62
The Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project, available at http://www.firrp.org (choose
"Resources" and follow "How to Defend Your Case” hyperlink, scroll to “Cancellation of Removal for
Legal Permanent Residents (green card holders) and select “English” hyperlink) (last visited May 12,
2016).
63
Matter of Roberts, 20 I. & N. Dec. 294, 294 (BIA 1991).
61
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SECTION 5 Individuals Ineligible for LPR Cancellation Relief
64

INA § 240A(c) - Aliens ineligible for relief :
The provisions of subsection (a) and (b)(l) shall not apply to any of the following aliens:
(1) An alien who entered the United States as a crewman subsequent to June 30,
1964.
(2) An alien who was admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant exchange
alien as defined in section 101(a)(15)(J) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)] of this title, or has
acquired the status of such a nonimmigrant exchange alien after admission, in
order to receive graduate medical education or training, regardless of whether
or not the alien is subject to or has fulfilled the two-year foreign residence
requirement of section 212(e) of this title.
(3) An alien who-(A) was admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant exchange alien as

defined in section 101(a)(15)(J) [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(J)], or has
acquired the status of such a nonimmigrant exchange alien after
admission other than to receive graduate medical education or training,
(B) is subject to the two-year foreign residence requirement of section

212(e) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(e)], and
(C) has not fulfilled that requirement or received a waiver thereof.

(4) An alien who is inadmissible under section 212(a)(3) [I U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)], or
deportable under section 237(a)(4) [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)].
(5) An alien who is described in section 241(b)(3)(B)(i) [8 U.S.C. A.
§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(i)].
(6) An alien whose removal has previously been canceled under this section or
whose deportation was suspended under section 244(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)] or
who has been granted relief under section 212(c) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)], as such
sections were in effect before the date of the enactment of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 [September 30,
1996].

64

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c) (2016); INA § 240A(c).
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Explanation of INA § 240A(c)

Noncitizens who are per se ineligible for LPR Cancellation of Removal include:
1. Crewmen who entered subsequent to June 30, 1964;
2. Persons admitted on J visas to receive graduate medical training regardless of
whether they are subject to or have fulfilled the 2-year home residency
requirement;
3. Persons admitted on a J visa or who acquired such status after admission with 2year foreign residency requirement who never fulfilled the requirement or
received a waiver;
4. Persons inadmissible or deportable for security or related reasons;
5. Persons determined to have persecuted others;
6. Persons previously granted suspension of deportation or Cancellation of
Removal.
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8 C.F.R. § 1240.20: Cancellation of removal and adjustment of status
under INA § 240A
(a) Jurisdiction. An application for the exercise of discretion under section 240A of the
Act shall be submitted on Form EOIR–42, Application for Cancellation of Removal, to the
Immigration Court having administrative control over the Record of Proceeding of the
underlying removal proceeding under section 240 of the Act. The application must be
accompanied by payment of the filing fee as set forth in § 103.7(b) of 8 C.F.R. Chapter I
or a request for a fee waiver.
(b) Filing the application. The application may be filed only with the Immigration Court
after jurisdiction has vested pursuant to § 1003.14 of this chapter.

8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a): Creation of the status of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence
(1) In a removal proceeding, an alien may apply to the immigration judge for
cancellation of removal under section 240A of the Act, adjustment of status under
section 1 of the Act of November 2, 1966 (as modified by section 606 of Pub.L. 104–
208), section 101 or 104 of the Act of October 28, 1977, section 202 of Pub.L. 105–100,
or section 902 of Pub.L. 105–277, or for the creation of a record of lawful admission for
permanent residence under section 249 of the Act. The application shall be subject to
the requirements of § 1240.20, and 8 C.F.R. parts 1245 and 1249. The approval of any
application made to the immigration judge under section 245 of the Act by an alien
spouse (as defined in section 216(g)(1) of the Act) or by entrepreneur (as defined in
section 216A(f)(1) of the Act) shall result in the alien's obtaining the status of lawful
permanent resident on a conditional basis in accordance with the provisions of section
216 or 216A of the Act, whichever is applicable. However, the Petition to Remove the
Conditions on Residence required by section 216(c) of the Act, or the Petition by
Entrepreneur to Remove Conditions required by section 216A(c) of the Act shall be
made to the director in accordance with 8 C.F.R. part 1216.
(2) In conjunction with any application for creation of status of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence made to an immigration judge, if the alien is
inadmissible under any provision of section 212(a) of the Act, and believes that s/he
meets the eligibility requirements for a waiver of the ground of inadmissibility, s/he may
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apply to the immigration judge for such waiver. The immigration judge shall inform the
alien of his or her apparent eligibility to apply for any of the benefits enumerated in this
chapter and shall afford the alien an opportunity to make application during the
hearing, in accordance with the provisions of § 1240.8(d). In a relevant case, the
immigration judge may adjudicate the sufficiency of an Affidavit of Support Under
Section 213A (Form I–864), executed on behalf of an applicant for admission or for
adjustment of status, in accordance with the provisions of section 213A of the Act and 8
C.F.R. part 213a.
(3) In exercising discretionary power when considering an application for status as a
permanent resident under this chapter, the immigration judge may consider and base
the decision on information not contained in the record and not made available for
inspection by the alien, provided the Commissioner has determined that such
information is relevant and is classified under the applicable Executive Order as
requiring protection from unauthorized disclosure in the interest of national security.
Whenever the immigration judge believes that s/he can do so while safeguarding both
the information and its source, the immigration judge should inform the alien of the
general nature of the information in order that the alien may have an opportunity to
offer opposing evidence. A decision based in whole or in part on such classified
information shall state that the information is material to the decision.
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(a). Arranged by Court Authority
(1). Supreme Court of the United States
MELLOULI V. LYNCH, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a state drug-paraphernalia misdemeanor meets the categorical
definition of controlled substance under the Controlled Substance Act
when the state misdemeanor is silent as to the controlled substance?
HOLDING To be a categorical federal drug offense for immigration purposes, a
state law violation for controlled substances must be an offense for a
controlled substance as defined in the Controlled Substance Act.
Respondent Moones Mellouli, a citizen of Tunisia, entered the U.S. on a
•
student visa in 2004. In 2009, he became a conditional permanent
resident and, in 2011, an LPR. In 2010, he pleaded guilty to a
misdemeanor offense under Kansas law, the possession of drug
paraphernalia to “store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or
otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body.” Kan.
Stat. Ann. §21-5709(b)(2). Under the Kansas law, it was immaterial
whether the substance was scheduled in the Controlled Substance Act,
21 U. S. C. §802. The State did not charge, or seek to prove, that Mellouli
possessed a substance on the §802 schedules. The sole “paraphernalia”
Mellouli was charged with possessing was a sock in which he had placed
four orange tablets. The criminal charge and plea agreement did not
identify the controlled substance involved, although Mellouli had
acknowledged the tablets were Adderall. Mellouli was sentenced to a
suspended term of 359 days and 12 months’ probation, after which DHS
placed him in removal proceedings. The Board affirmed the immigration
judge's decision and he was removed. The Eighth Circuit denied
Mellouli’s petition for review. The Supreme Court then granted
certiorari and applied the categorical approach. The Court held that
since the record did not prove that Mellouli’s conviction was based on
possession of a drug on the §802 schedule, the conviction could not be a
categorical controlled substance conviction.
This case is important because an offense for drug-paraphernalia
•
possession must specify whether the controlled substance is scheduled
in the Controlled Substance Act to meet the criteria for a controlled
substance offense. Please note Mellouli was not found deportable of an
aggravated felony, but rather deportable because Mellouli was found
guilty of a crime involving controlled substance under INA §237(a)(2)(B).
This case is included as an example of the application of the categorical
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approach.

MONCRIEFFE V. HOLDER, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a conviction under a statute that criminalizes conduct
described by the Controlled Substance Act’s (CSA) 21 U.S.C. §841’s
felony provision and its misdemeanor provision, such as a statute that
punishes all marijuana distribution without regard to the amount or
remuneration, is a conviction for an offense punishable as a felony under
the CSA?
HOLDING To be a categorical federal drug offense for immigration purposes, a
state drug offense must necessarily correspond to an offense punishable
as a felony under the Controlled Substance Act.
Respondent Adrian Moncrieffe legally entered the U.S. in 1984. In 2007
•
he was stopped for a traffic violation and was found in possession of 1.3
grams of marijuana. He pleaded guilty under Georgia law to possession
of marijuana with intent to distribute. He was placed in removal
proceedings on the grounds that his conviction was an aggravated felony
because possession of marijuana with intent to distribute is a Controlled
Substance Act offense, 21 U.S.C. §841(a), punishable by up to five years’
imprisonment, §841(b)(1)(D). An IJ ordered his removal, and the Board
affirmed. The Fifth Circuit denied Moncrieffe’s petition to review his
argument that his conviction met CSA’s §841(b)(4), which makes
marijuana distribution punishable as a misdemeanor if the offense
involves a small amount for no remuneration. The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve whether the state conviction qualified as an
aggravated felony when applying the categorical approach. A state drug
offense must meet two conditions: 1) the offense must “necessarily”
proscribe conduct that is an offense under the CSA, and 2) the CSA must
“necessarily” prescribe felony punishment for that conduct. Unlike the
federal statute, the Georgia statute is ambiguous as to whether the
conduct proscribed involved remuneration or the amount of controlled
substances needed to be a violation. Thus, because the conviction did
not “necessarily” involve facts that correspond to an offense punishable
as a felony under the CSA, the Court held the offense was not a
categorical aggravated felony. The Court reversed and remanded the
case.
This case is important because when there is ambiguity in the state
•
conviction the facts may not “necessarily” correspond to an offense
punishable as a felony under the CSA. A noncitizen’s conviction for a
marijuana distribution offense can fail to qualify as an aggravated felony
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if the there is no remuneration or no more than a small amount of
marijuana.

DESCAMPS V. U.S., 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether the modified categorical approach applies to statutes that contain
a single, indivisible set of elements?
HOLDING The modified categorical approach does not apply to statutes that contain a
single, indivisible set of elements.
Respondent Michael Descamps was convicted of being “a felon in
•
possession of a firearm” and the government sought an enhanced sentence
“based on Descamps’ prior state convictions for burglary, robbery, and
felony harassment.” To be subject to the enhanced sentencing, the statute
requires that the person had been previously convicted of a 3 violent
felonies or a serious drug offense. A “violent felony” is one which “has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another,” or that is a “burglary, arson or extortion, involves
use of explosives or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.” Descamps argued that his past
conviction was not within the meaning of the “violent felony” and therefore
he could not be subject to the enhanced sentencing. The prior California
felony that Descamps had been convicted found guilty a “person who
enters” certain locations “with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or
any felony.” Unlike the federal statute, Descamps argues, the California
statute did not require that a person enter into the location unlawfully;
therefore, the California statute was not a categorical match. Both the
District Court and the Ninth Circuit disagreed with Descamps, and applied
the modified categorical approach to look to “certain documents, including
the record of the plea colloquy, to discover whether Descamps had
“admitted the elements of a generic burglary” when entering his plea.” The
District Court and the Ninth Circuit concluded that Descamps’ crime was
within the meaning of the federal statute of burglary but Descamps
appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that the California statute was
indivisible, and therefore, the lower courts erred in applying the modified
categorical approach. The Court found that the purpose of the modified
categorical approach was to help “effectuate the categorical analysis when
a divisible statute, listing potential offense elements in the alternative,
renders opaque which element played a part in the defendant’s conviction.”
The Court illustrated that a statute may be indivisible, for example, when a
statute of burglary includes both “entry into an automobile as well as a
building.” In such a situation, entering an automobile would not be within
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the generic federal definition; however, the alternative, “entry into… a
building” would be within the generic federal definition. Because, in this
hypothetical situation, the statute would not reveal which alternative the
defendant was convicted, courts could look to the plea agreement, the
colloquy between the judge and the defendant, or indictment so as to
determine which alternative was used. On the other hand, where a statute
is indivisible, courts should apply the categorical approach and may “only
look to the statutory definitions,” of the defendant’s prior offenses, and not
“to the particular facts underlying those convictions.” Here, the statute of
Descamps prior conviction was not divisible, as the statute does not have a
list of alternatives.
This case is important because it shows an example of the application of the
modified categorical approach and sets forth that the “sentencing courts
may not consult additional documents when a defendant was convicted
under an “indivisible” statutes.”

HOLDER V. MARTINEZ GUTIERREZ, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a parent’s lawful permanent resident status can be imputed to a
child for purposes of calculating the 5 years of lawful permanent residence
required to establish eligibility for Cancellation of Removal under
§ 240A(a)(1)?
HOLDING A child of an LPR may not impute the parent’s length of time as an LPR for
purposes of 5 years of LPR and 7-year continuous residence requirement.
This case decided two consolidated cases about imputation, one with regard
•
to the 5-year LPR requirement and the other with regard to 7-year
continuous residence requirement. Only Respondent Martinez Gutierrez
involved imputation with regard to the five years of LPR requirement.
Martinez Gutierrez illegally entered the U.S. with his family in 1989, when he
was five years old. Respondent’s father obtained a LPR status two years
later; however, respondent never adjusted his status until 2003. Two years
later respondent was apprehended and admitted to smuggling
undocumented people across the border. He then applied for Cancellation
of Removal. The IJ determined he could qualify for LPR § 240A(a)(1) and
(a)(2) on his own because of his father’s status, but the Board reversed.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and remanded
the decision to the Board. On appeal from the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme
Court concluded that the Board’s interpretation of §240A(a)(1) is “based on a
permissible construction of the statute,” and reversed the Ninth Circuit’s
decision.
This case is important because the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Board’s
•
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holding that a parent’s LPR status may not be imputed to their children to
give the child the necessary 5 years of LPR status to qualify for
cancellation or 7 years’ continuous residence.

INS v. ENRICO ST. CYR, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether the post-IIRAIRA statutory restrictions on discretionary relief apply
to noncitizens who plead guilty to a deportable crime prior to the enactment
of IIRAIRA?
HOLDING Post-IIRAIRA statutory restrictions on discretionary relief do not apply to
noncitizens who pled guilty to a deportable crime prior to the enactment of
IIRAIRA.
Respondent Enrico St. Cyr was admitted as an LPR in 1986. A decade later in
•
Connecticut, he pled guilty in a Connecticut state court to selling a
controlled substance, $100 worth of cocaine, and thus became
deportable. If the INS had taken custody of St. Cyr at the completion of
his sentence, he would have been eligible for a waiver of deportation
under INA § 212(c). Because the INS did not begin proceedings against St.
Cyr until 1997, St. Cyr would be subject to the new laws passed in 1996,
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), if the court
found that the statutes were retroactive. Therefore, St. Cyr could no longer
file a motion for § 212(c), even though he pled to the crime when the
waiver was still being granted. Represented by the ACLU, St. Cyr sued the
federal government on the grounds that he was lawfully eligible for the
waiver. The case reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 2001. The Court ruled
that Congress never intended for INS to apply its new rule retroactively in
cases involving plea bargains made prior to the enactment of IIRIRA. That
meant that St. Cyr, and other immigrants whose convictions were obtained
through plea agreements, remain eligible for § 212(c) waiver if they would
have been eligible for § 212(c) relief at the time of their plea.
This case is important because it held that the effective date of the changes
•
from INA § 212(c) to Cancellation of Removal for LPRs, April 1, 1997, does
not bar § 212(c) relief for certain pre-IIRIRA convictions.

(2). United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
SINGH V. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 807 F.3d 547 (3d Cir. 2015) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a noncitizen convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT)
can use a re-entry to restart the clock to satisfy the seven-year continuous
residency requirement?
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HOLDING An LPR convicted of a CIMT cannot reenter as a method to restart the clock
to accrue the requisite 7-year continuous residence.
Respondent, Narinder Singh, was a native and citizen of India. He was
•
granted asylum on July 1, 1993, and adjusted to LPR status on June 1, 1994.
On September 14, 2000, he was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Florida of conspiracy to counterfeit passports,
counterfeiting and using visas, and mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.
He was also convicted of unlawful possession of forged, counterfeited,
altered, and falsely made nonimmigrant U.S. visas in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1546. Singh departed the U.S and re-entered on January 20, 2003. In
October 2009, he applied for admission to the U.S. as an LPR. On January 10,
2010, Immigration and Customs Enforcement detained him. On January 19,
2010, he was served with a Notice to Appear charging him as inadmissible
because he had a counterfeiting conviction, a crime involving moral
turpitude. Singh applied for Cancellation of Removal but the IJ denied the
petition and the Board dismissed his appeal based on a finding that he had
not accrued seven years of continuous residence in the U.S. to be eligible for
Cancellation of Removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) [240A(a)]. Singh
then filed a petition for review arguing that his 2003 re-entry restarted the
clock for purposes of the seven-year residence requirement. However, the
Court held that when Singh committed the CIMT, the clock both stopped
and permanently prevented the clock from restarting. The Third Circuit cited
to its Okeke decision that where there is a re-entry, the clock starts “anew.”
However, the Third Circuit court distinguishes Okeke from the present case
because in the former, the basis for removal was that the noncitizen was a
visa-overstay. Thus, the court relied instead on the Nelson case in which the
noncitizen’s removal was based on a crime that terminated his continuous
residence and his continuous presence. Because Singh’s conviction involved
a CIMT, the CIMT terminated his continuous residence and continuous
presence so his re-entry could not restart the clock.
This case is important because it reaffirms that re-entry can re-start the
•
clock after a “clock stopping event” (i.e., receipt of a NTA), except when the
NTA states the “clock stopping event” as the cause for removal. Here, the
Third Circuit distinguished in part and applied in part the holding in Okeke
and thereby Cisneros-Gonzalez, to the context of LPR Cancellation of
Removal.
MATTER OF PAEK, 26 I. & N. 403 (BIA 2014), aff’d, 793 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2015)
[Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a noncitizen who was admitted to the U.S. as a conditional
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permanent resident is considered a lawful permanent resident?
HOLDING A noncitizen spouse lawfully admitted as a permanent resident on a
conditional basis, is considered an LPR.
Respondent Ka A. Paek was admitted into the U.S. in 1991. Respondent
•
was convicted of theft in 2005 and robbery in 2006, and removal
proceedings were initiated in July 2013. Respondent then applied for
adjustment of status pursuant to his marriage to a U.S. citizen and applied
for Section 212(h) waiver. However, the waiver states that “No waiver
shall be granted under this subsection in the case of an alien who has
previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence if… since the date of his admission the
alien has been convicted of an aggravated felony.” Therefore, if the
Respondent was considered a “lawful” permanent resident at the time of
his convictions, he would not be eligible for the waiver. The Board found
that “notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, an alien spouse….
shall be considered, at the time of obtaining the status of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence to have obtained such status on a
conditional basis to the provisions of this section.”
While this case deals with § 212(h) waivers, this case further indicates that
•
a conditional permanent resident will be considered to have “lawfully”
entered.
GUZMAN V. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 770 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 2014) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether the stop-time rule can be applied retroactively to terminate the
accrual of continuous residence for LPR Cancellation of Removal?
HOLDING The stop-time rule can be applied retroactively to terminate accrual of
time required to satisfy the requisite 7-year continuous physical presence.
Respondent, Cristian Guzman is a 38-year-old citizen of the Dominican
•
Republic. He was admitted to the U.S. as an LPR on October 8, 1994 and
had continually resided in the U.S. since that time. In 1995, Guzman was
arrested in NY and charged with Criminal Possession of a Controlled
Substance. On December 19, 1995, Guzman pled guilty to a lesser
possession charge and was sentenced to 3 years’ probation. In 2005, he
was again arrested and charged with Criminal Possession of a Controlled
Substance and pled guilty. On December 1, 2005 he was sentenced to time
served. On March 6, 2012, DHS served Guzman with an NTA and took him
into custody based on the 2005 conviction pursuant to a controlled
substance abuse (INA §237(a)(2)(B)(i)). He conceded removability, but
applied for LPR Cancellation of Removal. The Government argued that
Guzman was ineligible for the relief because the stop-time rule terminated
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his continuous residence when he committed the 1995 drug offense.
Guzman argued that he could have accrued 7 years of continuous
residence. Specifically, Guzman argued that (1) the application of the stoptime rule was impermissibly retroactive because the rule became effective
on April 1, 1997 through IIRIRA, after he committed his 1995 drug offense;
(2) he should be able to apply for the 212(c) deportation waiver, which
was available prior to IIRIRA, and he should be able to delay his
deportation, which was a strategy available prior to IIRIRA to allow him to
accrue the 7 years of continuous presence for the 212(c) waiver; and, (3)
the retroactive application of the stop-time rule was arbitrary and
capricious because only LPRs who committed crimes within 7 years of
admission were punished by being subject to the rule. Therefore, Guzman
moved to terminate his deportation to apply for naturalization. The IJ held
the stop-time rule was not arbitrary; therefore, Guzman was ineligible for
Cancellation of Removal and for 212(c) because he had only accrued 1
year of continuous residence by the time he committed the 1995 crime.
Further, Guzman had not made affirmative communication with DHS
regarding his prima facie eligibility for naturalization, which is required to
terminate the deportation so that the Petitioner can seek naturalization
(In re Acosta Hidalgo). The Board affirmed the IJ’s holding and found that
Guzman could not apply simultaneously for 212(c) relief and LPR
Cancellation of Removal because 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c)(6) explicitly precludes
applying for both. Additionally, even if he could obtain a 212(c) waiver
notwithstanding his 1995 conviction, the conviction would still have ended
his continuous residence for purposes of Cancellation of Removal because
the 212(c) waiver does not serve to pardon, expunge, or eliminate all
negative immigration consequences stemming from a noncitizen’s criminal
conviction. The 3rd Circuit Court affirmed the Board’s decision that
Guzman was ineligible to apply for the 212(c). The Court cited St. Cyr,
wherein the noncitizen has accrued the required 7 years of continuous
residence before IIRIRA became effective and removal proceedings
commenced after IIRIRA became effective, thus, retroactive application of
IIRIRA was held a “new disability” because the LPR already had a vested
right to use 212(c) when he plead guilty. The 3rd Circuit Court also cited to
Sinotes-Cruz, where the noncitizen committed a crime pre-IIRIRA that was
later reclassified by IIRIRA as a deportable crime. Retroactive application
was impermissible in that case because the LPR relied on the pre-IIRIRA
law when he pled guilty. In the present case, the 3rd Circuit held that
Guzman has no vested right in 212(c) because he did not have the
requisite 7 years of continuous residence at the time he committed the
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1995 crime, and the 1995 crime made him deportable. Thus, the stop-time
rule was triggered and made him ineligible for LPR Cancellation of
Removal.
This case is important because the 3rd Circuit reinforced that an LPR may
use 212(c) as relief only when the vested right to qualify under 212(c)
existed at the time in which the crime was committed and that the stoptime rule does apply retroactively to terminate the accrual of continuous
presence for purposes of LPR Cancellation of Removal65. Additionally, the
3rd Circuit did not rule on whether the Board’s interpretation is correct
when the Board held that an LPR cannot apply concurrently for 212(c)
relief and LPR Cancellation of Removal.

VARGAS V. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 543 Fed. Appx. 162 (3d Cir. 2013)66 [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to review a petitioner’s
claim that the Board gave insufficient consideration to discretionary factors?
HOLDING The Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to review a petitioner’s claim, unless
the Board engaged in “impermissible fact finding.”
Respondent Emmanuel De La Cruz Vargas was found to be statutorily
•
eligible for Cancellation of Removal; however, he was denied application on
account of discretionary factors. Respondent argued that the IJ erred
because the Judge did not meaningfully consider all discretionary factors.
The government argues that the Courts of Appeal generally lack jurisdiction
to review discretionary matters. The Third Circuit agreed with the
government finding that the court lacked authority to review claims based
on the IJ’s discretion; however, the Third Circuit found that the court can
review for “impermissible fact finding.”
This case is important because it holds that the Third Circuit will not look to
•
whether the Board or IJ insufficiently weighed the equities, but will look at
only those scenarios, which the Board engaged in “impermissible fact
finding.”

65

See, Sinotes-Cruz v Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the stop-time rule may not
be applied retroactively to prevent noncitizens from fulfilling the seven-year continuous residence
requirement when the noncitizen pleads guilty under the expectation that his plea will not affect his
immigration status based on the law in effect at the time the noncitizen pleads guilty).
66
See e.g., Padmore v. Holder, 609 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding the BIA “improperly found facts
which it held to be “significant” and “important” to its decision denying him relief”).
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LEE V. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 431 Fed. Appx. 184 (3d Cir. 2011) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether the IJ abused his discretion in denying Cancellation of Removal for
a respondent who was statutorily eligible for relief?
HOLDING The IJ did not abuse his discretion.
Respondent Mun Seok Lee conceded removability on account of his
•
conviction of possession of a handgun without a permit and applied for
Cancellation of Removal. Although Respondent was statutorily eligible, the IJ
denied Cancellation of Removal on a discretionary basis. The IJ stated:
“[Respondent] has not demonstrated that he is worthy of the Court’s
favorable exercise of discretion based on [his] pattern of engaging in
unlawful conduct relating to his alcohol intoxication as reported in
conviction and/or arrest records occurring from 1993 to 2008.” The Board
affirmed, finding that Respondent had not displayed that his “positive
equities do not outweigh the adverse factors in this case.” The Board stated
that Respondent’s positive equities included his lengthy stay in the U.S., the
fact that he owns “several successful businesses that employ about 40
people, his history of paying taxes, and his active participation in his church
and community.” The adverse factors included his criminal history, the
“recency, the quantity of the [] alcohol-related arrests and convictions[,] and
the serious nature of them poses a public risk,” the fact that his
rehabilitation is not supported by the record, the fact that he only attended
Alcoholics Anonymous that were mandated because of his criminal
convictions, and the fact that “he was not forthcoming in his testimony
about his use of alcohol in connection with his arrests, and that, by his own
admission, he continued to drink alcohol.” The Third Circuit concluded that
the Board correctly “weigh[ed] the favorable and adverse factors.”
This case is important because the case provides an example of how the
•
positive and adverse factors will be applied.
GALLIMORE V. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 619 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2010) [Precedent]:
ISSUE 1
Whether a noncitizen who had mistakenly responded falsely on an
application for adjustment of status is considered to have been “lawfully
admitted for permanent residence?”
ISSUE 2
Whether a noncitizen is considered to have been “lawfully” admitted for
permanent residence when admitted on a conditional basis or when the
conditions were removed?
HOLDING A noncitizen who had mistakenly responded falsely on an application for
1 adjustment of status is not considered to have been lawfully admitted for
permanent residence.
HOLDING A noncitizen is considered to have been admitted as a lawful permanent
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2

•

resident when s/he is admitted on a conditional basis.
The Respondent, Earl Gallimore, entered the U.S. on August 7, 1993
pursuant to a nonimmigrant visa. On September 25, 1993, police found five
pounds of marijuana in Respondent’s car on a car stop. On January 12, 1994,
Respondent married a US citizen and applied for adjustment of status. On
the application for adjustment of status, Respondent answered no to the
following question: “Have you ever, in or outside the U.S. been arrested,
cited, charged, indicted, fined, or imprisoned for breaking or violating any
law or ordinance…?” On September 13, 1994, Respondent was arrested for
the pending indictment for possession of marijuana and eventually pled
guilty to the charge. On April 1, 1996, Respondent applied to have the
conditions on his status removed. When Respondent applied for the
removal of the conditions, his wife answered on a supporting document that
Respondent had never been convicted of violating any law. On December
17, 2001, Gallimore applied for naturalization and was denied. Due to
Respondent’s previous failure to disclose the indictment, he was found to
have poor moral character. On April 3, 2006 he was served a Notice to
Appear. Respondent explained to the IJ that he had not understood that he
had been arrested during the car stop. The IJ found that Respondent had
“willfully failed to disclose” his arrest on his application for adjustment, and
that he had not been eligible for Cancellation of Removal because he had
never been “lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” The Board agreed
with the IJ’s conclusion, and the Third Circuit affirmed. The Third Circuit
concluded that his 1995 conviction rendered the Respondent inadmissible.
As such, the Respondent was inadmissible at the time adjustment, and he
had not been “lawfully” admitted for permanent residence. However, the
Third Circuit found that this was not the end of the inquiry as the date that
Respondent could be considered to have obtained “lawful” permanent
residence is January 12, 1994, the date in which Respondent had applied for
conditional permanent residence. The Third Circuit found that the Board did
not speak to this issue. While finding that the word “permanent” may
connote a meaning that did not encompass noncitizens given a conditional
status, the Third Circuit found this interpretation to be inconsistent with
Section 1186(a), which concerns “conditional permanent residents’ eligibility
for citizenship.” The statutes states: “For purposes of [naturalization] in the
case of an alien who is in the United States as an LPR on a conditional basis
under this section, the alien shall be considered to have been admitted as an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence and to be in the United
States as an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent
residence.” Further, Section 1186(a) is further corroborated by 8 C.F.R. §
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216.1, which states that conditional residents are to be considered LPRs, as
well. Therefore, the Third Circuit indicates that the court is not aware of any
reason to conclude that a conditional permanent resident is not a “lawful”
permanent resident. However, the Third Circuit leaves this decision to the
Board to make an affirmative holding that a conditional permanent resident
is considered a “lawful” permanent resident.
This case is important for three reasons. The case affirms the Board’s
holding that a noncitizen who fraudulently or mistakenly completed an
application for lawful permanent residence will not be considered to have
“lawfully” entered. The noncitizen will not be considered to have “lawfully”
entered even if it is the agency that had erroneously conferred lawful
permanent resident status. Further, this case indicates that a noncitizen who
is a conditional permanent resident, is an LPR.

JURADO-DELGADO v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 498 Fed. App. 101 (3d Cir. 2009)
[Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether INA § 240A(a) can be applied retroactively to crimes committed
by an LPR in 1991, before INA §240 was enacted?
HOLDING A noncitizen who committed crimes for which s/he was deportable under
pre-Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act may be
deportable under post-IIRIRA proceedings; the court left open the question
as to whether Lawful Permanent Resident Cancellation of Removal can be
applied retroactively to crimes committed before IIRIRA was enacted.
Respondent, Jimmy Jurado-Delgado, a native and citizen of Ecuador, was
•
admitted to the U.S. as an LPR in 1985. Jurado-Delgado conceded before an
IJ that he was removable either under INA §237(a)(2)(A)(ii) for having been
convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude in 1997, or under INA
§ 237(a)(3)(D), for having falsely represented himself to be a U.S. citizen,
but he requested Cancellation of Removal under INA §240A(a). The court
held that Jurado-Delgado's 1991 crimes stopped his accrual of time toward
a period of seven years of continuous residence because they were crimes
involving moral turpitude, which rendered him inadmissible under §
212(a)(2)(A)(i). Jurado-Delgado petitioned for review of a final order of the
Board. He argued, among other things, that the Board's determination that
he was ineligible for Cancellation of Removal is the result of an
impermissible, retroactive application of that statute. In his view, the Board,
when determining whether he was statutorily eligible for Cancellation Of
removal, was not entitled to take into account crimes that he committed
prior to Congress's creation of that remedy. Because the Board applied the
law in effect at the time Jurado-Delgado committed the deportable offense,
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no question of retroactivity was implicated. Here, the Third Circuit Court
denied Jurado-Delgado's petition for review.
This case is important because it suggests that INA § 240A(a) can be
applied retroactively to crimes committed by an LPR before INA § 240A was
enacted, such that the crimes can stop accrual of time toward a period of
seven years of continuous residence.

AUGUSTIN v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 520 F.3d 264 (3d Cir. 2008) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a noncitizen who entered the U.S. as a minor can impute his
parent's years of continuous residence in order to meet the seven-year
requirement for Cancellation of Removal?
HOLDING A parent’s LPR residence may not be imputed to his or her child for purpose
of the 7-year continuous residence requirement.
Respondent, Luckson Augustin, was admitted to the U.S. as an LPR at the age
•
of 13 to join his parents who had previously come to the U.S..
Approximately five years after coming to the U.S., the noncitizen
committed a crime involving moral turpitude. He was later charged with
being removable based in part on that crime. The noncitizen admitted the
allegations but argued that he was eligible for Cancellation of Removal
based on his father's seven years of continuous residence in the U.S. prior to
any of the crimes being committed. The Board rejected that argument,
interpreting the statute as requiring that the noncitizen himself actually
dwell in the U.S. for seven years before committing the crime. On review,
the court held that the Board's denial of Cancellation of Removal and its
refusal to impute the father's years of residence was permissible because
it was a straightforward application of the statute's requirements.
This case is important because it affirms, under Chevron deference, the
•
view that a parent's residence may not be imputed to his or her minor
child for purposes of the seven-year residence provision of Cancellation of
Removal. This case affirms the Board’s reasoning in Matter of Ramirez
Vargas, 24 I. & N. Dec. 599 (BIA 2008).
ATKINSON v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 479 F.3d. 222 (3d Cir. 2007) [Precedent]
ISSUE
Whether the post-IIRAIRA statutory restrictions on discretionary relief apply
to noncitizens who were convicted of a deportable crime prior to the
enactment of IIRAIRA?
HOLDING Post-IIRAIRA statutory restrictions on discretionary relief do not apply to
noncitizens who were convicted of a deportable crime prior to the
enactment of IIRAIRA.
Respondent Claudius Atkinson was convicted of state criminal offenses in
•
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1991. He received a notice to appear in 1997, notifying him that he was
removable based upon his convictions. The IJ denied the noncitizen's
request for a waiver of deportation under former § 212(c) (repealed 1996),
finding that he was ineligible for that relief. A month after the Board denied
the noncitizen's appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in St. Cyr.
The noncitizen filed his habeas petition after his reconsideration motion,
based on St. Cyr, was denied. The District Court held that the he was not
entitled to relief because he failed to show that he had relied on § 212(c)
when he was convicted in 1991. In conformity with the REAL ID Act, the
court treated the habeas petition as a petition for review. The court held that
the noncitizen was not precluded from applying for § 212(c) relief. IIRIRA
did not apply retroactively to noncitizens who were convicted of
aggravated felonies prior to IIRIRA's effective date, regardless of whether
they pleaded guilty or were convicted by a jury.
This case is important because the Third Circuit held that § 212(c) is
available to individuals who elected to go to trial and were convicted (as
opposed to entering a plea agreement).

JOSEPH v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 236 Fed. Appx. 787 (3d Cir. 2007) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether an LPR is eligible for Cancellation of Removal when he
commits a controlled substance violation, triggering the statute's "stoptime" provision under § 240A(d)(1)?
HOLDING The stop-time rule only terminates the accrual of time for purposes of
satisfying the requisite 7-year continuous residence; the stop-time rule
does not apply to the 5-years of permanent residency requirement.
Respondent George Russel Joseph entered the U.S. in 1992 as a
•
conditional resident and became an LPR in 1994. A NTA that was dated
June 15, 2005 placed him in removal proceedings. He was charged with
being removable because in August of 1997 he committed a controlled
substance violation and an aggravated felony. He was convicted in January
of 1998. The IJ found him removable for committing the controlled
substance violation, but found that the Government had not met its
burden of showing that any of his convictions were also aggravated
felonies. Nevertheless, the IJ found Joseph ineligible for Cancellation of
removal under INA § 240A(a). Joseph appealed to the Board, but the
Board affirmed that Joseph was ineligible for LPR Cancellation of Removal
because he did not have the required 5 years of permanent residence. The
Board applied the stop-time rule to Joseph’s permanent residence status,
and calculated that his status as a permanent resident began in 1994 and
terminated in 1998 when he was convicted. Joseph then appealed to the
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Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which held that the Board
impermissibly applied the stop-time rule to the requirement of 5 years of
permanent residence, and the stop-time rule only applies to the 7 years of
continuous residence. Joseph had met the permanent residency
requirement. However, the Board still found him ineligible for LPR
Cancellation of Removal because his conviction did trigger the stop-time
rule for purposes of the 7 years of continuous residence requirement. To
calculate Joseph’s continuous residence, the Board counted the time from
when Joseph was admitted in 1992 to the date he committed the crime in
1997 and determined he did not have the 7 years of continuous residence.
Thus, the court denied Joseph's petition for review.
This case is important because it reaffirms that the stop-time rule applies
only to the requirement of 7 years of continuous residence.

OKEKE v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 407 F.3d 585 (3d Cir. 2005) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a noncitizen is entitled to a new period of continuous physical
presence, commencing upon his lawful reentry into the U.S., so as to allow
him to accrue the time required to establish eligibility for Non-LPR
Cancellation of Removal?
HOLDING A noncitizen who lawfully reenters the U.S. after overstaying a visa may start
a new accrual of time for purposes of satisfying the requisite 10-year
continuous physical presence when the noncitizen’s Notice to Appear
exclusively charges the noncitizen with being a visa overstay.
Respondent, Anderson Jude Okeke, a native and citizen of Nigeria,
•
petitioned for review of two orders from the Board. Those orders affirmed
the Immigration Judge's decision that Okeke could not demonstrate the
requisite continuous physical presence in the U.S. in order to qualify for
Non-LPR Cancellation of Removal. Essentially, the Board found that the
'stop-time' provision (INA § 240A(d)(l)), once triggered, precluded the
accrual of a new period of continuous presence, which in this case
commenced with Okeke's lawful reentry into the U.S. The lawful reentry,
which was the critical fact on appeal, occurred after Okeke committed a
controlled substance offense, which, pursuant to INA § 240A(d)(l), clearly
ended any prior period of continuous physical residence. This court
concluded that the clock restarted upon Okeke's reentry. Pursuant to the
express terms of the NTA, it was the last reentry into the U.S. that should
have been considered in calculating continuous physical presence.
This case is important because a noncitizen is entitled to a new period of
•
continuous physical presence under INA § 240A(d)(l), commencing upon his
lawful reentry into the U.S., so as to allow him to accrue the time required to
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establish eligibility for Non-LPR Cancellation of Removal. Here, the Third
Circuit is applying the holding in Cisneros. Though this holding applies to
Non-LPR Cancellation of Removal, the holding could also apply to LPR
Cancellation of Removal as INA § 240A(d)(l) refers to both continuous
physical presence under Non-LPR Cancellation of Removal and continuous
residence under LPR Cancellation of Removal.

DUDNEY v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 129 Fed. Appx. 747 (3d Cir. 2005) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether an LPR's 1998 conviction stopped the clock for purposes of the
continuous residence requirement of INA §240A(a)(2)?
HOLDING The stop-time rule may be triggered by a noncitizen when s/he commits a
crime for which a noncitizen is deportable.
Respondent Barrington Dudney was admitted to the U.S. as an immigrant in
•
August 1992. In October 1998, he was convicted of possession and
possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance (92 packets of
marijuana). On August 3, 1999, he was convicted of possession of a
controlled substance, simple assault and for resisting arrest during an August
20, 1998 incident. Dudney also was convicted on August 31, 1999 of
charges of simple assault, possession of an instrument of crime and
recklessly endangering another person in an incident on February 19, 1999.
In June 1999, the INS issued a NTA charging Dudney with removability
based upon his October 1998 conviction. A removal order was entered
after Dudney failed to appear for his hearing, but the IJ later terminated the
proceedings due to insufficient evidence. In October 2001, the INS issued
another NTA charging Dudney with removability for having committed an
aggravated felony (drug trafficking), two crimes involving moral turpitude
not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, and a violation of
law relating to a controlled substance, other than a single offense
involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana.
These charges were based on the October 1998 and August 31, 1999
convictions. The NTA was then amended, and the August 3, 1999 convictions
for drug possession and simple assault, and another aggravated felony
charge were added. Through counsel, Dudney sought Cancellation of
Removal as a permanent resident pursuant to INA § 240A(a). The IJ found
Dudney removable for a violation of law relating to a controlled substance,
other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of 30
grams or less of marijuana, based on his August 3, 1999 drug conviction.
The Board also agreed with the IJ that Dudney was not eligible for
Cancellation of Removal because he did not meet the requirement that he
have continuous residence here for seven years. The Board explained that
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even if Dudney could not be removed based upon his October 1998
conviction because the proceedings related to this conviction were
terminated, the October 1998 conviction stopped the clock for purposes of
the seven-year residence requirement. Alternatively, Dudney’s continuous
residence stopped as early as August 20, 1998 when the crime was
committed.
This case is important because it affirms that an LPR must satisfy INA §
240A(a)(2), the seven-year continuous residence requirement, in order to be
eligible for LPR Cancellation of Removal, and furthermore that commission
of the deportable crime or conviction for the deportable crime may stop the
accrual of time.

RODRIGUEZ-MUNOZ v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 419 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 2005) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a noncitizen who has been convicted of an aggravated felony can
seek simultaneous INA §212(c) and Cancellation of Removal relief?
HOLDING A crime involving moral turpitude that may be waivable under §212(c) may
nevertheless be an aggravated felony that renders a noncitizen ineligible for
LPR Cancellation of Removal.
Respondent Richard Jose Rodriguez-Munoz was admitted to the U.S. as an
•
LPR in 1976. In 1992, he pled guilty to four drug offenses in New York
state court, including third degree criminal sale of a controlled substance
(crack cocaine). In 1994, the INS charged Rodriguez-Munoz with
deportability as a noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony and as
being convicted of a violation relating to a controlled substance. While the
immigration proceedings were pending, Rodriguez-Munoz pled guilty in
New York to two additional offenses: fifth degree criminal possession of
marijuana and seventh degree criminal possession of a controlled substance.
The government acknowledged that there was no question that RodriguezMunoz was eligible to apply for an INA § 212(c), waiver of deportation
concerning his 1992 conviction. Indeed, § 212(c) relief remained available
for noncitizens whose convictions were obtained through plea
agreements and who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been
eligible for § 212(c) relief at the time of their plea under the law then in
effect. Rodriguez-Munoz apparently did not argue before the Board that his
1992 conviction was not an aggravated felony, nor did he raise such an
argument on appeal. Although a waiver of deportation gave him a chance
to stay in the U.S. despite his misdeed, it did not expunge his conviction.
Thus, even if Rodriguez-Munoz's deportation based on his 1992 conviction
were waived under § 212(c), that conviction would nonetheless remain an
aggravated felony for purposes of precluding his application for
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Cancellation of Removal under INA§ 240A. Thus, he was deportable.
This case is important because a noncitizen who has an aggravated felony
conviction along with other crimes of moral turpitude cannot seek
simultaneous INA § 212(c) and Cancellation of Removal relief, because the
aggravated felony makes him or her ineligible for Cancellation of Removal.

MURALI KRISHNA PONNAPULA v. ASHCROFT, 373 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 2004) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether the post-IIRAIRA statutory restrictions on discretionary relief apply
to noncitizens who were convicted of a deportable crime prior to the
enactment of IIRAIRA, but who turned down a misdemeanor plea deal?
HOLDING A noncitizen who turned down a misdemeanor plea deal, and was later
convicted of an aggravated felony is not subject to the statutory restrictions
of IIRAIRA.
Respondent Murali Krishna Ponnapula was indicted for grand larceny and
•
falsifying business records in violation of New York law after his brother
submitted a loan application with the noncitizen's forged signature and
without the noncitizen's knowledge. In reliance on counsel's advice, the
noncitizen turned down a misdemeanor plea agreement, went to trial
when former INA § 212(c) was still in effect, and was convicted. The court
rejected the Government's contention that St. Cyr precluded the
noncitizen from claiming an impermissible retroactive effect of the
repeal of § 212(c). With respect to the noncitizen, who reasonably could
have relied on the potential availability of § 212(c) relief, the court found
the repeal of § 212(c) had an impermissible retroactive effect. Although
the court concluded that actual reliance was not necessary, the court found
that the noncitizen demonstrated clear and reasonable actual reliance on
the former statutory scheme in making the decision to go to trial.
This case is important because the noncitizen reasonably believed that even
•
if he was convicted of a felony after trial he would still likely be eligible for
hardship relief from deportation pursuant to former § 212(c). In reliance
of this, the noncitizen decided to turn down the misdemeanor offer and
proceeded to trial. The Third Circuit court utilized St. Cyr and allowed the
noncitizen to avail himself of § 212(c) relief.
SCHEIDEMANN v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517 (3d Cir. 1996) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether an LPR who has served at least five years of imprisonment for a
crime defined as an aggravated felony (under the original 1988 definition)
is eligible to apply for a discretionary waiver of deportation under § 212(c).
HOLDING A noncitizen who has been convicted of an aggravated felony with a 5-year
sentence is ineligible for relief under INA 212(c).
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Respondent James Scheidemann was an LPR since 1959. Scheidemann
sought review of an order of the Board, which dismissed his appeal to
overturn a deportation order. Scheidemann faced deportation on account
of a 1987 drug trafficking conviction for which he had served over five
years in prison. Scheidemann did not contest his deportability. Rather, he
argued that he was eligible to apply for a discretionary waiver of
deportation under I N A § 212(c). The court held that Congress intended
§ 212(c) to restrict the Attorney General's power to exercise discretionary
relief, immediately after the amendment to the aggravated felony statute,
with respect to noncitizens who had served at least five years imprisonment
for crimes defined as aggravated felonies under the original 1988 definition,
regardless of the conviction date. Accordingly, Scheidemann's petition for
review was denied.
This case is important because an LPR who has served at least five years
of imprisonment for a crime defined as an aggravated felony (under the
original 1988 definition) will not be eligible to apply for a discretionary
waiver of deportation under the former § 212(c).

MATTER OF HUANG, 19 I. & N. Dec. 749 (BIA 1988) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Who has the burden of establishing abandonment of lawful permanent
resident status?
HOLDING The DHS has the burden of establishing abandonment of lawful permanent
residence status.
The noncitizen family members were natives and citizens of Taiwan and
•
included an adult female and her two minor children. They were initially
admitted to the US as LPRs on June 5, 1982. The noncitizen's husband was
admitted as an LPR one week earlier. The noncitizen's husband, after
receiving his Alien Registration Receipt Card, returned to Japan to continue
studying and working at a university's medical school as a medical doctor.
Soon after, the noncitizen wife and the children returned to Japan. The
noncitizen and her two children last sought to reenter the U.S. on May
10, 1986, at which time they were placed in exclusion proceedings and
ordered removed. She appealed. The INS contended on appeal that the
noncitizens had abandoned their LPR statuses. The Board noted that the
INS has the burden of proving that a noncitizen is ineligible for admission
as a returning permanent resident. In determining whether the DHS has
met its burden of proof, the IJ should look to whether the LPR has an
unrelinquished residence after a temporary visit abroad. A temporary visit
abroad may be an extended period of absence, “if the end of the period of
absence can be fixed by some early event.” The noncitizen’s professed
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intent to return is not sufficient to support a finding that the visit was
“temporary.” The Board found that the INS had met the burden and the
Board ordered the noncitizen and her children removed from the U.S.
This case is important because the Board held that the DHS bears the
ultimate burden of showing abandonment of LPR status.

(3). Board of Immigration Appeals
MATTER OF NELSON, 25 I. & N. Dec. 410 (BIA 2011) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a noncitizen is entitled to a new period of continuous residence,
commencing upon his reentry into the U.S., so as to allow him to accrue the
time required to establish eligibility for LPR Cancellation of Removal?
HOLDING “Once an alien has been convicted of an offense that stops the accrual of the
7-year period of continuous residence required for cancellation of
removal…section 240A(d)(1) of the Act does not permit such residence to
restart simply because the alien has departed from, and returned to the
United States.”
Respondent, Michael Alexander Nelson, a native and citizen of Jamaica, was
•
admitted as a LPR on November 3, 1994. On February 20, 1999, Respondent
was convicted of a New York offense for possession of marijuana. In August
2000, Respondent visited Canada and thereafter returned to the U.S.. On
November 26, 2008, Nelson was served with an NTA because of his criminal
offense of possession of marijuana. The IJ found that Nelson was removable
based on his 1999 convictions and that Nelson failed to show eligibility for
Cancellation of Removal because he had not accrued continuous residence
for 7 years. Specifically, the IJ found that Nelson could not re-start the clock
when he re-entered after his trip to Canada. Thus, according to the IJ, the
clock stopped for purposes of accruing continuous residence time on
February 20, 1999, at which point Nelson had not resided in the U.S. for 7years. On appeal, Nelson argued that he was eligible for Cancellation of
Removal because his reentry into the U.S. after his trip to Canada, restarted
the clock. Thus, the date that the stopped the time for accrual of residence
was November 2008, rather than February 1999. The Board affirmed the IJ’s
decision. In so holding, the Board found that the facts in Okeke v. Attorney
General differ. In Okeke, the respondent had been removed for possession
of marijuana, and thereafter returned to the U.S. lawfully on a student visa.
The respondent in Okeke, was then placed into removal proceedings for
failing to maintain a student status. Here, the Board found that the fact that
the new removal proceedings were related to the clock stopping event
distinguished the Nelson’s case from that of Okeke. Unlike the respondent in
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Okeke, here Nelson’s removal proceedings are on account of his conviction.
Therefore, the Board concluded that Okeke, was not “binding” in this case.
However, the Board did suggest that it may have come to a different result
should Nelson have received a waiver prior to his reentry into the U.S..
This case is important because the holding provides that lawful reentry into
the U.S. after a clock-stopping event will not re-start the clock for purposes
of 7-years continuous residence when the clock-stopping event was the
basis for removal. Further, this distinguishes the holding in Okeke v.
Attorney General, providing a further wrinkle in that the clock cannot restart
after lawful re-entry, if the basis for removal is the prior clock stopping
event.

MATTER OF CAMARILLO, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644 (BIA 2011) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether an NTA that does not include the date and time of the initial
hearing can stop the clock for purposes of Cancellation of Removal?
HOLDING In-person service of an NTA that does not indicate a date or time of
hearing is nevertheless sufficient to terminate the continuous residence of
an LPR.
Respondent, Judith Camarillo, was a native and citizen of Guatemala who
•
became a LPR in 2000. On August 29, 2005, she was served in person with
a Notice to Appear, which included the phrase “To be set” in the space
provided for the date and time of the hearing. The NTA was later filed with
the Harlingen Immigration Court, which issued a notice of hearing on
November 9, 2007. She was charged with alien smuggling and the IJ found
her removable. But the IJ granted her petition for Cancellation of Removal
on the grounds that Camarillo had accrued the required seven-years of
continuous residence by the time the Court issued the notice that
contained the hearing date. The IJ interpreted the terms in 239(a)(1) of 8
U.S.C. §1229(a)(1)(G), “[t]he time and place at which the proceedings will
be held,” as requirements for an NTA so that the stop-time rule takes
effect. DHS appealed, arguing that section § 1229(a)(1) specifies that an
NTA must be served, and the terms in §1229(a)(1)(G) help identify what an
NTA is. The Board agreed with the DHS that the key phrase was “served a
notice to appear” and the Congress intended the phrase “under section
239(a)” after “notice to appear” to specify the document the DHS must
serve to trigger the “stop-time” rule. Additionally, the court highlighted
that removal proceedings commence when the NTA is filed with the
Immigration Court. 8 C.F.R. § 1239.1(a) (2011). Since the commencement
of proceedings is a separate issue from the service of the NTA, what
mattered was the NTA that Camarillo was served in person. Thus,
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Camarillo was not eligible for Cancellation of Removal because she had
not accrued seven-years at the time she was served in 2005. The court
sustained the appeal by DHS.
This case is important because the holding found that the NTA will suffice
to end continuous residence, regardless if there is a date or time for the
hearing on the NTA at the time the noncitizen is served. The court also
distinguished that the date that mattered for purposes of terminating
continuous residence is the date that the NTA was served and not the date
on which removal proceedings commence nor the date that the NTA is
filed. Peculiarly, the Board never makes any conclusions regarding
Camarillo’s criminal conviction for smuggling aliens into the U.S., which
could have been a reason to stop time for purposes of the 7 years of
continuous residence.

MATTER OF RAMIREZ-VARGAS, 24 I. & N. Dec. 599 (BIA 2008) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a parent's lawful permanent resident status can be imputed to a
child for purposes of calculating the 5 years of lawful permanent
residence required to establish for Cancellation of Removal under
§ 240A(a)(1)?
HOLDING A parent’s LPR residence may not be imputed to his or her child for purpose
of the 7-year continuous residence requirement.
Respondent, Ramirez-Vargas, a native and citizen of Mexico and an LPR of
•
the U.S., was found removable as a noncitizen convicted of a controlled
substance violation but granted his application for Cancellation of
Removal. The DHS appealed, arguing that the IJ erred in finding the
respondent statutorily eligible for that relief because the lawful permanent
residence of the noncitizen's father could not be imputed to the noncitizen.
The Board sustained the appeal by DHS. The Board held that a parent's
period of residence in the U.S. cannot be imputed to a child for purposes of
calculating the 7 years of continuous residence required to establish
eligibility for Cancellation of Removal under INA § 240A(a)(2).
This case is important because it rejected the 9th Circuit Court’s holding that
•
imputation of a parent’s LPR status to a child was permissible. Matter Of
Escobar, 24 I. & N. Dec. 231 (BIA 2007). Matter of Escobar was vacated in
2009 and currently all Circuit Courts hold that imputation of a parent’s
continuance residence is impermissible.
MATTER OF JURADO, 24 I. & N. Dec. 29 (BIA 2006) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a noncitizen needs to be charged with a crime and found
inadmissible or removable in order for the criminal conduct in question to
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terminate continuous residence?
HOLDING A noncitizen who committed crimes for which s/he was deportable under
pre-IIRIRA may be deportable under post-IIRIRA proceedings; the Board
left open the question as to whether LPR Cancellation of Removal can be
applied retroactively to crimes committed before IIRIRA was enacted.
Respondent Jimmy Roberto Jurado, was admitted to the U.S. as an LPR on
•
September 15, 1985. He was convicted in 1991 of retail theft in violation
of Pennsylvania law. In 1992 he was also convicted of unsworn
falsification to authorities. In addition, the noncitizen was convicted in
1997 of two crimes involving moral turpitude that were the basis of the
charge of removability in his NTA. In proceedings before the IJ, the
noncitizen conceded that he was removable, both on the initial charge
and on a lodged charge that he falsely represented himself to be a U.S.
citizen. He applied for Cancellation of Removal under section 240A(a) of
the Act, which the IJ granted. On appeal, the DHS contended that the
noncitizen failed to demonstrate the requisite period of continuous
residence to establish his eligibility for Cancellation of Removal. The
Board agreed and found that the IJ erred in concluding that the noncitizen
was eligible for Cancellation of Removal.
This case is important because the Board concluded that the time period
•
of a crime is measured from the commission of the crime, not the
conviction.
MATTER OF CISNEROS-GONZALEZ, 23 I. & N. Dec. 668 (BIA 2004) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a noncitizen who departed the U.S. after being served with a valid
charging document can seek relief in a subsequent removal proceeding,
based on a new period of continuous physical presence measured from the
date of his return?
HOLDING For purposes of applying for Cancellation of Removal, a noncitizen’s period
of continuous physical presence ends when s/he is served with the charging
document on which the current removal proceeding is based (8 U.S.C. §
1229b(d)(1)); the stop-time rule does not refer to charging documents
served in prior proceedings.
Respondent Ignacio Cisneros-Gonzalez’s first removal proceeding was in
•
December 28, 1990. He was served with an Order to Show Cause, Notice of
Hearing, and Warrant for Arrest of Alien (Form I-221S), charging him with
deportability for having entered without inspection (former 8 U.S.C.
§1251(a)(2)). On January 10, 1991 he was deported. On January 11, 1991 he
returned to the U.S. without being admitted or paroled. On January 5, 2001,
he applied for Non-LPR Cancellation of Removal, which requires continuous
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physical presence for 10 years. The IJ cited to Matter of Mendoza-Sandino as
authority to apply the stop-time rule to Cisneros-Gonzalez’s first deportation
proceeding from 1990, which would have made him ineligible for the relief.
However, the Board’s legislative history analysis determined that Congress
did not intend for the stop-time rule under INA §240A(d)(1) to ban
noncitizens from seeking Cancellation of Removal relief. The “stop-time”
rule was not intended to extend to charging documents issued in earlier
proceedings. Thus, the Board sustained Cisneros-Gonzalez’s appeal and
remanded the case.
This case is important because the Board distinguishes this case from Matter
of Mendoza-Sandino, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1236 (BIA 2000). There, the noncitizen
applied for suspension of deportation based on a single order to show
cause. Here, however, multiple charging documents existed. When the DHS
does not or cannot reinstate a prior order of removal against a previously
deported noncitizen and instead issues a new order of removal, the
noncitizen may be eligible to apply for Cancellation of Removal based on the
accrual of the new continuous presence (§ 240A(b)) or new continuous
residence (§ 240A(a)). Importantly, note that Cisneros-Gonzalez was applied
to § 240A(b) [Non-LPR Cancellation of Removal], rather than § 240A(a) [LPR
Cancellation of Removal]. Under 240A(d)(1), however, the stop-time rule
applies to both LPR Cancellation of Removal’s continuous residence
requirement (§ 240A(a)(2)) and Non-LPR Cancellation of Removal’s
continuous physical presence requirement (§ 240A(b)(2)).

MATTER OF DEANDA-ROMO, 23 I. & N. Dec. 597 (BIA 2003) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a noncitizen who has committed two crimes involving moral
turpitude is precluded from establishing the requisite 7 years of
continuous residence for cancellation of removal under INA §240A(a)(2),
where his first crime was a petty offense that was committed within the
7-year period and the second crime was committed more than 7 years after
his admission to the U.S.?
HOLDING The stop-time rule is triggered by crimes for which a noncitizen is
inadmissible; however, the stop-time rule is not triggered by petty offenses.
Respondent Jose Abraham Deanda-Romo, was admitted to the U.S. as an
•
LPR on January 8, 1992. On September 21, 1999, he was convicted in Texas
of two misdemeanor offenses of assault with bodily injury to his spouse,
one occurring on October 30, 1998, and the other on June 20, 1999. He
was sentenced to imprisonment for both offenses. He conceded
removability and applied for LPR Cancellation of Removal. The IJ terminated
the application after finding that the noncitizen was ineligible for relief
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under the "stop-time" rule. The Board held that the noncitizen was not
precluded by the stop-time rule from establishing the requisite seven
years of continuous residence because his first crime qualified as a petty
offense, under INA 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), and therefore did not render him
inadmissible. Thus, according to the Board, the noncitizen had accrued the
requisite seven years of continuous residence before the second offense was
committed.
This case is important because the court held that the stop-time rule
does not apply until the second conviction where the first conviction was a
petty offense.

IN RE BLANCAS-LARA, 23 I. & N. Dec. 458 (BIA 2002) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether the period of a noncitizen's residence in the U.S. after admission as
a nonimmigrant may be considered in calculating the 7 years of
continuous residence required to establish eligibility for cancellation of
removal.
HOLDING A noncitizen’s admission as a nonimmigrant may be used to calculate the
start of 7-year continuous residence requirement.
Respondent Eduardo Blancas-Lara was first admitted to the U.S. in August
•
1986 with a border-crossing card. He adjusted his status to that of an LPR on
August 5, 1991. The noncitizen's period of continuous residence under
section 240A(a)(2) of the Act ended on April 1, 1998, when he was served
with a Notice to Appear. At that point, the noncitizen had resided in the
U.S. as an LPR for about 6 years and 8 months. The IJ concluded that the
noncitizen could count time he spent in the U.S. as a child before his
admission as an LPR toward the accrual of 7 years of continuous residence
under section 240A(a)(2), because the lawful residence of his father, a
citizen and resident of the U.S., could be imputed to him. On appeal the
Board found that the noncitizen established that, at the time of his
application for relief, he had resided in the U.S. continuously for 7 years
after having been admitted as a nonimmigrant. Thus, an applicant who is
admitted with a nonimmigrant visa, and accrues the 7 years of
continuous residence to meet the second element of the statute, does
not need an imputation argument. Accordingly, the Board concurred with
the IJ's decision and dismissed the appeal.
This case is important because the Board stated that the period of a
•
noncitizen's residence in the U.S. after admission as a nonimmigrant may be
considered in calculating the seven years of continuous residence required
to establish eligibility for cancellation of removal.
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MATTER OF SOTELO-SOTELO, 23 I. & N. Dec. 201 (BIA 2001) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a noncitizen is required to satisfy a threshold test of showing
"unusual or outstanding equities" for the consideration of whether a
favorable exercise of discretion is warranted?
HOLDING The noncitizen does not have to show “unusual or outstanding equities.”
Rather, favorable and adverse factors should be weighed to determine
whether the person warrants discretionary relief.
Respondent Javier Sotelo-Sotelo adjusted his status to that of an LPR on
•
December 1, 1990. On July 24, 2000, he was convicted of the following
offenses: possession and passing fraudulent resident alien cards, failure
to provide migrant workers with terms and conditions of employment,
and illegal entry or aiding and abetting illegal entry. The noncitizen was
sentenced to 8 months of imprisonment for each of the first two offenses,
and to 6 months of imprisonment for the third offense. In proceedings
before the IJ, the noncitizen conceded removability as charged and applied
for Cancellation of Removal under INA §240A(a). The IJ denied the
noncitizen's application for relief, and the noncitizen appealed. The
Board found that the favorable factors presented in support of the
noncitizen's application for cancellation of removal did not outweigh the
adverse factors. In doing so, the Board rejected the use of an
'outstanding and unusual equities' requirement as a threshold for relief and
instead found that the IJ should weigh the favorable and adverse factors to
determine whether the 'totality of the evidence' on balance indicates that a
favorable discretion is warranted.
This case is important because the Board rejected the use of an
•
'outstanding and unusual equities' requirement as a threshold for relief
and instead found that the IJ should weigh the favorable and adverse
factors to determine whether the 'totality of the evidence' on balance
indicates that a favorable discretion is warranted.
MATTER OF CAMPOS-TORRES, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1289 (BIA 2000) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether the noncitizen's commission of a firearms offense, which is not
referred to in INA § 212(a)(2), precluded him from satisfying the
requirement in INA § 240A(a)(2) that he have resided in the U.S.
continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status?
HOLDING A noncitizen triggers the stop-time rule when s/he violates a provision that is
actually found in 212(a)(2).
Respondent Ignacio Campos-Torres, was admitted to the U.S. as a
•
temporary resident on May 4, 1988, and adjusted his status to that of a
LPR on December 13, 1990. On September 23, 1993 the noncitizen was
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convicted of a single offense of unlawful use of a weapon. The noncitizen
was sentenced to 18 months of probation. On June 25, 1997, the INS
issued and served a NTA, commencing removal proceedings and charging
the noncitizen with removability. The issue that was raised before the IJ
and argued in the initial briefs submitted on appeal concerned the
appropriate date to apply in determining when accrual of continuous
residence ends. The noncitizen argued that under the plain language of the
statute, firearms offenses do not cut off continuous residence because
they are not "referred to" in § 212(a)(2) of the Act. The government
argued that the plain language of INA § 240A(d)(l) does not clearly
support either its position or that of the noncitizen because the statute is
ambiguous. The Board found that because the noncitizen's firearms
offense, which rendered him deportable under INA § 237(a)(2)(C), is not
referred to in INA § 212(a)(2), it did not stop time under INA § 240A(d)(l).
This case is important because the Board held that “an offense must be
one ‘referred to in section 212(a)(2)” of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (1994
& Supp. II 1996), to terminate the period of continuous residence or
continuous physical presence required for cancellation of removal.’”

MATTER OF PEREZ, 22 I. & N. Dec. 689 (BIA 1999) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether the "stop-time" rule operates to terminate the period of
continuous residence required for Cancellation of Removal as of the date
the noncitizen commits the offense that renders him/her deportable?
HOLDING The stop-time rule is triggered by a noncitizen who violates a provision in
INA § 212(a)(2), § 237(a)(2) or 237(a)(4).
Respondent Cristobal Perez, admitted each of the factual allegations in the
•
Notice to Appear. Specifically, he a d m i t t e d t h a t was first admitted as a
temporary resident on September 21, 1989, and that his status was
subsequently adjusted to that of an LPR on December 7, 1990. The
noncitizen further admitted that he was convicted on July 11, 1997, in
Texas, of possession of cocaine, and that this offense was committed on or
about August 4, 1992. The noncitizen conceded that he was removable as
charged under section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act on the basis of this
conviction and the IJ ordered him removed. The noncitizen appealed to
the Board on the basis of the retroactive effect of § 240A, arguing that the
section's rules limiting eligibility for relief from removal should not apply to
him. The Board, after finding that applying Section 240A would not have an
impermissible "retroactive effect," concluded that the respondent's period of
continuous residence is deemed to have ended on the date he committed
his controlled substance violation. The commission of that offense was
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prior to his attainment of the required 7 years of continuous residence.
Therefore, he was statutorily ineligible for section 240A(a) Cancellation of
Removal. Accordingly, the Board found that the IJ's pretermission of his
application for Cancellation of Removal was proper.
This case is important because the Board concluded that "admission in any
status" includes admission as a temporary resident. Also, "Under INA
240A(d)(l)(B), continuous residence is deemed to end upon the
commission of an offense under INA § 212(a)(2), or INA § 237(a)(2) or §
237(a)(4). The time period is measured from the commission of the crime,
not the conviction."

MATTER OF EDWARDS, 20 I. & N. Dec. 191 (BIA 1990) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether S e c t i o n 2 1 2 ( c ) provides an indiscriminate waiver for
individuals who demonstrate statutory eligibility?
HOLDING Section 212(c) does not provide an indiscriminate waiver for individuals
who demonstrate statutory eligibility.
•
Respondent Edwards, who was admitted as an LPR in 1968. He married a
US citizen with whom he had four US citizen children. He incurred
criminal convictions while in the US that entailed him serving some 2 and
1/2 years of imprisonment. The noncitizen implored that he be allowed to
remain in the US because of his family. He insisted that he would work
hard to change his ways. He stated that his wife and children, as well as his
mother and siblings, resided here and that he knew no one in Barbados.
The IJ determined that the noncitizen was statutorily eligible for a section
212(c) waiver. However, he denied that relief in the exercise of discretion.
On appeal, Edwards argued that the IJ erred by failing to consider all of the
favorable factors presented in his case. The Board balanced the various
factors in the noncitizen' s case and took note of his favorable equities,
which the board found to be unusual or outstanding. However, when the
Board weighed these equities against the adverse factors of the
noncitizen's extensive criminal record, the Board determined that a
favorable exercise of discretion was not warranted.
•
This case is important because the Board states that under f o r m e r INA
§ 212(c), courts should consider the record as a whole. Additionally,
this case clarified confusion that was found from the rehabilitation factor in
Matter of Marin. Some courts found that “a clear showing of reformation is
an absolute prerequisite to a favorable exercise of discretion;” however,
the Board clarified the rehabilitation is not an absolute prerequisite.
Rather, each instance should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
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MATTER OF MARIN, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581 (BIA 1978) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a waiver of deportation/cancellation of removal provides an
indiscriminate waiver for all who demonstrate statutory eligibility for such
relief?
HOLDING Waivers of deportation/cancellation do not provide indiscriminate relief for
all who demonstrate statutory eligibility for such relief. Rather, the
adjudicator will consider positive and adverse factors, as set forth below.
Respondent Marin was admitted as a LPR on February 3, 1965. In March
•
1976, he pled guilty to the felony charge of criminal sale of cocaine. He
served 30 months in New York State penal institutions. In May 1977 he
was served with an order to show cause and was charged with being
deportable. The IJ found him deportable and he appealed. The noncitizen
argued that he was eligible for 212(c) relief. The Board stated that
Section 212(c) does not provide an indiscriminate waiver for all who
demonstrate statutory eligibility for such relief. Instead, the Attorney
General is required to determine as a matter of discretion whether an
applicant warrants the relief sought. The Board concluded that the
noncitizen bears the burden of demonstrating that his application merits
favorable consideration. The noncitizen was unable to advance any
substantial equities and the Board dismissed his appeal.
This case is important because the Board courts should consider a
•
noncitizen's record as a whole. Courts should balance the adverse factors
evidencing the noncitizen's undesirability as a permanent resident with
the social and humane considerations presented in his or her behalf to
determine whether relief should be granted. Adverse factors include: (1)
“the nature and underlying circumstances of the exclusion ground at issue,”
(2) “the presence of additional significant violations of this country's
immigration laws,” (3) “the existence of a criminal record and, if so, its
nature, recency, and seriousness,” and (4) “the presence of other evidence
indicative of a respondent's bad character or undesirability as a permanent
resident of this country.” Positive equities include: (1) family ties within the
US, (2) residence of long duration in this country (particularly when the
inception of residence occurred while the respondent was of young age),
(3) evidence of hardship to the respondent and family if deportation occurs,
(4) service in this country's Armed Forces, (5) a history of employment, (6)
the existence of property or business ties, (7) evidence of value and service
to the community, (8) proof of a genuine rehabilitation if a criminal record
exists, and (9) other evidence attesting to a respondent's good character
(e.g., affidavits from family, friends, and responsible community
representatives).”
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(b). Arranged by Statutory Element
(1). Has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less
than 5 years
(A). Conditional Lawful Permanent Residents
GALLIMORE V. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 619 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2010) [Precedent]:
ISSUE 1
Whether a noncitizen who had mistakenly responded falsely on an
application for adjustment of status is considered to have been “lawfully
admitted for permanent residence?”
ISSUE 2
Whether a noncitizen is considered to have been “lawfully” admitted for
permanent residence when admitted on a conditional basis or when the
conditions were removed?
HOLDING A noncitizen who had mistakenly responded falsely on an application for
1 adjustment of status is not considered to have been lawfully admitted for
permanent residence.
HOLDING A noncitizen is considered to have been admitted as a lawful permanent
2 resident when s/he is admitted on a conditional basis.
The Respondent, Earl Gallimore, entered the U.S. on August 7, 1993
•
pursuant to a nonimmigrant visa. On September 25, 1993, police found five
pounds of marijuana in Respondent’s car on a car stop. On January 12, 1994,
Respondent married a US citizen and applied for adjustment of status. On
the application for adjustment of status, Respondent answered no to the
following question: “Have you ever, in or outside the U.S. been arrested,
cited, charged, indicted, fined, or imprisoned for breaking or violating any
law or ordinance…?” On September 13, 1994, Respondent was arrested for
the pending indictment for possession of marijuana and eventually pled
guilty to the charge. On April 1, 1996, Respondent applied to have the
conditions on his status removed. When Respondent applied for the
removal of the conditions, his wife answered on a supporting document that
Respondent had never been convicted of violating any law. On December
17, 2001, Gallimore applied for naturalization and was denied. Due to
Respondent’s previous failure to disclose the indictment, he was found to
have poor moral character. On April 3, 2006 he was served a Notice to
Appear. Respondent explained to the IJ that he had not understood that he
had been arrested during the car stop. The IJ found that Respondent had
“willfully failed to disclose” his arrest on his application for adjustment, and
that he had not been eligible for Cancellation of Removal because he had
never been “lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” The Board agreed
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with the IJ’s conclusion, and the Third Circuit affirmed. The Third Circuit
concluded that his 1995 conviction rendered the Respondent inadmissible.
As such, the Respondent was inadmissible at the time adjustment, and he
had not been “lawfully” admitted for permanent residence. However, the
Third Circuit found that this was not the end of the inquiry as the date that
Respondent could be considered to have obtained “lawful” permanent
residence is January 12, 1994, the date in which Respondent had applied for
conditional permanent residence. The Third Circuit found that the Board did
not speak to this issue. While finding that the word “permanent” may
connote a meaning that did not encompass noncitizens given a conditional
status, the Third Circuit found this interpretation to be inconsistent with
Section 1186(a), which concerns “conditional permanent residents’ eligibility
for citizenship.” The statutes states: “For purposes of [naturalization] in the
case of an alien who is in the United States as an LPR resident on a
conditional basis under this section, the alien shall be considered to have
been admitted as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence and to
be in the United States as an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for
permanent residence.” Further, Section 1186(a) is further corroborated by 8
C.F.R. § 216.1, which states that conditional residents are to be considered
LPRs, as well. Therefore, the Third Circuit indicates that the court is not
aware of any reason to conclude that a conditional permanent resident is
not a “lawful” permanent resident. However, the Third Circuit leaves this
decision to the Board to make an affirmative holding that a conditional
permanent resident is considered a “lawful” permanent resident.
This case is important for three reasons. The case affirms the Board’s
holding that a noncitizen who fraudulently or mistakenly completed an
application for lawful permanent residence will not be considered to have
“lawfully” entered. The noncitizen will not be considered to have “lawfully”
entered even if it is the agency that had erroneously conferred LPR status.
Further, this case indicates that a noncitizen who is a conditional permanent
resident, is an LPR.

MATTER OF PAEK, 26 I. & N. 403 (BIA 2014), aff’d, 793 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2015)
[Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a noncitizen who was admitted to the U.S. as a conditional
permanent resident is considered a lawful permanent resident?
HOLDING A noncitizen spouse lawfully admitted as a permanent resident on a
conditional basis, is considered an LPR.
Respondent Ka A. Paek, was admitted into the U.S. in 1991. Respondent
•
was convicted of theft in 2005 and robbery in 2006, and removal
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proceedings were initiated in July 2013. Respondent then applied for
adjustment of status pursuant to his marriage to a U.S. citizen and applied
for Section 212(h) waiver. However, the waiver states that “No waiver
shall be granted under this subsection in the case of an alien who has
previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence if… since the date of his admission the
alien has been convicted of an aggravated felony.” Therefore, if the
Respondent was considered a “lawful” permanent resident at the time of
his convictions, he would not be eligible for the waiver. The Board found
that “notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, an alien spouse….
shall be considered, at the time of obtaining the status of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence to have obtained such status on a
conditional basis to the provisions of this section.”
While this case deals with § 212(h) waivers, this case further indicates that
a conditional permanent resident will be considered to have “lawfully”
entered.

(B). Burden of Proof for Abandonment of Lawful Permanent Resident Status
MATTER OF HUANG, 19 I. & N. Dec. 749 (BIA 1988) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Who has the burden of establishing abandonment of lawful permanent
resident status?
HOLDING The DHS has the burden of establishing abandonment of lawful permanent
residence status.
The noncitizen family members were natives and citizens of Taiwan and
•
included an adult female and her two minor children. They were initially
admitted to the US as LPRs on June 5, 1982. The noncitizen's husband was
admitted as a lawful permanent resident one week earlier. The noncitizen's
husband, after receiving his Alien Registration Receipt Card, returned to
Japan to continue studying and working at a university's medical school as
a medical doctor. Soon after, the noncitizen wife and the children
returned to Japan. The noncitizen and her two children last sought to
reenter the U.S. on May 10, 1986, at which time they were placed in
exclusion proceedings and ordered removed. She appealed. The INS
contended on appeal that the noncitizens had abandoned their LPR
statuses. The Board noted that the INS has the burden of proving that a
noncitizen is ineligible for admission as a returning permanent resident. In
determining whether the DHS has met its burden of proof, the IJ should look
to whether the LPR has an unrelinquished residence after a temporary visit
abroad. A temporary visit abroad may be an extended period of absence, “if
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the end of the period of absence can be fixed by some early event.” The
noncitizen’s professed intent to return is not sufficient to support a finding
that the visit was “temporary.” The Board found that the INS had met the
burden and the Board ordered the noncitizen and her children removed
from the U.S.
This case is important because the Board held that the DHS bears the
ultimate burden of showing abandonment of LPR status.
(C). Ability to Impute a Parent’s Lawful Permanent Resident Status

HOLDER V. MARTINEZ GUTIERREZ, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a parent’s lawful permanent resident status can be imputed to a
child for purposes of calculating the 5 years of lawful permanent residence
required to establish eligibility for cancellation of removal under §
240A(a)(1)?
HOLDING A child of an LPR may not impute the parent’s length of time as an LPR for
purposes of 5 years of lawful permanent residence and 7-year continuous
residence requirement.
This case decided two consolidated cases about imputation, one with regard
•
to the 5-year LPR requirement and the other with regard to 7-year
continuous residence requirement. Only Respondent Martinez Gutierrez
involved imputation with regard to the five years of lawful permanent
residence requirement. Martinez Gutierrez, illegally entered the U.S. with
his family in 1989, when he was five years old. Respondent’s father obtained
a LPR status two years later; however, respondent never adjusted his status
until 2003. Two years later respondent was apprehended and admitted to
smuggling undocumented people across the border. He then applied for
cancellation of removal. The IJ determined he could qualify for LPR §
240A(a)(1) and (a)(2) on his own because of his father’s status, but the Board
reversed. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and
remanded the decision to the Board. On appeal from the Ninth Circuit, the
Supreme Court concluded that the Board’s interpretation of §240A(a)(1) is
“based on a permissible construction of the statute,” and reversed the Ninth
Circuit’s decision.
This case is important because the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Board’s
•
holding that a parent’s LPR status may not be imputed to their children to
give the child the necessary 5 years of LPR status to qualify for
cancellation or 7 years’ continuous residence.
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(2). Has resided in the U.S. continuously for 7 years after having been admitted
in any status
(A). Retroactivity
JURADO-DELGADO v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 498 Fed. App. 101 (3d Cir. 2009)
[Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether INA § 240A(a) can be applied retroactively to crimes
committed by an LPR in 1991, before INA §240 was enacted?
HOLDING A noncitizen who committed crimes for which s/he was deportable under
pre-Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act may be
deportable under post-IIRIRA proceedings; the court left open the
question as to whether Lawful Permanent Resident Cancellation of
Removal can be applied retroactively to crimes committed before IIRIRA
was enacted.
Respondent, Jimmy Jurado-Delgado, a native and citizen of Ecuador, was
•
admitted to the U.S. as an LPR in 1985. Jurado-Delgado conceded before
an IJ that he was removable either under INA §237(a)(2)(A)(ii) for having
been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude in 1997, or
under INA § 237(a)(3)(D), for having falsely represented himself to be a
U.S. citizen, but he requested Cancellation of Removal under INA
§240A(a). The court held that Jurado-Delgado's 1991 crimes stopped his
accrual of time toward a period of seven years of continuous residence
because they were crimes involving moral turpitude, which rendered
him inadmissible under § 212(a)(2)(A)(i). Jurado-Delgado petitioned for
review of a final order of the Board. He argued, among other things,
that the Board's determination that he was ineligible for Cancellation of
Removal is the result of an impermissible, retroactive application of that
statute. In his view, the Board, when determining whether he was
statutorily eligible for Cancellation Of removal, was not entitled to take
into account crimes that he committed prior to Congress's creation of
that remedy. Because the Board applied the law in effect at the time
Jurado-Delgado committed the deportable offense, no question of
retroactivity was implicated. Here, the Third Circuit Court denied
Jurado-Delgado's petition for review.
This case is important because it suggests that INA § 240A(a) can be
•
applied retroactively to crimes committed by an LPR before INA § 240A
was enacted, such that the crimes can stop accrual of time toward a
period of seven years of continuous residence.
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GUZMAN V. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 770 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 2014) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether the stop-time rule can be applied retroactively to terminate the
accrual of continuous residence for LPR Cancellation of Removal?
HOLDING The stop-time rule can be applied retroactively to terminate accrual of time
required to satisfy the requisite 7-year continuous physical presence.
Respondent, Cristian Guzman is a 38-year-old citizen of the Dominican
•
Republic. He was admitted to the U.S. as an LPR on October 8, 1994 and had
continually resided in the U.S. since that time. In 1995, Guzman was arrested
in NY and charged with Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance. On
December 19, 1995, Guzman pled guilty to a lesser possession charge and
was sentenced to 3 years’ probation. In 2005, he was again arrested and
charged with Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance and pled guilty.
On December 1, 2005 he was sentenced to time served. On March 6, 2012,
DHS served Guzman with an NTA and took him into custody based on the
2005 conviction pursuant to a controlled substance abuse (INA
§237(a)(2)(B)(i)). He conceded removability, but applied for LPR Cancellation
of Removal. The Government argued that Guzman was ineligible for the
relief because the stop-time rule terminated his continuous residence when
he committed the 1995 drug offense. Guzman argued that he could have
accrued 7 years of continuous residence. Specifically, Guzman argued that
(1) the application of the stop-time rule was impermissibly retroactive
because the rule became effective on April 1, 1997 through IIRIRA, after he
committed his 1995 drug offense; (2) he should be able to apply for the
212(c) deportation waiver, which was available prior to IIRIRA, and he
should be able to delay his deportation, which was a strategy available prior
to IIRIRA to allow him to accrue the 7 years of continuous presence for the
212(c) waiver; and, (3) the retroactive application of the stop-time rule was
arbitrary and capricious because only LPRs who committed crimes within 7
years of admission were punished by being subject to the rule. Therefore,
Guzman moved to terminate his deportation to apply for naturalization. The
IJ held the stop-time rule was not arbitrary; therefore, Guzman was
ineligible for Cancellation of Removal and for 212(c) because he had only
accrued 1 year of continuous residence by the time he committed the 1995
crime. Further, Guzman had not made affirmative communication with DHS
regarding his prima facie eligibility for naturalization, which is required to
terminate the deportation so that the Petitioner can seek naturalization (In
re Acosta Hidalgo). The Board affirmed the IJ’s holding and found that
Guzman could not apply simultaneously for 212(c) relief and LPR
Cancellation of Removal because 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c)(6) explicitly precludes
applying for both. Additionally, even if he could obtain a 212(c) waiver
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notwithstanding his 1995 conviction, the conviction would still have ended
his continuous residence for purposes of Cancellation of Removal because
the 212(c) waiver does not serve to pardon, expunge, or eliminate all
negative immigration consequences stemming from a noncitizen’s criminal
conviction. The 3rd Circuit Court affirmed the Board’s decision that Guzman
was ineligible to apply for the 212(c). The Court cited St. Cyr, wherein the
noncitizen has accrued the required 7 years of continuous residence before
IIRIRA became effective and removal proceedings commenced after IIRIRA
became effective, thus, retroactive application of IIRIRA was held a “new
disability” because the LPR already had a vested right to use 212(c) when he
plead guilty. The 3rd Circuit Court also cited to Sinotes-Cruz, where the
noncitizen committed a crime pre-IIRIRA that was later reclassified by IIRIRA
as a deportable crime. Retroactive application was impermissible in that
case because the LPR relied on the pre-IIRIRA law when he pled guilty. In the
present case, the 3rd Circuit held that Guzman has no vested right in 212(c)
because he did not have the requisite 7 years of continuous residence at the
time he committed the 1995 crime, and the 1995 crime made him
deportable. Thus, the stop-time rule was triggered and made him ineligible
for LPR Cancellation of Removal.
This case is important because the 3rd Circuit reinforced that an LPR may
use 212(c) as relief only when the vested right to qualify under 212(c)
existed at the time in which the crime was committed and that the stoptime rule does apply retroactively to terminate the accrual of continuous
presence for purposes of LPR Cancellation of Removal67. Additionally, the
3rd Circuit did not rule on whether the Board’s interpretation is correct
when the Board held that an LPR cannot apply concurrently for 212(c) relief
and LPR Cancellation of Removal.
(B). Re-entry After a Clock Stopping Event

MATTER OF CISNEROS-GONZALEZ, 23 I. & N. Dec. 668 (BIA 2004) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a noncitizen who departed the U.S. after being served with a valid
charging document can seek relief in a subsequent removal proceeding,

67

See, Sinotes-Cruz v Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the stop-time rule may not
be applied retroactively to prevent noncitizens from fulfilling the seven-year continuous residence
requirement when the noncitizen pleads guilty under the expectation that his plea will not affect his
immigration status based on the law in effect at the time the noncitizen pleads guilty).
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based on a new period of continuous physical presence measured from the
date of his return?
HOLDING For purposes of applying for Cancellation of Removal, a noncitizen’s period
of continuous physical presence ends when s/he is served with the charging
document on which the current removal proceeding is based (8 U.S.C. §
1229b(d)(1)); the stop-time rule does not refer to charging documents
served in prior proceedings.
Respondent Ignacio Cisneros-Gonzalez’s first removal proceeding was in
•
December 28, 1990. He was served with an Order to Show Cause, Notice of
Hearing, and Warrant for Arrest of Alien (Form I-221S), charging him with
deportability for having entered without inspection (former 8 U.S.C.
§1251(a)(2)). On January 10, 1991 he was deported. On January 11, 1991 he
returned to the U.S. without being admitted or paroled. On January 5, 2001,
he applied for Non-LPR Cancellation of Removal, which requires continuous
physical presence for 10 years. The IJ cited to Matter of Mendoza-Sandino as
authority to apply the stop-time rule to Cisneros-Gonzalez’s first deportation
proceeding from 1990, which would have made him ineligible for the relief.
However, the Board’s legislative history analysis determined that Congress
did not intend for the stop-time rule under INA §240A(d)(1) to ban
noncitizens from seeking Cancellation of Removal relief. The “stop-time”
rule was not intended to extend to charging documents issued in earlier
proceedings. Thus, the Board sustained Cisneros-Gonzalez’s appeal and
remanded the case.
This case is important because the Board distinguishes this case from Matter
•
of Mendoza-Sandino, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1236 (BIA 2000). There, the noncitizen
applied for suspension of deportation based on a single order to show
cause. Here, however, multiple charging documents existed. When the DHS
does not or cannot reinstate a prior order of removal against a previously
deported noncitizen and instead issues a new order of removal, the
noncitizen may be eligible to apply for Cancellation of Removal based on the
accrual of the new continuous presence (§ 240A(b)) or new continuous
residence (§ 240A(a)). Importantly, note that Cisneros-Gonzalez was applied
to § 240A(b) [Non-LPR Cancellation of Removal], rather than § 240A(a) [LPR
Cancellation of Removal]. Under § 240A(d)(1), however, the stop-time rule
applies to both LPR Cancellation of Removal’s continuous residence
requirement (§ 240A(a)(2)) and Non-LPR Cancellation of Removal’s
continuous physical presence requirement (§ 240A(b)(2)).
OKEKE v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 407 F.3d 585 (3d Cir. 2005) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a noncitizen is entitled to a new period of continuous physical
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presence, commencing upon his lawful reentry into the U.S., so as to allow
him to accrue the time required to establish eligibility for Non-LPR
Cancellation of Removal?
HOLDING A noncitizen who lawfully reenters the U.S. after overstaying a visa may start
a new accrual of time for purposes of satisfying the requisite 10-year
continuous physical presence when the noncitizen’s Notice to Appear
exclusively charges the noncitizen with being a visa overstay.
Respondent, Anderson Jude Okeke, a native and citizen of Nigeria,
•
petitioned for review of two orders from the Board. Those orders affirmed
the Immigration Judge's decision that Okeke could not demonstrate the
requisite continuous physical presence in the U.S. in order to qualify for
Non-LPR Cancellation of Removal. Essentially, the Board found that the
'stop-time' provision (INA § 240A(d)(l)), once triggered, precluded the
accrual of a new period of continuous presence, which in this case
commenced with Okeke's lawful reentry into the U.S. The lawful reentry,
which was the critical fact on appeal, occurred after Okeke committed a
controlled substance offense, which, pursuant to INA § 240A(d)(l), clearly
ended any prior period of continuous physical residence. This court
concluded that the clock restarted upon Okeke's reentry. Pursuant to the
express terms of the NTA, it was the last reentry into the U.S. that should
have been considered in calculating continuous physical presence.
This case is important because a noncitizen is entitled to a new period of
•
continuous physical presence under INA § 240A(d)(l), commencing upon his
lawful reentry into the U.S., so as to allow him to accrue the time required to
establish eligibility for Non-LPR Cancellation of Removal. Here, the Third
Circuit is applying the holding in Cisneros. Though this holding applies to
Non-LPR Cancellation of Removal, the holding could also apply to LPR
Cancellation of Removal as INA § 240A(d)(l) refers to both continuous
physical presence under Non-LPR Cancellation of Removal and continuous
residence under LPR Cancellation of Removal.
MATTER OF NELSON, 25 I. & N. Dec. 410 (BIA 2011) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a noncitizen is entitled to a new period of continuous residence,
commencing upon his reentry into the U.S., so as to allow him to accrue the
time required to establish eligibility for LPR Cancellation of Removal?
HOLDING “Once an alien has been convicted of an offense that stops the accrual of the
7-year period of continuous residence required for cancellation of
removal…section 240A(d)(1) of the Act does not permit such residence to
restart simply because the alien has departed from, and returned to the
United States.”
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Respondent, Michael Alexander Nelson, a native and citizen of Jamaica, was
admitted as a LPR on November 3, 1994. On February 20, 1999, Respondent
was convicted of a New York offense for possession of marijuana. In August
2000, Respondent visited Canada and thereafter returned to the U.S.. On
November 26, 2008, Nelson was served with an NTA because of his criminal
offense of possession of marijuana. The IJ found that Nelson was removable
based on his 1999 convictions and that Nelson failed to show eligibility for
Cancellation of Removal because he had not accrued continuous residence
for 7 years. Specifically, the IJ found that Nelson could not re-start the clock
when he re-entered after his trip to Canada. Thus, according to the IJ, the
clock stopped for purposes of accruing continuous residence time on
February 20, 1999, at which point Nelson had not resided in the U.S. for 7years. On appeal, Nelson argued that he was eligible for Cancellation of
Removal because his reentry into the U.S. after his trip to Canada, restarted
the clock. Thus, the date that the stopped the time for accrual of residence
was November 2008, rather than February 1999. The Board affirmed the IJ’s
decision. In so holding, the Board found that the facts in Okeke v. Attorney
General differ. In Okeke, the respondent had been removed for possession
of marijuana, and thereafter returned to the U.S. lawfully on a student visa.
The respondent in Okeke, was then placed into removal proceedings for
failing to maintain a student status. Here, the Board found that the fact that
the new removal proceedings were related to the clock stopping event
distinguished the Nelson’s case from that of Okeke. Unlike the respondent in
Okeke, here Nelson’s removal proceedings are on account of his conviction.
Therefore, the Board concluded that Okeke, was not “binding” in this case.
However, the Board did suggest that it may have come to a different result
should Nelson have received a waiver prior to his reentry into the U.S..
This case is important because the holding provides that lawful reentry into
the U.S. after a clock-stopping event will not re-start the clock for purposes
of 7-years continuous residence when the clock-stopping event was the
basis for removal. Further, this distinguishes the holding in Okeke v.
Attorney General, providing a further wrinkle in that the clock cannot restart
after lawful re-entry, if the basis for removal is the prior clock stopping
event.

SINGH V. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 807 F.3d 547 (3d Cir. 2015) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a noncitizen convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT)
can use a re-entry to restart the clock to satisfy the seven-year continuous
residency requirement?
HOLDING An LPR convicted of a CIMT cannot reenter as a method to restart the clock
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to accrue the requisite 7-year continuous residence.
Respondent, Narinder Singh, was a native and citizen of India. He was
granted asylum on July 1, 1993, and adjusted to LPR status on June 1, 1994.
On September 14, 2000, he was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Florida of conspiracy to counterfeit passports,
counterfeiting and using visas, and mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.
He was also convicted of unlawful possession of forged, counterfeited,
altered, and falsely made nonimmigrant U.S. visas in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1546. Singh departed the U.S and re-entered on January 20, 2003. In
October 2009, he applied for admission to the U.S. as an LPR. On January 10,
2010, Immigration and Customs Enforcement detained him. On January 19,
2010, he was served with a Notice to Appear charging him as inadmissible
because he had a counterfeiting conviction, a crime involving moral
turpitude. Singh applied for Cancellation of Removal but the IJ denied the
petition and the Board dismissed his appeal based on a finding that he had
not accrued seven years of continuous residence in the U.S. to be eligible for
Cancellation of Removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) [240A(a)]. Singh
then filed a petition for review arguing that his 2003 re-entry restarted the
clock for purposes of the seven-year residence requirement. However, the
Court held that when Singh committed the CIMT, the clock both stopped
and permanently prevented the clock from restarting. The Third Circuit cited
to its Okeke decision that where there is a re-entry, the clock starts “anew.”
However, the Third Circuit court distinguishes Okeke from the present case
because in the former, the basis for removal was that the noncitizen was a
visa-overstay. Thus, the court relied instead on the Nelson case in which the
noncitizen’s removal was based on a crime that terminated his continuous
residence and his continuous presence. Because Singh’s conviction involved
a CIMT, the CIMT terminated his continuous residence and continuous
presence so his re-entry could not restart the clock.
This case is important because it reaffirms that re-entry can re-start the
clock after a “clock stopping event” (i.e., receipt of a NTA), except when the
NTA states the “clock stopping event” as the cause for removal. Here, the
Third Circuit distinguished in part and applied in part the holding in Okeke
and thereby Cisneros-Gonzalez, to the context of LPR Cancellation of
Removal.
(C). An Incomplete NTA’s Application to Stop-Time Rule

MATTER OF CAMARILLO, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644 (BIA 2011) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether an NTA that does not include the date and time of the initial
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hearing can stop the clock for purposes of Cancellation of Removal?
HOLDING In-person service of an NTA that does not indicate a date or time of
hearing is nevertheless sufficient to terminate the continuous residence of
an LPR.
Respondent, Judith Camarillo, was a native and citizen of Guatemala who
•
became a LPR in 2000. On August 29, 2005, she was served in person with
a Notice to Appear, which included the phrase “To be set” in the space
provided for the date and time of the hearing. The NTA was later filed with
the Harlingen Immigration Court, which issued a notice of hearing on
November 9, 2007. She was charged with alien smuggling and the IJ found
her removable. But the IJ granted her petition for Cancellation of Removal
on the grounds that Camarillo had accrued the required seven-years of
continuous residence by the time the Court issued the notice that
contained the hearing date. The IJ interpreted the terms in 239(a)(1) of 8
U.S.C. §1229(a)(1)(G), “[t]he time and place at which the proceedings will
be held,” as requirements for an NTA so that the stop-time rule takes
effect. DHS appealed, arguing that section § 1229(a)(1) specifies that an
NTA must be served, and the terms in §1229(a)(1)(G) help identify what an
NTA is. The Board agreed with the DHS that the key phrase was “served a
notice to appear” and the Congress intended the phrase “under section
239(a)” after “notice to appear” to specify the document the DHS must
serve to trigger the “stop-time” rule. Additionally, the court highlighted
that removal proceedings commence when the NTA is filed with the
Immigration Court. 8 C.F.R. § 1239.1(a) (2011). Since the commencement
of proceedings is a separate issue from the service of the NTA, what
mattered was the NTA that Camarillo was served in person. Thus,
Camarillo was not eligible for Cancellation of Removal because she had
not accrued seven-years at the time she was served in 2005. The court
sustained the appeal by DHS.
This case is important because the holding found that the NTA will suffice
•
to end continuous residence, regardless if there is a date or time for the
hearing on the NTA at the time the noncitizen is served. The court also
distinguished that the date that mattered for purposes of terminating
continuous residence is the date that the NTA was served and not the date
on which removal proceedings commence nor the date that the NTA is
filed. Peculiarly, the Board never makes any conclusions regarding
Camarillo’s criminal conviction for smuggling aliens into the U.S., which
could have been a reason to stop time for purposes of the 7 years of
continuous residence.
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(D). Ability to Impute Parent’s Continuous Residence Time

MATTER OF RAMIREZ-VARGAS, 24 I. & N. Dec. 599 (BIA 2008) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a parent's lawful permanent resident status can be imputed to a
child for purposes of calculating the 5 years of lawful permanent
residence required to establish for cancellation of removal under §
240A(a)(1)?
HOLDING A parent’s LPR residence may not be imputed to his or her child for purpose
of the 7-year continuous residence requirement.
Respondent, Ramirez-Vargas, a native and citizen of Mexico and an LPR of
•
the U.S., was found removable as a noncitizen convicted of a controlled
substance violation but granted his application for Cancellation of
Removal. The DHS appealed, arguing that the IJ erred in finding the
respondent statutorily eligible for that relief because the lawful permanent
residence of the noncitizen's father could not be imputed to the noncitizen.
The Board sustained the appeal by DHS. The Board held that a parent's
period of residence in the U.S. cannot be imputed to a child for purposes of
calculating the 7 years of continuous residence required to establish
eligibility for Cancellation of Removal under INA § 240A(a)(2).
This case is important because it rejected the 9th Circuit Court’s holding that
•
imputation of a parent’s LPR status to a child was permissible. Matter Of
Escobar, 24 I. & N. Dec. 231 (BIA 2007). Matter of Escobar was vacated in
2009 and currently all Circuit Courts hold that imputation of a parent’s
continuance residence is impermissible.
AUGUSTIN v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 520 F.3d 264 (3d Cir. 2008) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a noncitizen who entered the U.S. as a minor can impute his
parent's years of continuous residence in order to meet the seven-year
requirement for Cancellation of Removal?
HOLDING A parent’s LPR residence may not be imputed to his or her child for purpose
of the 7-year continuous residence requirement.
Respondent, Luckson Augustin, was admitted to the U.S. as an LPR at the age
•
of 13 to join his parents who had previously come to the U.S..
Approximately five years after coming to the U.S., the noncitizen
committed a crime involving moral turpitude. He was later charged with
being removable based in part on that crime. The noncitizen admitted the
allegations but argued that he was eligible for Cancellation of Removal
based on his father's seven years of continuous residence in the U.S. prior to
any of the crimes being committed. The Board rejected that argument,
interpreting the statute as requiring that the noncitizen himself actually
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dwell in the U.S. for seven years before committing the crime. On review,
the court held that the Board's denial of Cancellation of Removal and its
refusal to impute the father's years of residence was permissible because
it was a straightforward application of the statute's requirements.
This case is important because it affirms, under Chevron deference, the
view that a parent's residence may not be imputed to his or her minor
child for purposes of the seven-year residence provision of cancellation.
This case affirms the Board’s reasoning in Matter of Ramirez Vargas, 24
I. & N. Dec. 599 (BIA 2008).
(E). Date to Stop Time of Continuous Residence

MATTER OF PEREZ, 22 I. & N. Dec. 689 (BIA 1999) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether the "stop-time" rule operates to terminate the period of
continuous residence required for Cancellation of Removal as of the
date the noncitizen commits the offense that renders him/her deportable?
HOLDING The stop-time rule is triggered by a noncitizen who violates a provision in
INA § 212(a)(2), § 237(a)(2) or 237(a)(4).
Respondent Cristobal Perez, admitted each of the factual allegations in
•
the Notice to Appear. Specifically, he a d m i t t e d t h a t was first
admitted as a temporary resident on September 21, 1989, and that his
status was subsequently adjusted to that of an LPR on December 7, 1990.
The noncitizen further admitted that he was convicted on July 11,
1997, in Texas, of possession of cocaine, and that this offense was
committed on or about August 4, 1992. The noncitizen conceded that he
was removable as charged under section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act on the
basis of this conviction and the IJ ordered him removed. The noncitizen
appealed to the Board on the basis of the retroactive effect of § 240A,
arguing that the section's rules limiting eligibility for relief from removal
should not apply to him. The Board, after finding that applying Section
240A would not have an impermissible "retroactive effect," concluded
that the respondent's period of continuous residence is deemed to have
ended on the date he committed his controlled substance violation. The
commission of that offense was prior to his attainment of the required 7
years of continuous residence. Therefore, he was statutorily ineligible
for section 240A(a) Cancellation of Removal. Accordingly, the Board
found that the IJ's pretermission of his application for Cancellation of
Removal was proper.
This case is important because the Board concluded that "admission in
•
any status" includes admission as a temporary resident. Also, "Under INA
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240A(d)(l)(B), continuous residence is deemed to end upon the
commission of an offense under INA § 212(a)(2), or INA § 237(a)(2) or §
237(a)(4). The time period is measured from the commission of the crime,
not the conviction."

MATTER OF CAMPOS-TORRES, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1289 (BIA 2000) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether the noncitizen's commission of a firearms offense, which is not
referred to in INA § 212(a)(2), precluded him from satisfying the
requirement in INA § 240A(a)(2) that he have resided in the U.S.
continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status?
HOLDING A noncitizen triggers the stop-time rule when s/he violates a provision that is
actually found in 212(a)(2).
Respondent Ignacio Campos-Torres, was admitted to the U.S. as a
•
temporary resident on May 4, 1988, and adjusted his status to that of an
LPR on December 13, 1990. On September 23, 1993 the noncitizen was
convicted of a single offense of unlawful use of a weapon. The noncitizen
was sentenced to 18 months of probation. On June 25, 1997, the INS
issued and served a NTA, commencing removal proceedings and charging
the noncitizen with removability. The issue that was raised before the IJ
and argued in the initial briefs submitted on appeal concerned the
appropriate date to apply in determining when accrual of continuous
residence ends. The noncitizen argued that under the plain language of the
statute, firearms offenses do not cut off continuous residence because
they are not "referred to" in § 212(a)(2) of the Act. The government
argued that the plain language of INA § 240A(d)(l) does not clearly
support either its position or that of the noncitizen because the statute is
ambiguous. The Board found that because the noncitizen's firearms
offense, which rendered him deportable under INA § 237(a)(2)(C), is not
referred to in INA § 212(a)(2), it did not stop time under INA § 240A(d)(l).
This case is important because the Board held that “an offense must be one
•
‘referred to in section 212(a)(2)” of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. II
1996), to terminate the period of continuous residence or continuous physical
presence required for cancellation of removal.’”

MATTER OF DEANDA-ROMO, 23 I. & N. Dec. 597 (BIA 2003) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a noncitizen who has committed two crimes involving moral
turpitude is precluded from establishing the requisite 7 years of
continuous residence for cancellation of removal under INA §240A(a)(2),
where his first crime was a petty offense that was committed within the
7-year period and the second crime was committed more than 7 years after
his admission to the U.S.?
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HOLDING The stop-time rule is triggered by crimes for which a noncitizen is
inadmissible; however, the stop-time rule is not triggered by petty offenses.
Respondent Jose Abraham Deanda-Romo, was admitted to the U.S. as an
•
LPR on January 8, 1992. On September 21, 1999, he was convicted in Texas
of two misdemeanor offenses of assault with bodily injury to his spouse,
one occurring on October 30, 1998, and the other on June 20, 1999. He
was sentenced to imprisonment for both offenses. He conceded
removability and applied for LPR Cancellation of Removal. The IJ terminated
the application after finding that the noncitizen was ineligible for relief
under the "stop-time" rule. The Board held that the noncitizen was not
precluded by the stop-time rule from establishing the requisite seven
years of continuous residence because his first crime qualified as a petty
offense, under INA 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), and therefore did not render him
inadmissible. Thus, according to the Board, the noncitizen had accrued the
requisite seven years of continuous residence before the second offense was
committed.
This case is important because the court held that the stop-time rule
•
does not apply until the second conviction where the first conviction was a
petty offense.
DUDNEY v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 129 Fed. Appx. 747 (3d Cir. 2005) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether an LPR's 1998 conviction stopped the clock for purposes of the
continuous residence requirement of INA §240A(a)(2)?
HOLDING The stop-time rule may be triggered by a noncitizen when s/he commits a
crime for which a noncitizen is deportable.
Respondent Barrington Dudney, was admitted to the U.S. as an immigrant
•
in August 1992. In October 1998, he was convicted of possession and
possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance (92 packets of
marijuana). On August 3, 1999, he was convicted of possession of a
controlled substance, simple assault and for resisting arrest during an August
20, 1998 incident. Dudney also was convicted on August 31, 1999 of
charges of simple assault, possession of an instrument of crime and
recklessly endangering another person in an incident on February 19, 1999.
In June 1999, the INS issued a NTA charging Dudney with removability
based upon his October 1998 conviction. A removal order was entered
after Dudney failed to appear for his hearing, but the IJ later terminated the
proceedings due to insufficient evidence. In October 2001, the INS issued
another NTA charging Dudney with removability for having committed an
aggravated felony (drug trafficking), two crimes involving moral turpitude
not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, and a violation of
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law relating to a controlled substance, other than a single offense
involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana.
These charges were based on the October 1998 and August 31, 1999
convictions. The NTA was then amended, and the August 3, 1999 convictions
for drug possession and simple assault, and another aggravated felony
charge were added. Through counsel, Dudney sought cancellation of
removal as a permanent resident pursuant to INA § 240A(a). The IJ found
Dudney removable for a violation of law relating to a controlled substance,
other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of 30
grams or less of marijuana, based on his August 3, 1999 drug conviction.
The Board also agreed with the IJ that Dudney was not eligible for
cancellation of removal because he did not meet the requirement that he
have continuous residence here for seven years. The Board explained that
even if Dudney could not be removed based upon his October 1998
conviction because the proceedings related to this conviction were
terminated, the October 1998 conviction stopped the clock for purposes of
the seven-year residence requirement. Alternatively, Dudney’s continuous
residence stopped as early as August 20, 1998 when the crime was
committed.
This case is important because it affirms that an LPR must satisfy INA §
240A(a)(2), the seven-year continuous residence requirement, in order to be
eligible for LPR Cancellation of Removal, and furthermore that commission
of the deportable crime or conviction for the deportable crime may stop the
accrual of time.

MATTER OF JURADO, 24 I. & N. Dec. 29 (BIA 2006) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a noncitizen needs to be charged with a crime and found
inadmissible or removable in order for the criminal conduct in question to
terminate continuous residence?
HOLDING A noncitizen who committed crimes for which s/he was deportable under
pre-IIRIRA may be deportable under post-IIRIRA proceedings; the Board
left open the question as to whether LPR cancellation of removal can be
applied retroactively to crimes committed before IIRIRA was enacted.
Respondent Jimmy Roberto Jurado, was admitted to the U.S. as an LPR on
•
September 15, 1985. He was convicted in 1991 of retail theft in violation
of Pennsylvania law. In 1992 he was also convicted of unsworn
falsification to authorities. In addition, the noncitizen was convicted in
1997 of two crimes involving moral turpitude that were the basis of the
charge of removability in his NTA. In proceedings before the IJ, the
noncitizen conceded that he was removable, both on the initial charge
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and on a lodged charge that he falsely represented himself to be a U.S.
citizen. He applied for Cancellation of Removal under section 240A(a) of
the Act, which the IJ granted. On appeal, the DHS contended that the
noncitizen failed to demonstrate the requisite period of continuous
residence to establish his eligibility for Cancellation of Removal. The
Board agreed and found that the IJ erred in concluding that the noncitizen
was eligible for cancellation of removal.
This case is important because the Board concluded that the time period
of a crime is measured from the commission of the crime, not the
conviction.

(F). Stop-Time Rule’s Application to 5 years as Lawful Permanent Resident
JOSEPH v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 236 Fed. Appx. 787 (3d Cir. 2007) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether an LPR is eligible for Cancellation of Removal when he
commits a controlled substance violation, triggering the statute's "stoptime" provision under § 240A(d)(1)?
HOLDING The stop-time rule only terminates the accrual of time for purposes of
satisfying the requisite 7-year continuous residence; the stop-time rule does
not apply to the 5-years of permanent residency requirement.
Respondent George Russel Joseph entered the U.S. in 1992 as a conditional
•
resident and became an LPR in 1994. A NTA that was dated June 15, 2005
placed him in removal proceedings. He was charged with being removable
because in August of 1997 he committed a controlled substance violation
and an aggravated felony. He was convicted in January of 1998. The IJ found
him removable for committing the controlled substance violation, but found
that the Government had not met its burden of showing that any of his
convictions were also aggravated felonies. Nevertheless, the IJ found Joseph
ineligible for Cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(a). Joseph appealed
to the Board, but the Board affirmed that Joseph was ineligible for LPR
Cancellation of Removal because he did not have the required 5 years of
permanent residence. The Board applied the stop-time rule to Joseph’s
permanent residence status, and calculated that his status as a permanent
resident began in 1994 and terminated in 1998 when he was convicted.
Joseph then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which
held that the Board impermissibly applied the stop-time rule to the
requirement of 5 years of permanent residence, and the stop-time rule only
applies to the 7 years of continuous residence. Joseph had met the
permanent residency requirement. However, the Board still found him
ineligible for LPR Cancellation of Removal because his conviction did trigger
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the stop-time rule for purposes of the 7 years of continuous residence
requirement. To calculate Joseph’s continuous residence, the Board counted
the time from when Joseph was admitted in 1992 to the date he committed
the crime in 1997 and determined he did not have the 7 years of continuous
residence. Thus, the court denied Joseph's petition for review.
This case is important because it reaffirms that the stop-time rule applies
only to the requirement of 7 years of continuous residence.

(G). Nonimmigrant Status and 7 Years Continuous Residence Requirement
IN RE BLANCAS-LARA, 23 I. & N. Dec. 458 (BIA 2002) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether the period of a noncitizen's residence in the U.S. after admission
as a nonimmigrant may be considered in calculating the 7 years of
continuous residence required to establish eligibility for cancellation of
removal.
HOLDING A noncitizen’s admission as a nonimmigrant may be used to calculate the
start of 7-year continuous residence requirement.
Respondent Eduardo Blancas-Lara was first admitted to the U.S. in
•
August 1986 with a border-crossing card. He adjusted his status to that of
an LPR on August 5, 1991. The noncitizen's period of continuous residence
under section 240A(a)(2) of the Act ended on April 1, 1998, when he was
served with a Notice to Appear. At that point, the noncitizen had
resided in the U.S. as an LPR for about 6 years and 8 months. The IJ
concluded that the noncitizen could count time he spent in the U.S. as a
child before his admission as an LPR toward the accrual of 7 years of
continuous residence under section 240A(a)(2), because the lawful
residence of his father, a citizen and resident of the U.S., could be
imputed to him. On appeal the Board found that the noncitizen
established that, at the time of his application for relief, he had resided
in the U.S. continuously for 7 years after having been admitted as a
nonimmigrant. Thus, an applicant who is admitted with a nonimmigrant
visa, and accrues the 7 years of continuous residence to meet the
second element of the statute, does not need an imputation argument.
Accordingly, the Board concurred with the IJ's decision and dismissed
the appeal.
This case is important because the Board stated that the period of a
•
noncitizen's residence in the U.S. after admission as a nonimmigrant may
be considered in calculating the seven years of continuous residence
required to establish eligibility for cancellation of removal.
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(3). Has not been convicted of any aggravated felony
(A). Categorical Approach
PARK v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 472 F.3d 66 (3d Cir. 2006) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a conviction for trafficking in counterfeit goods or services in
violation of the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §2320, is
a conviction for "an offense relating to ... counterfeiting," pursuant to INA
§101(a)(43)(R) (and an aggravated felony)?
HOLDING A noncitizen who commits an aggravated felony as defined in INA
§101(a)(43) is ineligible for LPR Cancellation of Removal and 18 U.S.C. 2320
is an aggravated felony.
Respondent Yong Wong Park was admitted to the U.S. as an immigrant
•
on or around February 12, 1998. On February 18, 2000, Park pleaded
guilty in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to one
count of trafficking in counterfeit goods or services from at least February
1997 through October 1997, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320. After his
conviction, the DHS initiated removal proceedings. The court found that
Park's conviction under 18 U.S.C. §2320 was an offense relating to
counterfeiting for purposes of the definition of "aggravated felony" under
INA § 101(a)(43)(R). Park applied for LPR Cancellation under INA §240A(a)
but because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony, he was
ineligible for Cancellation of Removal. Park's petition for review was
dismissed.
This case is important because a conviction for trafficking in counterfeit
•
goods or services in violation of the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of
1984, 18 U.S.C. §2320, is an aggravated felony because it is a conviction for
"an offense relating to ... counterfeiting," pursuant to INA § 101(a)(43)(R).
Therefore, a noncitizen with this type of conviction will be unsuccessful
applying for LPR Cancellation of Removal.
MONCRIEFFE V. HOLDER, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a conviction under a statute that criminalizes conduct described
by the Controlled Substance Act’s (CSA) 21 U.S.C. §841’s felony provision
and its misdemeanor provision, such as a statute that punishes all
marijuana distribution without regard to the amount or remuneration, is a
conviction for an offense punishable as a felony under the CSA?
HOLDING To be a categorical federal drug offense for immigration purposes, a state
drug offense must necessarily correspond to an offense punishable as a
felony under the Controlled Substance Act.
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Respondent Adrian Moncrieffe legally entered the U.S. in 1984. In 2007 he
was stopped for a traffic violation and was found in possession of 1.3 grams
of marijuana. He pleaded guilty under Georgia law to possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute. He was placed in removal proceedings
on the grounds that his conviction was an aggravated felony because
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute is a Controlled Substance
Act offense, 21 U.S.C. §841(a), punishable by up to five years’
imprisonment, §841(b)(1)(D). An IJ ordered his removal, and the Board
affirmed. The Fifth Circuit denied Moncrieffe’s petition to review his
argument that his conviction met CSA’s §841(b)(4), which makes marijuana
distribution punishable as a misdemeanor if the offense involves a small
amount for no remuneration. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve whether the state conviction qualified as an aggravated felony
when applying the categorical approach. A state drug offense must meet
two conditions: 1) the offense must “necessarily” proscribe conduct that is
an offense under the CSA, and 2) the CSA must “necessarily” prescribe
felony punishment for that conduct. Unlike the federal statute, the Georgia
statute is ambiguous as to whether the conduct proscribed involved
remuneration or the amount of controlled substances needed to be a
violation. Thus, because the conviction did not “necessarily” involve facts
that correspond to an offense punishable as a felony under the CSA, the
Court held the offense was not a categorical aggravated felony. The Court
reversed and remanded the case.
This case is important because when there is ambiguity in the state
conviction, then the facts may not “necessarily” correspond to an offense
punishable as a felony under the CSA. A noncitizen’s conviction for a
marijuana distribution offense can fail to qualify as an aggravated felony if
the there is no remuneration or no more than a small amount of marijuana.

MELLOULI V. LYNCH, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a state drug-paraphernalia misdemeanor meets the categorical
definition of controlled substance under the Controlled Substance Act
when the state misdemeanor is silent as to the controlled substance?
HOLDING To be a categorical federal drug offense for immigration purposes, a state
law violation for controlled substances must be an offense for a controlled
substance as defined in the Controlled Substance Act.
Respondent Moones Mellouli, a citizen of Tunisia, entered the U.S. on a
•
student visa in 2004. In 2009, he became a conditional permanent resident
and, in 2011, an LPR. In 2010, he pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor offense
under Kansas law, the possession of drug paraphernalia to “store, contain,
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conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance
into the human body.” Kan. Stat. Ann. §21-5709(b)(2). Under the Kansas
law, it was immaterial whether the substance was scheduled in the
Controlled Substance Act, 21 U. S. C. §802. The State did not charge, or seek
to prove, that Mellouli possessed a substance on the §802 schedules. The
sole “paraphernalia” Mellouli was charged with possessing was a sock in
which he had placed four orange tablets. The criminal charge and plea
agreement did not identify the controlled substance involved, although
Mellouli had acknowledged the tablets were Adderall. Mellouli was
sentenced to a suspended term of 359 days and 12 months’ probation,
after which DHS placed him in removal proceedings. The Board affirmed
the immigration judge's decision and he was removed. The Eighth Circuit
denied Mellouli’s petition for review. The Supreme Court then granted
certiorari and applied the categorical approach. The Court held that since
the record did not prove that Mellouli’s conviction was based on possession
of a drug on the §802 schedule, the conviction could not be a categorical
controlled substance conviction.
This case is important because an offense for drug-paraphernalia
possession must specify whether the controlled substance is scheduled in
the Controlled Substance Act to meet the criteria for a controlled substance
offense. Please note Mellouli was not found deportable of an aggravated
felony, but rather deportable because Mellouli was found guilty of a crime
involving controlled substance under INA §237(a)(2)(B). This case is
included as an example of the application of the categorical approach.
(B). Modified Categorical Approach

DESCAMPS V. U.S., 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether the modified categorical approach applies to statutes that “contain
a single, “indivisible” set of elements?”
HOLDING The modified categorical approach does not apply to statutes that contain a
single, indivisible set of elements.
Respondent Michael Descamps was convicted of being “a felon in
•
possession of a firearm” and the government sought an enhanced sentence
“based on Descamps’ prior state convictions for burglary, robbery, and
felony harassment.” To be subject to the enhanced sentencing, the statute
requires that the person had been previously convicted of a 3 violent
felonies or a serious drug offense. A “violent felony” is one which “has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another,” or that is a “burglary, arson or extortion, involves
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use of explosives or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.” Descamps argued that his past
conviction was not within the meaning of the “violent felony” and therefore
he could not be subject to the enhanced sentencing. The prior California
felony that Descamps had been convicted found guilty a “person who
enters” certain locations “with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or
any felony.” Unlike the federal statute, Descamps argues, the California
statute did not require that a person enter into the location unlawfully;
therefore, the California statute was not a categorical match. Both the
District Court and the Ninth Circuit disagreed with Descamps, and applied
the modified categorical approach to look to “certain documents, including
the record of the plea colloquy, to discover whether Descamps had
“admitted the elements of a generic burglary” when entering his plea.” The
District Court and the Ninth Circuit concluded that Descamps’ crime was
within the meaning of the federal statute of burglary but Descamps
appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that the California statute was
indivisible, and therefore, the lower courts erred in applying the modified
categorical approach. The Court found that the purpose of the modified
categorical approach was to help “effectuate the categorical analysis when a
divisible statute, listing potential offense elements in the alternative,
renders opaque which element played a part in the defendant’s conviction.”
The Court illustrated that a statute may be indivisible, for example, when a
statute of burglary includes both “entry into an automobile as well as a
building.” In such a situation, entering an automobile, would not be within
the generic federal definition; however, the alternative, “entry into… a
building” would be within the generic federal definition. Because, in this
hypothetical situations, the statute would not reveal which alternative the
defendant was convicted, courts could look to the plea agreement, the
colloquy between the judge and the defendant, or indictment so as to
determine which alternative was used. On the other hand, where a statute is
indivisible, courts should apply the categorical approach and may “only look
to the statutory definitions,” of the defendant’s prior offenses, and not “to
the particular facts underlying those convictions.” Here, the statute of
Descamps prior conviction was not divisible, as the statute does not have a
list of alternatives.
This case is important because it shows an example of the application of the
modified categorical approach and sets forth that the “sentencing courts
may not consult additional documents when a defendant was convicted
under an “indivisible” statutes.”
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(C). Simultaneous Applications for Relief if Applicant Committed an Aggravated Felony
RODRIGUEZ-MUNOZ v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 419 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 2005) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a noncitizen who has been convicted of an aggravated felony can
seek simultaneous INA §212(c) and cancellation of removal relief.
HOLDING A crime involving moral turpitude that may be waivable under §212(c) may
nevertheless be an aggravated felony that renders a noncitizen ineligible for
LPR Cancellation of Removal?
Respondent Richard Jose Rodriguez-Munoz was admitted to the U.S. as an
•
LPR in 1976. In 1992, he pled guilty to four drug offenses in New York
state court, including third degree criminal sale of a controlled substance
(crack cocaine). In 1994, the INS charged Rodriguez-Munoz with
deportability as a noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony and as
being convicted of a violation relating to a controlled substance. While the
immigration proceedings were pending, Rodriguez-Munoz pled guilty in
New York to two additional offenses: fifth degree criminal possession of
marijuana and seventh degree criminal possession of a controlled substance.
The government acknowledged that there was no question that RodriguezMunoz was eligible to apply for a INA § 212(c), waiver of deportation
concerning his 1992 conviction. Indeed, § 212(c) relief remained available
for noncitizens whose convictions were obtained through plea
agreements and who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been
eligible for § 212(c) relief at the time of their plea under the law then in
effect. Rodriguez-Munoz apparently did not argue before the Board that his
1992 conviction was not an aggravated felony, nor did he raise such an
argument on appeal. Although a waiver of deportation gave him a chance
to stay in the U.S. despite his misdeed, it did not expunge his conviction.
Thus, even if Rodriguez-Munoz's deportation based on his 1992 conviction
were waived under § 212(c), that conviction would nonetheless remain an
aggravated felony for purposes of precluding his application for
cancellation of removal under INA§ 240A. Thus, he was deportable.
This case is important because a noncitizen who has an aggravated felony
•
conviction along with other crimes of moral turpitude cannot seek
simultaneous INA § 212(c) and Cancellation of Removal relief, because the
aggravated felony makes him or her ineligible for Cancellation of Removal.
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(D). Availability of Alternative Discretionary Relief
if Convicted of an Aggravated Felony

SCHEIDEMANN v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517 (3d Cir. 1996) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether an LPR who has served at least five years of imprisonment for a
crime defined as an aggravated felony (under the original 1988
definition) is eligible to apply for a discretionary waiver of deportation
under § 212(c).
HOLDING A noncitizen who has been convicted of an aggravated felony with a 5year sentence is ineligible for relief under INA 212(c).
Respondent James Scheidemann was an LPR since 1959. Scheidemann
•
sought review of an order of the Board, which dismissed his appeal to
overturn a deportation order. Scheidemann faced deportation on
account of a 1987 drug trafficking conviction for which he had served
over five years in prison. Scheidemann did not contest his deportability.
Rather, he argued that he was eligible to apply for a discretionary waiver
of deportation under I N A § 212(c). The court held that Congress
intended § 212(c) to restrict the Attorney General's power to exercise
discretionary relief, immediately after the amendment to the aggravated
felony statute, with respect to noncitizens who had served at least five
years imprisonment for crimes defined as aggravated felonies under the
original 1988 definition, regardless of the conviction date. Accordingly,
Scheidemann's petition for review was denied.
This case is important because an LPR who has served at least five
•
years of imprisonment for a crime defined as an aggravated felony
(under the original 1988 definition) will not be eligible to apply for a
discretionary waiver of deportation under the former § 212(c).

(4). Discretionary Component of LPR Cancellation of Removal
(A). Standard for Determining Discretionary Component
MATTER OF MARIN, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581 (BIA 1978) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a waiver of deportation/cancellation of removal provides an
indiscriminate waiver for all who demonstrate statutory eligibility for such
relief?
HOLDING Waivers of deportation/cancellation do not provide indiscriminate relief for
all who demonstrate statutory eligibility for such relief. Rather, the
adjudicator will consider positive and adverse factors, as set forth below.
Respondent Marin was admitted as a LPR on February 3, 1965. In March
•
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1976, he pled guilty to the felony charge of criminal sale of cocaine. He
served 30 months in New York State penal institutions. In May 1977 he
was served with an order to show cause and was charged with being
deportable. The IJ found him deportable and he appealed. The noncitizen
argued that he was eligible for 212(c) relief. The Board stated that
Section 212(c) does not provide an indiscriminate waiver for all who
demonstrate statutory eligibility for such relief. Instead, the Attorney
General is required to determine as a matter of discretion whether an
applicant warrants the relief sought. The Board concluded that the
noncitizen bears the burden of demonstrating that his application merits
favorable consideration. The noncitizen was unable to advance any
substantial equities and the Board dismissed his appeal.
This case is important because the Board courts should consider a
noncitizen's record as a whole. Courts should balance the adverse factors
evidencing the noncitizen's undesirability as a permanent resident with
the social and humane considerations presented in his or her behalf to
determine whether relief should be granted. Adverse factors include: (1)
“the nature and underlying circumstances of the exclusion ground at issue,”
(2) “the presence of additional significant violations of this country's
immigration laws,” (3) “the existence of a criminal record and, if so, its
nature, recency, and seriousness,” and (4) “the presence of other evidence
indicative of a respondent's bad character or undesirability as a permanent
resident of this country.” Positive equities include: (1) family ties within the
US, (2) residence of long duration in this country (particularly when the
inception of residence occurred while the respondent was of young age),
(3) evidence of hardship to the respondent and family if deportation occurs,
(4) service in this country's Armed Forces, (5) a history of employment, (6)
the existence of property or business ties, (7) evidence of value and service
to the community, (8) proof of a genuine rehabilitation if a criminal record
exists, and (9) other evidence attesting to a respondent's good character
(e.g., affidavits from family, friends, and responsible community
representatives).”

MATTER OF EDWARDS, 20 I. & N. Dec. 191 (BIA 1990) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether S e c t i o n 2 1 2 ( c ) provides an indiscriminate waiver for
individuals who demonstrate statutory eligibility?
HOLDING Section 212(c) does not provide an indiscriminate waiver for individuals
who demonstrate statutory eligibility.
Respondent Edwards, who was admitted as an LPR in 1968. He married a
•
US citizen with whom he had four US citizen children. He incurred
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criminal convictions while in the US that entailed him serving some 2 and
1/2 years of imprisonment. The noncitizen implored that he be allowed to
remain in the US because of his family. He insisted that he would work
hard to change his ways. He stated that his wife and children, as well as his
mother and siblings, resided here and that he knew no one in Barbados.
The IJ determined that the noncitizen was statutorily eligible for a section
212(c) waiver. However, he denied that relief in the exercise of discretion.
On appeal, Edwards argued that the IJ erred by failing to consider all of the
favorable factors presented in his case. The Board balanced the various
factors in the noncitizen' s case and took note of his favorable equities,
which the board found to be unusual or outstanding. However, when the
Board weighed these equities against the adverse factors of the
noncitizen's extensive criminal record, the Board determined that a
favorable exercise of discretion was not warranted.
This case is important because the Board states that under f o r m e r INA
§ 212(c), courts should consider the record as a whole. Additionally,
this case clarified confusion that was found from the rehabilitation factor in
Matter of Marin. Some courts found that “a clear showing of reformation is
an absolute prerequisite to a favorable exercise of discretion;” however,
the Board clarified the rehabilitation is not an absolute prerequisite.
Rather, each instance should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

MATTER OF SOTELO-SOTELO, 23 I. & N. Dec. 201 (BIA 2001) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether a noncitizen is required to satisfy a threshold test of showing
"unusual or outstanding equities" for the consideration of whether a
favorable exercise of discretion is warranted?
HOLDING The noncitizen does not have to show “unusual or outstanding equities.”
Rather, favorable and adverse factors should be weighed to determine
whether the person warrants discretionary relief.
Respondent Javier Sotelo-Sotelo adjusted his status to that of an LPR on
•
December 1, 1990. On July 24, 2000, he was convicted of the following
offenses: possession and passing fraudulent resident alien cards, failure
to provide migrant workers with terms and conditions of employment,
and illegal entry or aiding and abetting illegal entry. The noncitizen was
sentenced to 8 months of imprisonment for each of the first two offenses,
and to 6 months of imprisonment for the third offense. In proceedings
before the IJ, the noncitizen conceded removability as charged and applied
for Cancellation of Removal under INA §240A(a). The IJ denied the
noncitizen's application for relief, and the noncitizen appealed. The
Board found that the favorable factors presented in support of the
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noncitizen's application for cancellation of removal did not outweigh the
adverse factors. In doing so, the Board rejected the use of an
'outstanding and unusual equities' requirement as a threshold for relief and
instead found that the IJ should weigh the favorable and adverse factors to
determine whether the 'totality of the evidence' on balance indicates that a
favorable discretion is warranted.
This case is important because the Board rejected the use of an
'outstanding and unusual equities' requirement as a threshold for relief
and instead found that the IJ should weigh the favorable and adverse
factors to determine whether the 'totality of the evidence' on balance
indicates that a favorable discretion is warranted.

LEE V. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 431 Fed. Appx. 184 (3d Cir. 2011) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether the IJ abused his discretion in denying Cancellation of Removal for
a respondent who was statutorily eligible for relief?
HOLDING The IJ did not abuse his discretion.
Respondent Mun Seok Lee conceded removability on account of his
•
conviction of possession of a handgun without a permit and applied for
Cancellation of Removal. Although Respondent was statutorily eligible, the IJ
denied Cancellation of Removal on a discretionary basis. The IJ stated:
“[Respondent] has not demonstrated that he is worthy of the Court’s
favorable exercise of discretion based on [his] pattern of engaging in
unlawful conduct relating to his alcohol intoxication as reported in
conviction and/or arrest records occurring from 1993 to 2008.” The Board
affirmed, finding that Respondent had not displayed that his “positive
equities do not outweigh the adverse factors in this case.” The Board stated
that Respondent’s positive equities included his lengthy stay in the U.S., the
fact that he owns “several successful businesses that employ about 40
people, his history of paying taxes, and his active participation in his church
and community.” The adverse factors included his criminal history, the
“recency, the quantity of the[] alcohol-related arrests and convictions[,] and
the serious nature of them poses a public risk…,” the fact that his
rehabilitation is not supported by the record, the fact that he only attended
Alcoholics Anonymous that were mandated because of his criminal
convictions, and the fact that “he was not forthcoming in his testimony
about his use of alcohol in connection with his arrests, and that, by his own
admission, he continued to drink alcohol.” The Third Circuit concluded that
the Board correctly “weigh[ed] the favorable and adverse factors.”
This case is important because the case provides an example of how the
•
positive and adverse factors will be applied.
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(B). Court of Appeals Jurisdiction to Hear Appeals Concerning
the Discretionary Component
VARGAS V. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 543 Fed. Appx. 162 (3d Cir. 2013)68 [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to review a petitioner’s
claim that the Board gave insufficient consideration to discretionary factors?
HOLDING The Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to review a petitioner’s claim, unless
the Board engaged in “impermissible fact finding.”
Respondent Emmanuel De La Cruz Vargas was found to be statutorily
•
eligible for Cancellation of Removal; however, he was denied application on
account of discretionary factors. Respondent argued that the IJ erred
because the Judge did not meaningfully consider all discretionary factors.
The government argues that the Courts of Appeal generally lack jurisdiction
to review discretionary matters. The Third Circuit agreed with the
government finding that the court lacked authority to review claims based
on the Immigration Judge’s discretion; however, the Third Circuit found that
the court can review for “impermissible fact finding.”
This case is important because it holds that the Third Circuit will not look to
•
whether the Board or IJ insufficiently weighed the equities, but will look at
only those scenarios which the Board engaged in “impermissible fact
finding.”
(C). Retroactivity
INS v. ENRICO ST. CYR, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether the post-IIRAIRA statutory restrictions on discretionary relief apply
to noncitizens who plead guilty to a deportable crime prior to the enactment
of IIRAIRA?
HOLDING Post-IIRAIRA statutory restrictions on discretionary relief do not apply to
noncitizens who pled guilty to a deportable crime prior to the enactment of
IIRAIRA.
Respondent Enrico St. Cyr was admitted as an LPR in 1986. A decade later in
•
Connecticut, he pled guilty in a Connecticut state court to selling a

68

See e.g., Padmore v. Holder, 609 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding the BIA “improperly found facts
which it held to be “significant” and “important” to its decision denying him relief”).
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controlled substance, $100 worth of cocaine, and thus became
deportable. If the INS had taken custody of St. Cyr at the completion of
his sentence, he would have been eligible for a waiver of deportation
under INA § 212(c). Because the INS did not begin proceedings against St.
Cyr until 1997, St. Cyr would be subject to the new laws passed in 1996,
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), if the court
found that the statutes were retroactive. Therefore, St. Cyr could no longer
file a motion for § 212(c), even though he pled to the crime when the
waiver was still being granted. Represented by the ACLU, St. Cyr sued the
federal government on the grounds that he was lawfully eligible for the
waiver. The case reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 2001. The Court ruled
that Congress never intended for INS to apply its new rule retroactively in
cases involving plea bargains made prior to the enactment of IIRIRA. That
meant that St. Cyr, and other immigrants whose convictions were obtained
through plea agreements, remain eligible for § 212(c) waiver if they would
have been eligible for § 212(c) relief at the time of their plea.
This case is important because it held that the effective date of the changes
from INA § 212(c) to Cancellation of Removal for LPRs, April 1, 1997, does
not bar § 212(c) relief for certain pre-IIRIRA convictions.

ATKINSON v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 479 F.3d. 222 (3d Cir. 2007) [Precedent]
ISSUE
Whether the post-IIRAIRA statutory restrictions on discretionary relief apply
to noncitizens who were convicted of a deportable crime prior to the
enactment of IIRAIRA?
HOLDING Post-IIRAIRA statutory restrictions on discretionary relief do not apply to
noncitizens who were convicted of a deportable crime prior to the
enactment of IIRAIRA.
Respondent Claudius Atkinson was convicted of state criminal offenses in
•
1991. He received a notice to appear in 1997, notifying him that he was
removable based upon his convictions. The IJ denied the noncitizen's
request for a waiver of deportation under former § 212(c) (repealed 1996),
finding that he was ineligible for that relief. A month after the BOARD denied
the noncitizen's appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in St. Cyr.
The noncitizen filed his habeas petition after his reconsideration motion,
based on St. Cyr, was denied. The District Court held that the he was not
entitled to relief because he failed to show that he had relied on § 212(c)
when he was convicted in 1991. In conformity with the REAL ID Act, the
court treated the habeas petition as a petition for review. The court held that
the noncitizen was not precluded from applying for § 212(c) relief. IIRIRA
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did not apply retroactively to noncitizens who were convicted of
aggravated felonies prior to IIRIRA's effective date, regardless of whether
they pleaded guilty or were convicted by a jury.
This case is important because the Third Circuit held that § 212(c) is
available to individuals who elected to go to trial and were convicted (as
opposed to entering a plea agreement).

MURALI KRISHNA PONNAPULA v. ASHCROFT, 373 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 2004) [Precedent]:
ISSUE
Whether the post-IIRAIRA statutory restrictions on discretionary relief apply
to noncitizens who were convicted of a deportable crime prior to the
enactment of IIRAIRA, but who turned down a misdemeanor plea deal?
HOLDING A noncitizen who turned down a misdemeanor plea deal, and was later
convicted of an aggravated felony is not subject to the statutory restrictions
of IIRAIRA.
Respondent Murali Krishna Ponnapula was indicted for grand larceny and
•
falsifying business records in violation of New York law after his brother
submitted a loan application with the noncitizen's forged signature and
without the noncitizen's knowledge. In reliance on counsel's advice, the
noncitizen turned down a misdemeanor plea agreement, went to trial
when former INA § 212(c) was still in effect, and was convicted. The court
rejected the Government's contention that St. Cyr precluded the
noncitizen from claiming an impermissible retroactive effect of the
repeal of § 212(c). With respect to the noncitizen, who reasonably could
have relied on the potential availability of § 212(c) relief, the court found
the repeal of § 212(c) had an impermissible retroactive effect. Although
the court concluded that actual reliance was not necessary, the court found
that the noncitizen demonstrated clear and reasonable actual reliance on
the former statutory scheme in making the decision to go to trial.
This case is important because the noncitizen reasonably believed that even
•
if he was convicted of a felony after trial he would still likely be eligible for
hardship relief from deportation pursuant to former § 212(c). In reliance
of this, the noncitizen decided to turn down the misdemeanor offer and
proceeded to trial. The Third Circuit court utilized St. Cyr and allowed the
noncitizen to avail himself of § 212(c) relief.

Page 97 of 327

PART 1

VI. PRACTICE ADVISORIESHow to Apply for LPR Cancellation of Removal

VI. PRACTICE ADVISORIES
Of the following guidance from stakeholders, some are direct quotes and some have
been paraphrased. Some practitioner comments, as labeled in the footnotes, are from
2009 and some are from 2016. Please note that the practitioner comments are provided
for general litigation strategies, and specific facts about the application process may
have changed since 2009.

(a). How to Apply for LPR Cancellation of Removal
The following is an explanation of how an attorney should file an application for LPR
Cancellation of Removal on behalf of a client.69

Preparing the Application

An LPR that has been placed in removal proceedings before an Immigration Court and

who is prima facie eligible for relief may apply for LPR Cancellation. An attorney
should first determine whether the LPR is eligible for LPR Cancellation under INA
§240A(a) by interviewing the LPR and obtaining his or her criminal and immigration
records. If the attorney determines that the LPR is eligible, the attorney should obtain
relevant and necessary information from the LPR and complete an LPR Cancellation
application. In order to prepare the application, the attorney should do the following: 70
(1) Complete Form EOIR-42A, Application for Cancellation of Removal for Certain
Permanent Residents. 71 This Form requires the applicant to supply basic
information about his or her self, information about his or her presence in the
U.S., marital status and spouse, employment and financial status, and family.
(2) Include a birth certificate of the applicant or other identification with a
translation if it is not in English, a copy of the LPR card (Green Card), passport

69

An applicant proceeding pro se should follow the same steps as an attorney when applying for LPR
Cancellation, but should not include Form EOIR-28 in his or her application.
70
An attorney should note the importance of making sure that he or she uses the most current version
of all forms (Form EOIR-42A, Form G-325A, and Form EOIR-28). These forms are updated frequently and
it is easy to locate and use an outdated form by mistake. E-mail from Ms. Powers, Esq., (Nov. 30, 2009).
71
See Revised as of January 1, 2016 § 1240.20(a) (2016). United States Department of Justice, Executive
Office for Immigration Review
(follow "Form EOIR-42A" hyperlink) available at
www.justice.gov/eoir/formslist.htm (last visited May 12, 2016).
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stamp, DHS Form I-94, proof of fee payment and biometrics, a full copy of the
applicant's criminal record, affidavits from the applicant and others72, a brief in
support of the application, and other supporting documentation.

(3) Complete Form G-325A, Biographic Information. 73 This Form requires the
applicant to supply information pertaining to his or her residence in the last five
years, last address outside the U.S. of more than one year, employment during
the last five years, and last occupation abroad.
(4) Complete Form EOIR-28, Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or
Representative Before the Immigration Court. 74 This Form requires the
applicant's attorney to supply information pertaining to his or her bar
membership and good standing, and authority to represent the applicant.
(5) Note that every block of each form should be filled in completely and clearly.75 If
a particular section does not apply to an applicant, the attorney should write "not
applicable" rather than leaving it blank.76 In addition, an attorney should note
that all documents filed with the Immigration Court must be in English or
accompanied by a certified English translation.77 An affidavit or declaration in

72

See, PART 2: I. ADVICE FOR PRACTITIONERS BY PRACTIONERS, available only upon request of Center
for Immigrants’ Rights at centerforimmigrantsr@pennstatelaw.psu.edu.
73
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, available at www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis
(follow "Forms" hyperlink; then follow " follow "Form G-325A" hyperlink), (last visited May 12, 2016)
74
United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review (follow "Form EOIR-28”
hyperlink) available at www.justice.gov/eoir/formslist.htm (last visited May 12, 2016).
75
United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Immigration Court
Practice Manual, Chapter 3: Filing with the Immigration Court, 56, available at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/02/04/practice_manual_-_02-082016_update.pdf (last visited May 12, 2016).
76
Refer to the Form EOIR-42A application instructions found in 'PART I: Appendix IX: Sample Documents
and Forms From Government Entities and Select Non-Profit Organizations' of this toolkit and to the
United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review (follow "Form EOIR-42A"
hyperlink) available at www.justice.gov/eoir/formslist.htm. In addition, an attorney should look to pro
se packets available from the Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project found in 'PART I: Appendix
VIII: Pro Se Packets' of this toolkit and at the Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project available at
www.firrp.org (choose "Resources" and follow "How to Defend Your Case” hyperlink, scroll to
“Cancellation of Removal for Legal Permanent Residents (green card holders) and select “English”
hyperlink), (last visited May 12, 2016).
77
8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.33, 1003.23(b)(1)(i) (2016).

Page 99 of 327

PART 1

VI. PRACTICE ADVISORIESHow to Apply for LPR Cancellation of Removal
English by a person who does not understand English must include a certificate of
interpretation stating that the affidavit or declaration has been read to the
person in a language that the person understands and that s/he understood it
before signing.78

(6) Include a witness list with the application. The witness list should include the
following information for each witness, except the applicant:79 the name of the
witness, if applicable, the alien registration number ("A number"), a written
summary of the testimony, the estimated length of the testimony, the language
in which the witness will testify, and a curriculum vitae or resume, if called as an
expert.

Supporting Documents

In addition to filing Form EOIR-42A and Form G-325A, an attorney should attach
supporting documents on behalf of an LPR. These documents should correspond with
each statutory element of INA §240A(a). For example an attorney should submit
documentary evidence to show that an LPR has been an LPR for at least five years, has
resided continuously in the U.S. after having been lawfully admitted in any status, and
has not been convicted of an aggravated felony.
An attorney should attach the supporting documents to the application for LPR
cancellation and include a table of contents with the documents.80 Also, an attorney
should include copies of original documents rather than the originals. The IJ has
discretion to retain original documents in the Record of Proceedings.81 The IJ notes on
the record when original documents are turned over to DHS or the Immigration Court.82

78

United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Immigration Court
Practice Manual, Chapter 3: Filing with the Immigration Court, 54, available at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/02/04/practice_manual_-_02-082016_update.pdf (last visited May 12, 2016).
79
See Id. at 64.
80
United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Immigration Court
Practice Manual, Chapter 3: Filing with the Immigration Court, 59, available at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/02/04/practice_manual_-_02-082016_update.pdf (last visited May 12, 2016).
81
See Id. at 62.
82
See Id.
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Required Biometric and Biographical Information

An attorney must complete Form G-325A for Biographic Information to submit with
an LPR Cancellation application for applicants 14 years of age or older.83 Form G-325A
is available for download from the Internet through USCIS 84 and requires an
applicant to supply information pertaining to his or her residence in the last five
years, last address outside the U.S. of more than one year, employment during the
last five years, and last occupation abroad.85
When an individual who is detained applies for LPR Cancellation, his or her biometrics
and fingerprinting will be handled by the facility in which s/he is detained.86 DHS is
responsible for obtaining biometrics and any other biographical information with
respect to any individual in detention.87
When an individual who is not detained has submitted an LPR Cancellation application
to the Department of Homeland Security, s/he will be given instructions on how to
complete the biometrics requirement and pay the application fees. The instructions are
called "Instructions for Submitting Certain Applications in Immigration Court and for
Providing Biometric and Biographic Information to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services."88 The applicant will be notified in writing of the location of the Applicant
Support Center (ASC) or the designated Law Enforcement Agency where s/he must go to
provide biometric and biographic information.89 The applicant will also be given a date

83

United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Executive Office for
Immigration Review, Application for Cancellation of Removal for Certain Permanent Residents,
Instructions, 1, available at www.justice.gov/eoir/formslist.htm (last visited May 12, 2016).
84
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, available at www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis
(follow "Forms" hyperlink; then follow " follow "Form G-325A" hyperlink), (last visited May 12, 2016)
85
See Id.
86
United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Immigration Court
Practice Manual, Chapter 3: Filing with the Immigration Court, 85, available at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/02/04/practice_manual_-_02-082016_update.pdf (last visited May 12, 2016).
87
8 C.F.R. §1003.47(d) (2016)
88
United States Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services,
Immigration
Benefits
in
EOIR
Removal
Proceedings,
2,
available
at
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/article/PreOrderInstr.pdf (last visited May 12, 2016).
89
United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Executive Office for
Immigration Review, Application for Cancellation of Removal for Certain Permanent Residents,
Instructions, 1, available at www.justice.gov/eoir/formslist.htm (last visited May 12, 2016).
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and time for his or her appointment.90 When s/he goes to the interview noted on the
receipt issued by the DHS, the applicant's fingerprints will be taken and s/he will be
given a biometrics confirmation document.91 It is important that an applicant comply
with the instructions during this process in order to avoid delays.

Fees

An attorney must pay a required $100 filing fee and $85 biometrics fee to the
Department of Homeland Security before filing Form EOIR-42A with the Immigration
Court.92 The Immigration Court does not collect fees.93 Evidence of payment of these
fees in the form of a copy of a DHS notice of fee receipt and biometrics appointment
instructions must accompany the Form EOIR-42A when it is filed with the Immigration
Court.94 The attorney should submit the fees in the exact amount to the DHS. The DHS
will not accept a payment of cash; it will only accept payments made by personal
check, cashier's check, certified bank check, bank international money order, or
foreign draft drawn on a financial institution in the U.S. and payable to the
"Department of Homeland Security" in U.S. currency.95 If a check is drawn on an account
of a person other than the LPR applicant, the name and alien registration number of the
applicant must be entered on the face of the check.96 In addition, all checks must be
drawn on a bank located in the U.S.97 Furthermore, an attorney should note that the
required fees will not be reimbursed if the application is granted.98

90

See Id.
See Id.
92
8 C.F.R. § 1240.20(a) (2016).
93
United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Immigration Court
Practice Manual, Chapter 3: Filing with the Immigration Court, 64, available at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/02/04/practice_manual_-_02-082016_update.pdf (last visited May 12, 2016).
94
United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Executive Office for
Immigration Review, Application for Cancellation of Removal for Certain Permanent Residents,
Instructions, 2, available at www.justice.gov/eoir/formslist.htm (last visited May 12, 2016).
95
See Id.
96
See Id.
97
See Id.
98
United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Immigration Court
Practice Manual, Chapter 3: Filing with the Immigration Court, 66, available at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/02/04/practice_manual_-_02-082016_update.pdf (last visited May 12, 2016).
91
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If an LPR is unable to pay the filing fee, his or her attorney may ask the IJ for permission
to file the application without fee (fee waiver). The IJ has the discretion to waive the fee
if the applicant shows that s/he is unable to pay the fee.99 If an applicant wants to
request a fee waiver, his or her attorney should notify the IJ and submit an affidavit, or
unsworn declaration made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1746, substantiating the applicant's
inability to pay the fee.100 An attorney should note that if s/he submits an application
without a required fee and the LPR's request for a fee waiver is denied, the filing will be
deemed defectively filed and may be rejected or excluded from evidence.101

Serving and Filing the Application
After preparing an application for LPR Cancellation, an attorney should make a
minimum of three copies of the application so that s/he can retain at least one copy for
his or her records. The attorney should then file the application and serve it on opposing
counsel. The attorney should do the following102:
(1) File a copy of the application (Form EOIR-42A), Form G-325A, Form EOIR-28, and
the required $100 filing fee and $85 biometrics fee with the DHS at the
appropriate USCIS Service Center before filing the application with the
Immigration Court. The DHS will send a copy of a notice of fee receipt and
biometrics appointment instructions to the applicant.
(2) If the applicant is detained, DHS is responsible for obtaining biometrics. If the
applicant is not detained, instruct him or her to go to his or her biometrics
interview noted on the receipt from the DHS with the required documents
designated on the receipt. The applicant will have fingerprints taken and receive
a written confirmation once biometrics are complete.
(3) File the original application and copies of all supporting documents with the
Immigration Court with evidence of payment of the fees and biometrics.103 This
evidence should be in the form of a copy of the DHS notice of fee receipt and
biometrics appointment instructions.

99

See Id.
Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 103.7 (2016).
101
See Id.
102
United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Executive Office for
Immigration Review, Application for Cancellation of Removal for Certain Permanent Residents,
Instructions, 2, available at www.justice.gov/eoir/formslist.htm (last visited May 12, 2016).
103
8 C.F.R. § 1240.20 (2016).
100
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(4) Mail or deliver a copy of the packet to the Assistant Chief Counsel for the DHS at
the time the Immigration Court is served. Call the Assistant Chief Counsel prior to
the hearing to make certain that s/he received the packet.
(5) In addition to filing a copy of the application and all supporting documents with
the Immigration Court, the attorney should include a completed certificate
showing service of the documents on the Assistant Chief Counsel.

The application package should contain, in the following order104:
• Form EOIR-28 (if required)
• Cover page
•

If applicable, fee receipt (stapled to the application) or motion for a fee waiver

• Application
• Proposed exhibits (if any) with table of contents; and
• Proof of Service

104

United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Immigration Court
Practice Manual, Chapter 3: Filing with the Immigration Court, 56, available at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/02/04/practice_manual_-_02-082016_update.pdf (last visited May 12, 2016).
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(b). Release from Detention Information
Bond

A noncitizen who is detained is eligible for bond or conditional parole,105 unless s/he is
subject to mandatory detention106 or is considered an “arriving alien.”107 Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) will make an initial determination about bond eligibility.
However, if the noncitizen does not agree with ICE, s/he is able to motion for a bond
redetermination in front of an Immigration Judge (IJ). 108 Bond redetermination is
discretionary, and the IJ will consider whether the noncitizen poses a flight risk, danger
to the community, and the severity of the offense committed by the alien. 109
Additionally, for a noncitizen who is detained for a prolonged amount of time, s/he may
be eligible for habeas relief.

Habeas Corpus

In the case of a noncitizen who is ordered removed, the Attorney General is supposed to
remove the person from the United States within a period of 90 days.110 Noncitizens in
prolonged detention may be eligible to petition for a writ of habeas corpus so that the
habeas court can measure the “reasonableness” of detention that is beyond the 90 day
period.111 The Supreme Court held that after a “6-month period, once the alien provides
good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient
to rebut that showing.”112 “[A]n alien may be held in confinement until it has been
determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future.”113
In the Diop case, the Third Circuit held that a respondent who had been granted
withholding of removal and was released from custody could still have standing for a

105

INA § 236(a).
INA § 236(c); INA § 236(A).
107
8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(2) (2016).
108
Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 799 (BIA 1999).
109
INA § 236(c)(2).
110
INA § 241(a)(1)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (2016).
111
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
112
Id.
113
Id.
106

Page 105 of 327

PART 1

VI. PRACTICE ADVISORIES- Release from Detention Information

habeas corpus appeal. 114 The court concluded that the respondent’s 35 months of
detention “without any post-Joseph hearing inquiry into whether it was necessary to
accomplish the purposes of § 1226(c) was unreasonable.” 115 The Government had
argued that the respondent’s habeas case was moot because he had been released
from custody after the crime for which he was mandatorily detained was vacated.116
However the Third Circuit Court found that the respondent could again be taken into
custody if the decision that vacated his crime were overturned and because a second
conviction could be grounds for being detained again.117
Noncitizens who are still in removal proceedings and have not received a final order of
deportation may also seek to file a writ of habeas corpus.118 The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals applied the reasonableness test to cases where the noncitizen has been
detained for over the “6-month” period.119
For more information about bond, bond redetermination, and habeas corpus see the
following sources:
• American Immigration Law Foundation, Practice Advisory: Arrest, Detention and
Bond Procedures for Non-Citizens Without Criminal Convictions (July 2008),
http://www.asistahelp.org/documents/resources/AIC_on_detention_etc_DDCBE
EBCFCBD0.pdf.
• American Civil Liberties Union, Practice Advisory: Prolonged Mandatory
Detention and Bond Eligibility in the Third Circuit (May 12, 2015),
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/DiopAdvisory.pdf.
• Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project, “Pro Se Guide To Challenging Your
Detention Through Habeas Corpus” (May 2013), http://firrp.org/media/HabeasGuide-2013.pdf

114

Diop v ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2011), citing United States v. Frumento, 552 F.2d
534.
115
Diop v ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2011).
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 783 F.3d 469 (3d Cir. 2015)
119
Id.
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(c). How to Obtain Client’s Records
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Requests

The following is applicable to FOIA requests processed by the following agencies:
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), and U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS).
Processing Tracks120
FOIA requests are placed on one of three (3) tracks. Requests are entered into tracks
based upon the complexity of the request:
•
•
•

Track 1: Track one is for those requests that seek and receive expedited
processing pursuant to subsection (a)(6)(E) of the FOIA.
Track 2: Track two is for those requests that do not involve a significant volume of
records or lengthy consultations with other entities.
Track 3: Track three is for those requests that do involve a significant volume of
records and for which lengthy or numerous consultations are required, or those
requests which may involve sensitive records.

Processing Times 121
The goal is to respond within 20 business days of receipt of the request; however, the
FOIA does permit a 10-day extension of this time period. If the request involves a
significant volume of records, requires that the agency collect records from separate
offices, or requires that the agency consult with another agency, the agency where the
request was sent will invoke the 10-day extension for the completion of the request.
Expediting Requests122
To have a FOIA request expedited, the request must demonstrate a compelling need
such as: (1) imminent threat to the life or physical safety of an individual; (2) an urgency

120

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FOIA Overview: Submitting FOIA Requests (select the tab
titled “FOIA Legal Information”, scroll down to “Multi-Track Processing”), available at,
https://www.ice.gov/foia/overview (last visited May 12, 2016).
121
Executive Office for Immigration Review, Freedom of Immigration Act: How to Submit a FOIA/PA
Request, available at, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/foia-facts (last visited May 12, 2016).
122
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Submitting FOIA Request, available at,
https://www.ice.gov/foia/request#wcm-survey-target-id (last visited May 12, 2016).
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to inform the public concerning actual or alleged Federal Government activity if the
request is made by a person primarily engaged in disseminating information; (3) loss of
substantial due process rights; or (4) a matter of widespread and exceptional media
interest in which there exist possible questions about the government's integrity which
Fees
123
There is no fee to file a FOIA request. However, FOIA established three fee categories
that agencies use to determine if fees will be charged. As pertaining to attorneys (noncommercial requesters), applicants are charged for photocopying after 100 pages and
for time spent searching for records in excess of two hours. Indicate a specific amount
that you are willing to pay, should there be a fee incurred beyond the free allotment. If
no amount is indicated, a fee of up to $25 may be assessed.

123

Id.
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Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) FOIA Request124

Requests for information about a person other than the requester require proper
authorization allowing release of the information. Requests regarding applications filed
with DHS should not be made with EOIR and DHS forms should not be used to request
records from EOIR. To obtain nonpublic information, such as the record of proceedings
before an immigration court regarding a person you represent, the FOIA Service Center
recommends the following:
How to Request the Information Sought
(1) Include in the request an authorization to release information from the person
who is the subject of the request (or include an explanation about how the public
interest outweighs the privacy interest of the subject of the record.
(2) The person who is the subject of the FOIA request must certify as to his or her
identity by completing Form DOJ-361 or reasonably describing the records sought
and including identifying information. For example, if a FOIA request seeks a
record of proceedings, the request, if possible, should include the following:
• The noncitizen's full name; aliases
• Immigration hearing location
• Alien registration (A) number (if known). If the A number is not known or
the case occurred before 1988, provide the date of the Order to Show
Cause, the country of origin, and the location of the immigration hearing.
(3) An attorney of record may provide evidence of that fact such as a valid entry of
appearance, Form EOIR-27 or Form EOIR-28.
(4) FOIA requests may be submitted to the following:
• Office of the General Counsel
Attn: FOIA Service Center
Executive Office for Immigration Review
5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 1903
Falls Church, VA 22041
• EOIR.FOIARequests@usdoj.gov
Tracking Requests
To follow up on the status of a FOIA request, call (703) 605-1297 and ask to speak to (1)
the FOIA Specialist assigned to your request or (2) Crystal Souza, the FOIA Public Liaison.
Additional information on FOIA procedures can be found here.
124

Executive Office for Immigration Review, Freedom of Immigration Act: How to Submit a FOIA/PA
Request, available at, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/foia-facts (last visited May 12, 2016).
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Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) FOIA Request125

ICE FOIA requests must be submitted in writing. The request can be made using
Form G-639 or by using the online FOIA Request Form. Requests must be for access to
existing records only. The ICE FOIA Office will not "create" records for the purpose of
responding to a FOIA.
How to Request the Information Sought
(1) The request must be in writing, including a daytime phone number.
(2) Provide as much information as possible on the subject matter to help expedite
the search process.
• Date of Birth
• Alien number (A number)
• Any Alias(es) (possibly used at the time of entry or apprehension)
• Dates (Note: Travel Records only go back to 1982).
• Times
• Type of document
• Entry numbers
• Officer names (if available)
• Certificate numbers
(3) Requests may be submitted by any of the following:
• Faxed to: (202) 732-4265
• Mailed to:
FOIA Office
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
800 North Capitol St., NW
5th Floor, Suite 585
Washington, DC 20536
• E-mailed to: ICE-FOIA@dhs.gov
Questions may also be submitted my email.
Tracking Requests
The requestor should receive an acknowledgement letter within 3-5 business days after
ICE receives the request. This letter will contain a tracking number that ICE that should
be on hand when checking the status of the request.
125

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Submitting FOIA Request,
https://www.ice.gov/foia/request#wcm-survey-target-id (last visited May 12, 2016).

available

at,
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Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) FOIA Request

CBP FOIA responses may provide the following information:126
• Apprehension by Border Patrol between Official Ports of Entry
o CBP does not have complete records of apprehensions made by Border
Patrol before 2000. Pre-2000 records of apprehensions may be available in
the A-File maintained by USCIS.
o Requests for Alien Files should be submitted to USCIS.
• Detention by Border Patrol or at Ports of Entry
• Expedited Removal by Border Patrol or at Ports of Entry
• I-94 Records
• Information Regarding Entry and Exit
o CBP does not have records on the entry and exit of persons arriving or
departing the U.S. before 1982.
• Records Regarding Inspection or Examination upon Arrival at a U.S. Port of Entry
• Voluntary Return
CBP FOIA requests may be submitted online. Register to create a FOIA account. From
the Agency Selection drop-down, choose U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Reports
are delivered to the registered account. Should the agency need to contact the attorney,
the agency will use the contact information provided during the account registration.
How to Request the Information Sought
The following information will be needed to provide accurate reports.
(1) Provide a clear and detailed description of the records being requested. Include
as much of the following as is available:
• Date of Birth
• Alien number (A number)
• Any Alias(es) (possibly used at the time of entry or apprehension)
• Dates (Note: Travel Records only go back to 1982).
• Times
• Type of document

126

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Submitting FOIA Requests (table contains information as to
which agency the FOIA request should be submitted), available at, https://www.uscis.gov/aboutus/freedom-information-and-privacy-act-foia/how-file-foia-privacy-act-request/submitting-foiarequests (last visited May 12, 2016).

Page 111 of 327

PART 1

VI. PRACTICE ADVISORIES-How to Obtain Client’s Records

• Entry numbers
• Officer names (if available)
• Certificate numbers
(2) Attorneys must attach a written consent from the subject of record.
• Submit Form G-28, Form G-639 or a written notarized consent.
Tracking Requests
From the account, a view of the request will be provided. Click on the desired request
number for additional details. Alternatively, call the CBP FOIA Office at 202-325-0150,
Mon-Fri 8am-5pm EST. However, they can only provide you with the same information
that you can obtain online.
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Citizenship & Immigration Services (USCIS) Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)127

Visit the USCIS website to request the Freedom of Information Act record. USCIS FOIA
requests must be submitted in writing by mail128 to the National Records Center.
USCIS FOIA responses may provide the following information:129
• Deportation Records; Detention and Removal Records
• A-file
• Petitions (I-130, I-485, I-589, N-400, etc.)
• USCIS Background Investigations
• Certification of non-existence of a record
How to Request the Information Sought
(1) Form G-639 may be used to submit the written request.
(2) Send form to the following physical address:
• U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
National Records Center, FOIA/PA Office
P. O. Box 648010
Lee’s Summit, MO 64064-8010
Tracking Requests
130
To check the status of the FOIA request, visit, https://egov.uscis.gov/foiawebstatus/
and enter the “Control Number” that was provided after receipt of the FOIA request.
The “Control Number” will begin with the letters NRC, COW, etc..
• If your request is pending, the status will indicate the position of your request
relative to all pending USCIS requests in the same processing track.
• If your request has been processed and responded to within the past six months,
you will be given the date your request was processed.

127

How to File a FOIA/PA Request, available at https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/freedom-informationand-privacy-act-foia/how-file-foia-privacy-act-request/how-file-foiapa-request (last visited May 12,
2016).
128
For assistance contact USCIS by Telephone 800-375-5283; Fax 802-288-1793 or 816-350-5785; Email
uscis.foia@uscis.dhs.gov;
or
visit
the
USCIS
FOIA
Request
Guide,
available
at,
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/About%20Us/FOIA/How%20to%20File%20a%20FOIA%
20Privact%20Act%20Request/USCIS_FOIA_Request_Guide.pdf (last visited May 12, 2016).
129
Submitting FOIA Requests (table contains information as to which agency the FOIA request should be
submitted), available at, https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/freedom-information-and-privacy-actfoia/how-file-foia-privacy-act-request/submitting-foia-requests (last visited May 12, 2016).
130
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Check Status of Request, available at,
https://egov.uscis.gov/foiawebstatus/ (last visited May 12, 2016).
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Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Background Check

FBI Background check reports can be processed within 13 to 15 weeks and additional
time should be allocated for delivery.131
How to Request the Information Sought132
(1) Complete the Application Information Form 133 with the Noncitizen’s Information
• The mailing address may be the attorney’s business mailing address.
• The telephone number and e-mail address may be the attorney’s business
contact information.
(2) Obtain a set of fingerprints on the Standard Fingerprint Form FD-258134
• The card must be of original fingerprints. Copies will not be accepted.
• The noncitizen’s name and date of birth must be provided on the card.
• The fingerprinting must include rolled impressions of all 10 fingerprints (these
are sometimes referred to as plain or flat impressions).
o Fingerprints taken with ink or via live scan are acceptable. If
fingerprints are not legible, the fingerprint card will be rejected.
o If possible, have the fingerprints taken by a fingerprinting technician.
§ e.g. UPS in Pennsylvania does fingerprinting. However, UPS
requires the noncitizen to register with the CogentID.com
agency to process the fingerprinting fee that UPS charges.
(3) Obtain a $18 Money Order made out to Treasury of the United States. Be sure to
have the noncitizen sign where required
(4) Mail to the FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Division.
• FBI CJIS Division – Summary Request
1000 Custer Hollow Road
Clarksburg, WV 26306
Tracking Requests
To check the status of the FOIA request, visit, https://vault.fbi.gov/fdps-1/@@searchfdps or email, foipaquestions@ic.fbi.gov.135

131

See, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks.
Identity History Summary Request Checklist, available at, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identityhistory-summary-checks/identity-history-summary-request-checklist-1 (l last visited May 12, 2016).
133
Application Information Form, available at, https://forms.fbi.gov/identity-history-summary-checksreview/q384893984839334.pdf (last visited May 12, 2016).
134
Form FD- 258, see, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks/fd-258-1
(last visited May 12, 2016).
132
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State Criminal Records

The manner to request records differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The information
provided below will detail the steps to obtain records in the states under the jurisdiction
of the Third Circuit (Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware).
Pennsylvania136
In Pennsylvania, there are two methods of requesting a Criminal Record, including 1) an
online request or 2) submitting a request form. Response time for record requests vary
depending on the volume of requests, but can be expected to take between four to six
weeks.
Online Request Steps
(1) Go to the Pennsylvania Access to Criminal History (PATCH) Website at
https://epatch.state.pa.us/Home.jsp.
(2) Select “Submit a New Record Check.”137
(3) Select “Individual Request.”
(4) Read Terms and Conditions and select “Accept”
(5) Complete questions as prompted. Prompts will include background information
about the requestor and the background information about the subject of the
background check.
(a) Required information about the requestor will include: 1) Full name, 2) Phone
number, and 3) Address.
(b) Information about the subject of the background check will include: 1) Full
name, 2) Social Security number, 3) Date of birth 4) Sex, 5) Race, and 6)
Aliases and/or maiden name.
(6) Complete payment information. For each request, there is a $8.00 nonrefundable fee.
(7) If the person has no criminal record, this information will be provided
immediately. Otherwise, record the control number to check status of request,

135

Federal Bureau of Investigation, The Vault, available at https://vault.fbi.gov/fdps-1/@@search-fdps
(last visited May 12, 2016).
136
See Pennsylvania State Police, Request a Criminal Record, http://www.psp.pa.gov/Pages/Request-aCriminal-History-Record.aspx#.VzPAi4-cF6U (last visited May 12, 2016).
137
Please note that different fees apply to different requests. If the person requesting the criminal
record is a “volunteer” the person may not be subject to a fee. A volunteer may press “New Record
Check” to request criminal records.
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which can be found in the original PATCH webpage. If the request continues to
state pending after 24 hours, call 1-888-783-7972.
Paper Request Steps
(1) Download and complete the Individual Access and Review Request Form – SP4164A.138 Information requested by the form includes:
(a) Requester information (Name, Address, Phone Number).
(b) Information Involving the Subject of the Record Check (Name, Social Security
Number, Date of Birth, Sex, Race)
(2) Make check payable to Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Fee is $10.00.
(3) Send completed application to:
• Pennsylvania State Police Central Repository – RCPU
1800 Elmerton Avenue
Harrisburg, PA 17110-9758
New Jersey139
In New Jersey, criminal history background checks are obtained through live scan
fingerprinting. Follow the steps below to be fingerprinted:
(1) Download and complete the Universal Form which can be found at
http://www.njsp.org/info/pdf/20150129_universforma.pdf.
(2) Visit www.bioapplicant.com/nj or call 1-877-503-5981 to schedule a live scan
fingerprinting appointment.
(3) Bring the Universal Form and photo identification to the scheduled live scan
fingerprinting appointment.
(4) At the appointment, pay the $40.70 fee with Visa, MasterCard or e-check.
(5) If no response is received within 10 days, contact 609 882-2000 ext. 2918.
Delaware140
In Delaware, criminal history background checks are obtained through fingerprints.
Steps for In-State Requestors
(1) Go to 1 of 3 fingerprinting sites.

138

See Individual Access and Review Request Form – SP4-170, http://www.psp.pa.gov/Pages/Request-aCriminal-History-Record.aspx#.VvRWDI-cG6M (last visited May 12, 2016).
139
See New Jersey State Police, NJ Criminal History Records Information, http://www.njsp.org/criminalhistory-records/ (last visited May 12, 2016).
140
See
State
of
Delaware,
State
Bureau
of
Identification,
http://dsp.delaware.gov/state_bureau_of_identification.shtml (last visited May 12, 2016).

Page 116 of 327

PART 1

VI. PRACTICE ADVISORIES-How to Obtain Client’s Records

(a) Blue Hen Corporate Center, 655 South Bay Road, Suite 1B, Dover, Delaware,
DE 19901. Hours of operation are Mondays, 8:30am to 6:30pm and Tuesday
through Friday, 8:30am to 3:30pm. No appointment is necessary.
(b) Thurman Adams State Service Center, 546 S. Bedford Street, Room 202,
Georgetown, DE 19947. Hours of operation are Monday through Thursday
8:30am to 3:30pm. To schedule an appointment, call 302-739-2528. Cash is
not accepted. Results of the completed certified criminal history are not
returned the same day. The results are forwarded as soon as possible.
(c) Delaware State Police Troop 2, 100 Langrange Ave, Newark, DE 19702. Hours
of operation are Monday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday from 8:30am to
3:15pm. To schedule an appointment, call 302-739-2528. Results of the
completed certified criminal history are not returned to same day. Results are
forwarded as soon as possible.
(2) Provide photo identification at the fingerprinting site.
(3) Pay at fingerprinting site. Payment options include cash, credit, debit, certified
checks, money orders or company checks made out to Delaware State Police.
American Express or personal checks are not accepted. The fee is $52.50.
Steps for Out-of-State Requestors
(1) Get fingerprints taken at local police agency or any fingerprinting agency
(2) Obtain fingerprint cards. If the fingerprint agency does not provide fingerprint
cards, print a FD-258 fingerprint card on the Federal Bureau of Investigation
website
at
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summarychecks/fd-258-1 and present card to the agency for fingerprinting.
(3) Mail an authorization letter, fingerprint card, and certified check or money order,
made payable to Delaware State Police. The fee is $52.50.
(4) Mail to:
• Delaware State Police
State Bureaus of Identification
P.O. Box 430
Dover, DE 199903
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VII. ALTERNATIVES TO §240A(a) –
Alternative Forms of Relief, Prosecutorial Discretion,
Administrative and Judicial Options for Individuals
Denied or Ineligible for LPR Cancellation of Removal
Relief
Noncitizens who do not meet the statutory requirements of INA § 240A(a) LPR
Cancellation of Removal may be eligible to apply for the alternative forms of relief
discussed below. In addition to meeting the statutory requirements for some of these
alternative forms of relief, the REAL ID Act of 2005 allows the Immigration Judge (IJ)
greater independence in determining credibility and requiring corroboration evidence
from the noncitizen.141 The IJ has greater discretion in determining whether or not
the testimony of the noncitizen or other witness in support of the noncitizen is
credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the
noncitizen has satisfied his/her burden of proof. 142

(a). Alternative Forms of Relief
Non-LPR Cancellation of Removal

Cancellation of Removal for non-lawful permanent resident is available to noncitizens
who have been physically present in the United States for at least 10 years, are of good
moral character, have not been convicted of any crimes that would make the
individual inadmissible or deportable, and can show that upon removal a qualifying
relative would suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” 143 Lawful
permanent residents who are ineligible LPR Cancellation under INA § 240A(a), may
apply to Non-LPR Cancellation of Removal under part INA § 240A(a).144

141

8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(l)(B)(i), 1229a(c)(4)(A) (2016); INA §§ 208(b)(l)(B)(i), 240(c)(4)(A).
8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(l)(B)(ii), 1229a(c)(4)(A) (2016); INA §§ 208(b)(l)(B)(ii), 240(c)(4)(A).
143
8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(b)(l)(A)-(C) (2016); INA §§ 240A(b)(l)(A)-(C).
144
Stephen H. Legomsky and Cristina M. Rodriguez, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy, 626 (6th
ed.) (2015).
142
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Incomplete Notice to Appear (Third Circuit Court Jurisdiction)
In Orozco-Velasquez V. Attorney General, the Third Circuit overturned the Board
precedent, Matter of Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644 (BIA 2011) by holding that that the
NTA needs to include all statutory stipulations in order to stop the time for purposes of
continuous physical presence, stipulations which include the date and time of the
removal hearing. 145 The court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1), necessarily requires
specification of the “time and place at which the proceedings shall be held.”146 The
Court found that the word “shall” in the statute is a requirement, and in the absence of
another conflicting canon of statutory construction such a requirement is mandatory.
Because the statute requires that an “alien [be] served a notice to appear under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229(a)” the statute also “compels” the government to follow all the statutory
stipulations set forth for an NTA, which includes stating the time and place of the
hearing.147 Until the government has set forth all such stipulations, the NTA “will not
stop the…clock” for purposes of Cancellation of Removal eligibility. 148 Thus, the
incomplete NTA will not preclude the noncitizen from continuing to accrue continuous
physical presence for the purpose of fulfilling the required 10 years of continuous
physical presence requirement of INA § 240A(a) eligibility.

§ 212(c) Waiver

A section 212(c) discretionary waiver, now repealed under the INA, provides that
noncitizens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, who committed a crime or
other act rendering him or her inadmissible or deportable from the U.S.; who has not had
an order of deportation, and who has had a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven
consecutive years, may be eligible for a waiver of deportation.149 However, this relief is
only available to those who pleaded guilty prior to April 1, 1997 with the intention
to apply for § 212(c) relief.150 The IJ weighs the negative factors, such as the severity of
the crime, against positive factors, such as the noncitizen's rehabilitation and
connections with the community, in making his or her determination on whether the
noncitizen merits a favorable exercise of discretion.151

145

Orozco-Velasquez v. Attorney General, No. 13-1685, 2016 WL 930241 (3d Cir. 2016).
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (2016); INA § 212(c).
150
8 C.F.R. §§§ 1003, 1212, 1240 (2016); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 289 (2001).
151
Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584 (BIA 1978).
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§ 212(h) Waiver

Noncitizens who have committed crimes of moral turpitude, have a single controlled
substance violation involving possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana, have
engaged in prostitution, or have received immunity from prosecution, may obtain a §
212(h) waiver. Such individuals may qualify for a § 212(h) waiver if (1) the crime was
committed more than fifteen years before the application or admission or if it was a
prostitution offense, the noncitizen has been rehabilitated and, (2) the individual is the
spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a U.S. citizen or permanent legal resident and
denying the waiver would cause extreme hardship to the citizen or permanent resident;
or (3) the individual is seeking permanent residence after being battered by a U.S.
citizen or permanent resident spouse or parent.152 When the waiver is sought based on
the passage of 15 years since the commission of the offense, the noncitizen also must
show that admission would not be contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security
and that the noncitizen has been rehabilitated.153 One bar from relief under § 212(h)
states that “[n]o waiver shall be granted…in the case of an alien who has previously
been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence if… since the date of such admission the alien has been convicted of an
aggravated felony…” Until recently, there was a Circuit split on the issue of whether a
noncitizen need not only be considered an LPR at the time of the application, but also
have had the LPR status when the noncitizen entered to be eligible for § 212(h) relief.154
However, recently the Board has held that a noncitizen who had not been admitted to
the U.S. as an LPR, but who adjusted to lawful permanent residence status while
residing in the U.S., is not barred from establishing eligibility for a waiver of

152

8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2016); INA §§ 212(h).
8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(A)(ii), (iii) (2016); INA §§ 212(h)(1)(A)(ii), (iii).
154
Medina-Rosales v. Holder, 778 F.3d 1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that the § 212(h) bar to
eligibility for relief did not include those who adjusted their status to a lawful permanent resident while
present in the U.S.); Negrete-Ramirez v. Holder, 741 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that the § 212(h)
bar to eligibility for relief did not include those who adjusted their status to a lawful permanent resident
while present in the U.S.); Hanif v. United States, 694 F.3d 479, 48 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that the
§ 212(h) bar to eligibility for relief did not included those who adjusted their status to a lawful
permanent resident in the U.S.); Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380, 387-388 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding
that § 212(h) bar to eligibility for relief did not include those who adjusted their status to lawful
permanent resident in the U.S.); Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 545 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that the
§212(h) bar to eligibility for relief did not include those who adjusted their status to a lawful permanent
resident in the U.S.); But see, Roberts v. Holder, 745 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that § 212(h) bar
to eligibility for relief included those who adjusted their status to a lawful permanent resident in the
U.S.).
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inadmissibility under section INA §212(h) as a result of an aggravated felony
conviction.155

Asylum
A person may apply for asylum as a defense to removal if the noncitizen meets the
definition of "refugee" under the Act and is not subject to one of the statutory bars.156 A
“refugee” is defined as “any person who is outside any country in which such
person’s nationality or…any country in which such person last habitually resided, and
who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of that country because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.”157

Withholding of Removal

A noncitizen in removal proceedings may apply for withholding of removal if s/he can
show that s/he may not be returned to a place where s/he will face persecution
because of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular group, or
political opinion.158 Withholding is similar to asylum in that it provides protection for
persons fleeing persecution on account of one of the aforementioned five grounds,
but withholding, in fact, requires a higher standard of proof. Thus, in order to obtain
withholding of removal, the noncitizen must show by a clear probability that s/he
faces the requisite harm of a threat to life or freedom in the proposed country of
removal.159

Protection under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)

The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
of Punishment, which Congress codified into U.S. law, prohibits the removal of a
noncitizen to a country where there are substantial grounds for believing that the
noncitizen would be in danger of torture or subject to inhuman or degrading
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Matter of J-H-J, 26 I. & N. Dec. 563, 564 (BIA 2015).
8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2016); INA § 208.
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8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2016); INA §101(a)(42)(A).
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torture.160 A noncitizen in removal proceedings may apply for this form of relief if s/he
can establish that it is more likely than not that s/he would be tortured if removed to
the proposed country of removal.”161

Temporary Protected Status (TPS)

Noncitizens from certain countries may request this form of relief.162 The Secretary of
Homeland Security, after consulting with “appropriate” government agencies, may
designate a foreign state or part of a foreign state under and of the three circumstances:
(A) There is an ongoing armed conflict that would pose a serious threat to the personal
safety of the state’s nationals if they were returned there; (B) An environmental disaster
has substantially but temporarily disrupted living conditions, and the state has
requested designation because it cannot adequately handle the return of its nationals;
(C) “[E]xtraordinary and temporary conditions” prevent safe return, and permitting the
state’s nationals to remain temporarily in the U.S. would not be contrary to the national
interests. 163 Countries that are currently designated for TPS are: El Salvador,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Somalia, and Sudan.164

Voluntary Departure

Noncitizens in removal proceedings who meet the statutory requirements of INA
§ 240B may request voluntary departure instead of receiving a formal removal
order.165 There are three different forms of voluntary departure, depending on the
stage of the proceeding when granted. Voluntary departure can be granted: (1) before
the removal hearing; (2) during the removal hearing; and (3) after the removal
hearing.166 Under § 240B(a), the Secretary of Homeland Security may permit certain
noncitizens to depart voluntarily, either in lieu of removal proceedings or before

160

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. The CAT was incorporated into United States law by the Foreign Affairs
Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA), Pub. L. No. 105-277 (1987); 8 C.F.R. §§ (1)208.16,
(1)208.17, (1)208.18 (2016).
161
8 C.F.R. §§ (1)208.16, (1)208.17, (1)208.18 (2016).
162
8 U.S.C. §§§ 1254a(b)(1)(A), (B), (C) (2016); INA § 244(b)(1).
163
Stephen Legomsky and Cristina Rodriguez, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy, 1140, (6th ed.)
(2015)
164
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, available at http://www.uscis.gov (locate “Other
Services”; select “Humanitarian” hyperlink; choose "Temporary Protected Status" hyperlink), (last visited
May 12, 2016).
165
8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2016); INA § 240B.
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removal proceedings have been completed, at the noncitizen's own expense. 167 If
granted pre or post-hearing departure, the noncitizen has to depart within 120 days
and s/he may be required to post bond. 168 Under § 240B(b) noncitizens may get
voluntary departure at the conclusion of the removal proceedings, at the noncitizen's
expense.169 Bond for subsection (b) applicants is mandatory.170 If voluntary departure
is granted under subsection (b), the maximum period the noncitizen has to depart is
60 days.171 Persons who have been convicted of an aggravated felony or who are
deportable as terrorists are ineligible for this form of relief.172
One who is granted voluntary departure but fails to depart within the designated time
becomes ineligible for several other immigration options.173 Additionally, civil penalties
for failure to depart within the time period specified include: (A) a civil penalty of not
less than $1,000 and not more than $5,000; (B) ineligibility for a period of 10 years, to
receive any further relief under § 240B, § 240A, § 245, § 248, and § 249.174
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8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(2) (2016); INA § 240B(a).
8 C.F.R. § 1240.26 (2016); 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(3) (2016); INA § 240B(a)(3).
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(b). Prosecutorial Discretion

Prosecutorial discretion refers to decision the DHS makes about whether to enforce
immigration laws against a person.175 According to the 2014 Jeh Johnson Memorandum,
the “DHS must exercise prosecutorial discretion in the enforcement of law,” meaning,
the DHS officer can make a decision not to enforce the law.176 The use of Prosecutorial
Discretion applies to a variety of enforcement actions including: (1) “whether to parole
an alien into the United States;” (2) “whether to commence removal proceedings and
what charges to lodge against the respondent;” (3) “whether to pursue formal removal
proceedings;” (4) “whether to cancel a Notice to Appear or other charging document
before jurisdiction vests with an immigration judge;” (4) “whether to grant deferred
action or extended voluntary departure;” (5) “whether to appeal an immigration judge’s
decision or order, and whether to file a motion to reopen;” (6) “whether to invoke an
automatic stay during the pendency of an appeal; and, (7) “whether to impose a fine for
particular offenses.”177
In addition to the types of prosecutorial discretion listed above, the government agent
may also exercise prosecutorial discretion in issuing a Notice to Appear. Specifically, the
DHS can choose not to initiate removal proceedings against someone who has positive
equities.178 Some positive equities that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) may
consider in determining whether to exercise Prosecutorial Discretion include:
“extenuating circumstances involving the offense of conviction; extended length of time
since the offense of conviction; length of time in the U.S.; military service; family or
community ties in the U.S.; status as a victim, witness or plaintiff in civil or criminal
proceedings; or compelling humanitarian factors such as poor health, age, pregnancy, a
young child, or a seriously ill relative.”179 This list of factors is not exhaustive. Attorneys
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Wadhia, Shoba Sivaprasad, The History of Prosecutorial Discretion In Immigration Law
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2605164 (last visited May 12, 2016).
176
See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S.
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should inform DHS officers of the positive equities the client possesses, in order to
request any form of Prosecutorial Discretion.

(c). Administrative and Judicial Options to Challenge Removal180

The following are a non-exhaustive list of forms of adjudicatory review and are meant to
provide a general understanding of the procedures.

Motions to Reopen or Reconsider
A noncitizen may move to reopen or to reconsider a previous decision by filing a timely
motion with an IJ or the Board. The central purpose of a motion to reopen181 is to
introduce new and additional evidence that is material and that was unavailable at
the original hearing. A motion to reconsider182 seeks a reexamination of the decision
based on alleged errors of law and facts. Unless an exception applies, a party may file
only one motion to reopen and one motion to reconsider. With a few exceptions, a
motion to reopen proceedings must be filed within 90 days of the final removal order,
while a motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the date of the final
order. The filing of such motions does not suspend the execution of the removal
decision unless a stay is ordered by the IJ, the Board, DHS, or the alien seeks to
reopen an in absentia order (a decision made when the alien was absent at the
proceeding).

Stay of Removal

A Stay of Removal prevents DHS from executing an order of removal, deportation, or
exclusion. Depending on the situation, a stay of removal may be automatic or
discretionary. A noncitizen is entitled to an automatic stay of removal during the time
allowed to file an appeal (unless a waiver of the right to appeal is filed), while an
appeal is pending before the Board, or while a case is before the Board by way of
certification.183
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United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/04/ReliefFromRemoval.pdf (last visited May 12, 2016).
181
Before the Immigration Judge 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3) (2016); INA § 240(c)(7)). Before the Board of
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Except in cases involving in absentia orders,184 filing a motion to reopen or reconsider
will not stay the execution of any decision made in a case 185 . Similarly, filing a
petition for review in federal court also does not result in an automatic stay of a
removal order. Thus, a removal order can proceed unless the alien applies for and is
granted a stay of execution as a discretionary form of relief by the Board, IJ, DHS, or
a federal court. Such a stay is temporary and is often coupled with a written motion to
reopen or reconsider filed with the Immigration Court, the Board, or an appeal to a
federal Circuit Court.

Judicial Review186

The Immigration and Nationality Act confers federal courts jurisdiction over certain
decisions appealed from the Board. However, subsequent laws have substantially
restricted judicial review of removal orders. A noncitizen has 30 days from the date of a
final removal decision to file a judicial appeal, which is generally filed with the Court of
Appeals.187

Administrative Appeal188

The Board is the highest administrative body with the authority to interpret federal
immigration laws. The Board has jurisdiction to hear appeals from decisions of IJs and
certain decisions of DHS. Either a noncitizen or DHS may appeal a decision from the IJ.
In deciding cases, the Board can dismiss or sustain the appeal, remand the case to the
deciding IJ, or, in rare cases, refer the case to the Attorney General for a decision. A
precedent decision by the Board is binding on DHS and IJs throughout the country
unless the Attorney General modifies or overrules the decision. With respect to the
filing deadline, the appeal of an Immigration Judge’s decision must be received by 30
calendar days from the date it was issued by the court.
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8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(v) (2016).
8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(3)(B) (2016); INA § 242(b)(3)(B).
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VIII. APPENDIX – Pro-se packets from the Florence
Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project
The Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project, available at http://www.firrp.org
(choose "Resources" and follow "How to Defend Your Case” hyperlink, scroll to
“Cancellation of Removal for Legal Permanent Residents (green card holders) and select
“English” hyperlink), (last visited May. 12, 2016).
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A Roadmap to Winning Your Case for
“LPR Cancellation of Removal”

This guide was prepared and updated by the staff of the Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project and was
written for immigrant detainees in Arizona who are representing themselves pro se in their removal
proceedings. This guide is not intended to provide legal advice or serve as a substitute for legal counsel. The
Florence Project is a nonprofit legal services organization and does not charge for its services to immigrant
detainees in Arizona. This guide is copyright protected but can be shared and distributed widely to assist
indigent immigrants around the country. All of our guides are available to download on our website:
www.firrp.org. We kindly ask that you give credit to the Florence Project if you are adapting the information in
this guide into your own publication.

1
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Important Words to Know
Immigration Law has a lot of technical words. Here’s a list of some of the
words you’ll see a lot in this guide and an short explanation of what they
mean.
 Immigration Judge (“Judge”): this is the person who will make a
decision about your case. He or she holds hearings in the
courtroom and wears a black robe. This person doesn’t work for
ICE. It’s her job to look at the facts of your case and apply the law
fairly.
 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”): this is the
agency that has put you in deportation proceedings and is in
charge of detaining you. ICE is part of the Department of
Homeland Security, or “DHS.”
 Government Attorney: this is the lawyer who represents ICE
when you go to your court hearings. He or she sits at the table
next to you and also talks to the Judge. It’s usually this attorney’s
job to ask the Judge to order you deported.
 Deportation: ICE has put you in deportation proceedings, which
are also called “removal proceedings.” If the Judge orders you
deported or “removed” from the United States, you will be sent
back to the country where you are a citizen and will not be able to
return legally to the U.S. for at least ten years.
 The Florence Project: this is a group of lawyers and legal
assistants who provide free legal help to people without lawyers.
The Florence Project wrote this guide to help you understand
your case.

3
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1. Introduction
If you are legal permanent resident (LPR) of the United States (also
called a “green card” holder) and you’ve been convicted of certain
crimes or broken other immigration laws, ICE may put you into
deportation proceedings.
However, you may be able to apply for a one-time-only pardon that
allows you to cancel your deportation.
In order to get the pardon, you’ll have to show
the Judge that the good things about you--like
your family ties here, your work history, and
your contributions to the community—
outweigh the bad things in your life, like your
criminal history or your addiction to drugs or
alcohol.
If you are eligible to apply for “LPR Cancellation of Removal”, there’s a
pretty good chance that you’ll win your case—if you do your homework
and prepare well, that is. Remember, you’ll have to apply while you’re in
deportation proceedings—you can’t apply if you’ve been deported
already. If you decide to take the deportation and not fight for “LPR
Cancellation of Removal,” you’ll face some big consequences:
 You will not able to apply for another
chance to live in the United States for at
least 10 years.
 Depending on your convictions, you may
never be able to apply for another
chance to live here.
 If you come back to the US without
permission and get caught, you may be sentenced to years in
federal prison.

4
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We know it’s not easy to be detained. But,
taking the time to put together an “LPR
Cancellation of Removal” case could let you
go on living in the United States. This guide
will give you a road map to winning your
case. It can be a long road to release with a
few detours along the way, but we hope to
give you the tools you need for a safe and
smooth trip. Best of luck with your case!

2. What Does “LPR Cancellation of Removal Mean?”
It means that you may be able to stop your deportation and keep your
green card if you meet ALL of the requirements below.
 You’ve been a Legal Permanent Resident (green card holder) for
at least the last five years
 You’ve been in the United States with some form of legal status for
at least seven years, without committing certain offenses or being
put into deportation proceedings
 You haven’t been convicted of an “aggravated felony.” An
aggravated felony usually means any conviction with a sentence
over one year. But, there are many exceptions.
Remember, the requirements for “LPR
Cancellation of Removal” can be a little technical
and depend a lot on the details of your life.
If you are eligible for “LPR Cancellation of
Removal,” that doesn’t mean that you’ll
automatically win your case. You’ll need to
convince the Judge that you deserve a second
chance here in the United States. You can do that
by showing that your deportation would cause
you and the people family a lot of suffering. You’ll also need to show that
you understand that you’ve made mistakes in the past and that you
won’t repeat them in the future.

5
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3. Hitting the Road to Cancellation of Removal: Your First
Court Hearings
First, let’s talk about the basics of immigration court. If you feel
confused about court, you’re not alone! Immigration law is complicated,
even for lawyers. Let’s figure out who is going to in court and what’s
going to happen in your first hearings.
The Judge will be at the front of the room and
will ask you questions. He will be dressed like
the man on the left. The Judge will be making
the decision about your case so it’s important
to be respectful, polite, and prepared.
 A government attorney. When you go to
court, a lawyer representing ICE will be there.
He’s called the government attorney. His job is to represent ICE
and try to get an order of deportation against you.
 An interpreter. Don’t worry if you don’t speak English—an
interpreter will be there in person or over the phone. Just make
sure you speak up and tell the IJ that you don’t speak or
understand English well and need an interpreter.
The first few hearings that you’ll go to
will be “master calendar” hearings. At
those hearings, you’ll be in court with
a group of other detainees. At “master
calendar” hearings, the Judge will
check in with you about your case and
see what you want to do. It isn’t time
yet to show her all your evidence of
the reasons why you should stay in the country. If you want more time
to talk to an attorney, the judge will give you a few weeks to do so. You’ll
then come back for another master calendar hearing.
When you come back to court, the Judge will ask you if you want to
admit or deny the changes against you. That means that the Judge wants
6
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to know if you want to force the government attorney to prove the
charges against you. If the government attorney says that you should be
deported because of your criminal convictions, making him prove the
charges against you can be an important step. To learn more about how
to do that, read the Florence Project’s guide on denying the charges
against you.
Certain types of criminal convictions, even for pretty minor crimes, can
affect your deportation case, so it’s good to get some legal advice before
admitting any criminal charges against you. If you can’t speak to an
attorney first, you might want to consider denying your criminal
charges just to be safe.
a. Eligibility for “ LPR Cancellation of Removal”
If the Judge decides that at least some of the charges against you are
correct, she’ll then ask you questions to figure out if you are eligible for
“LPR Cancellation of Removal.” She’ll ask questions to make sure you
meet the requirements to apply. Take a look at the requirements on
page 6 if you can’t remember. If the Judge agrees that you are eligible to
present your case for “LPR Cancellation” to her, she’ll give you a copy of
the application.
Remember, just because the Judge says you’re eligible for “LPR
Cancellation” does not mean that you’ve won your case! It means that
the Judge thinks that you’ve met the basic requirements and is giving
you a chance to show her that you deserve to have your deportation
cancelled.
b. Filling out and turning in the application
Before your final hearing, you’ll come back to court for one more
“master calendar” hearing to turn in your application for “LPR
Cancellation of Removal.” It’s important that you fill out the application
completely so that the Judge will accept it and schedule a final hearing
for you to present all your evidence. A short guide on how to fill out
your application is at the end of this packet.

7
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When you’ve completed the application,
make two extra copies and bring them to
court with you. The original will go to the
Judge. Another copy will go to the
government attorney and you’ll keep a
copy for yourself. This is important, so
don’t forget!
Once you turn in your application, the Judge
will give you a date for a final hearing. At this
hearing, you’ll appear without a group of
detainees. The hearing will last a few hours.
This hearing will be your chance to present your case to the judge.

4. Steering Toward Success: Gathering Evidence for Your
Case
As we talked about earlier, winning
your case for “LPR Cancellation” is like
following a roadmap for a long trip. You
got started on your trip by going to
your master calendar hearing and
filling out your application. Now it’s
time to hit the road and begin gathering
evidence to support your case. Every piece of evidence you gather
means that you’re a little further toward the finish line!
Start gathering evidence as soon as you decide that you want to apply
for “LPR Cancellation of Removal.” Take a look at the list of evidence
in Appendix 3. This will give you ideas of what documents to
gather. Many of these documents take time for your family to find and
to mail to you. We know it’s not easy to gather all of these documents
while you’re detained. Ask a trusted family member or friend to help
you get these documents together. Make sure that he mails you copies,
not originals, of these documents.

8
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The type of evidence that you’ll gather depends
on the facts of your case. Try and think of
evidence that shows that you or your family
would suffer a lot if you were deported. For
example, if you have health problems and would
have a hard time getting treatment in your home
country, that evidence would be very helpful to
your case.
Or, if you’re a single mom
whose kids have never been to your country, you’ll
want to get letters from their teachers about how
they’re doing in school and whether they have any
special needs. You’ll need copies of their birth
certificates to show that they’re U.S. citizens. You’ll
want to document all the opportunities that they
have here—scholarships, job trainings, camps—
that they won’t have in your country.
Every person applying for “LPR Cancellation of
Removal” should get as many letters of reference
as possible. These should be from friends,
family, and employers and should talk about all
the good contributions that you’ve made to the
United States. Again, there is a long list of
examples of good types of evidence in Appendix
3.
Remember, all the documents you submit need to be in English. If you
receive documents in another language, you can translate them. Just put
your translation in with the original letter and attach a signed copy of
the “Certificate of Translation” that’s at the end of this packet.

9
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Once you have all your documents
together, you’ll want to organize
them. Make a list of everything you
have and then put it on top. You can
divide your documents into
categories like these:
1. Family Ties in the US (birth certificates, marriage certificates)
2. Evidence of Hardship to Me if I Am Deported
3. Evidence of Hardship to My Family
4. Evidence of Employment History and Property in the US
5. Evidence of Rehabilitation (if you have criminal history)
Attach a signed and dated copy of “Certificate of Service” at the end of
this packet to the last page of all your evidence. Then make two copies
of all your evidence. Just like the application, the original will go to the
Judge, a copy will go to the government attorney and you’ll keep a copy
for yourself.
If you want to send the documents to the
Judge before your final date, put a cover sheet
with your name and A-number on top. Then
put the packets in envelopes. One should say
“To the Immigration Judge” and the other
should say “To ICE Litigation.” Ask detention
staff to make sure they are delivered or put
them in the detention center’s mailboxes that
are delivered to the Judge and to ICE.

10
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5. The Final Stretch: Preparing Your Testimony
You’re almost done with your journey toward
“LPR Cancellation of Removal” and are about to
see the finish line! Spending time preparing
your testimony for the final hearing will help
you with this final stretch of your case.
At your final hearing, you’ll have an
opportunity to tell the judge why you think you
should stay in the United States. Keep these
tips in mind when practicing your testimony:
 Be prepared. Write a list of the specific reasons why you and
your family would suffer if you were deported. Don’t just say
things like “they’ll miss me” or “they need me to pay the bills.”
That won’t be much help—all families go through that. Think
about the reasons why your family will suffer much more
than normal if you’re deported and explain those reasons to
the Judge. Write them down on a piece of paper.
For example, you’ll need to explain how much your
child’s cancer treatment costs, how you take care of her
when she’s sick, how this treatment isn’t available in
your home country, and how you pay all the family’s
medical bills. Practice explaining this to a friend or a
family member over the phone.

 Be honest. Your job is to tell the Judge about the circumstances of
your life. If you have criminal convictions and the Judge asks you
about them, tell her what happened. Lying will just make things
worse, and the Judge and government attorney often have ways to
figure out if you are lying.

11
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 Turn negatives into positives. If you had a problem with drugs
and alcohol in the past, explain how you’ve overcome those
problems—did you go to AA meetings or complete a
rehabilitation program? Tell the Judge about those things, too.
 Don’t be defensive. Admitting that you made mistakes can show
the Judge that you are sorry. It can also show the Judge that you
won’t repeat those mistakes in the future.
 Speak from the heart. Judges see a
lot of people every day. You can make your
testimony stand out by speaking sincerely.
Think of a funny story about your family to
share. Think about a story that will show
the Judge how much your family needs
you. Explain to the Judge why your
deportation would hurt you and your
family very much. Don’t worry if you
become nervous or emotional in court—it happens to almost
everyone.
 Ask your family members to testify in court. Your family can
come and tell the judge about the reasons why you should stay in
the United States. Help your family member prepare by asking her
to list all the reasons why she would suffer if you were in another
country. Make sure she practices and writes the reasons down to
have with her in court. Your family members can also come and
watch your final hearing to show the Judge that they support you.
Remember, some of the detention centers won’t let small children
come to court, so have your family members call the detention
center and ask about the rules before the come.
 Answer the judge’s questions. The judge may want to ask you
some specific questions. A list of what she may ask is at the end of
this guide. In addition to practicing your testimony, you should
practice responses to those questions so you’ll be prepared.
Remember, be respectful when the judge speaks. Refer to the
judge as “Your Honor,” “Ma’am,” or “Sir.”

12
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6. Weighing the Evidence: The Judge’s
Decision
In most cases, the Judge will give you her
decision at the end of your final hearing. She’ll
tell you whether or not she’ll approve your
application for “LPR Cancellation of Removal.”
Other times, the Judge will tell you that she
wants time to think about your case. She will
write a decision and send it to you through the
detention center’s mail within a few weeks.
There are a few possibilities for the Judge’s decision:
 If the Judge approves your application and the government
attorney does not want to appeal that decision, you’ll likely be
released the same day.
 If the Judge approves your application and the government
attorney appeals that decision, you’ll likely have to wait until the
Board of Immigration Appeals gives you a final decision. It usually
takes at least three months.
 If the Judge denies your application, you have the choice of
appealing that decision and saying that the Judge was wrong.
You’ll need to tell the Judge at your final hearing that you want to
appeal. She’ll give you some paperwork that needs to be mailed
within 30 days of her decision. Take a look at the Florence
Project’s guide to appealing your case or schedule an appointment
to talk with an attorney about your appeal.
Final Thoughts
As you’ve seen, winning a case for “LPR Cancellation of Removal” is not
easy. You need to show that you and your family would suffer if you
were deported. It takes planning, lots of work gathering evidence, and
really practicing your testimony. We wish you the best of luck with your
case!
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Appendix 1. Filling Out Your Application
This section addresses some common questions and mistakes that can
happen when you’re filling out your application for Cancellation of
Removal application. If you need an extra copy, it’s available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/formslist.htm.
You must use a pen or typewriter to fill out the form. Do not use a pencil.
Most importantly, if you are unsure or do not know the answer to a
question, write that on the form. For example, if you can’t remember
something about your criminal record, write down as much as you
know and put “I can’t remember” or “this is to the best of my memory.”
or indicate that you might have missing or incorrect information. If a
question does not apply to you simply put “N/A” in the box, for example
if you are not married and the question asks for information about your
wife.
If there is not enough room on the form for you to answer a question
completely, continue your answer on another piece of paper. Just make
sure to write your name and A-number at the top of each piece of paper.
These are questions to watch out for:

42A Application for Cancellation of Removal
Part 1
 If you are detained, use the address for the detention center.
Part 2
 If you first entered the U.S. as a legal permanent resident, write
down the date you entered and where. If you first entered the U.S.
illegally and later applied for and received your legal permanent
residency, put down the date you received your LPR status.

14
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Part 3
 If you used a different name when you entered the U.S. include
that information here.
 Mark here what your immigration status was when you entered
the U.S. If you entered without papers, mark “entered without
inspection”.
 Watch out for the question that asks you to list all of your entries
and departures from the U.S. You should list every trip you’ve
made out of the U.S., even if it was for less than one day. If you left
and came back many times for the same reason (for example, if
you went to Mexico several times just for the day to go shopping
or to visit family) then you can write something like “day trip once
a month to Mexico for shopping”. You may need another piece of
paper to answer this question.
Part 4
 If you have never married, please mark “I am not married” and
skip to question #36. If you have only been married ONE time,
please answer questions 25-34 in full and on #35 mark “I have not
been previously married”.
Part 5
 When listing your work history, begin with the job you had just
before coming to detention and work backwards. If you cannot
remember all of the details of your work history include as much
information as you can remember.
Part 6
 Please include ALL children and listed relatives (parents,
brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, and grandparents), whether they
are in the U.S. or another country. If they live outside the U.S.,
then only put the country where they live. If necessary, continue
information on additional pieces of paper.
15
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Part 7
 THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION on the application is the one
that asks about your criminal history. It is VERY important to
include any and all arrests, court appearances, convictions, even if
you think that ICE does not know about it or the charges were
dismissed. This also includes any fines or traffic violations. ICE
will obtain your “rap sheet” and other conviction documents
before your hearing. If you do not list the charges on your
application and they later come out at the hearing, the judge may
think you trying to hide something and it will hurt your case. If
you think that you may not remember your criminal history
perfectly, then you can note that the answers provided are “to the
best of your recollection” and that you “might be missing or
forgetting an incident.”
G-325A
 If you’ve never been married before, just list N/A
 List your addresses from the most recent to the lease recent. If
you’re currently detained, use the detention center’s address
 If you can’t remember exactly when you lived someplace, use the
abbreviation “apprx” or “+/-“ to show that you’re making an
estimation
 List your previous jobs from most recent to least recent
 Check the box to indicate that the form is filed along with an
application to be a Permanent Resident
Fee Waiver
 If you are currently detained and not paying any bills, you can put
0’s when asked about your monthly expenses and income.
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Appendix 2: Questions to Expect from the Judge and
Government Attorney
Immigration History:
1. Have you used any aliases in the United States?
2. When did you first enter the United States?
3. How did you enter?
4. How did you get your green card?
5. Have you left the U.S. since you got your green card? How many
times? What is the longest amount of time you have spent outside of
the U.S. after you got your green card?
Family Life:
1. Are you married? When did you get married (make sure you know
the date!!!)? Where does s/he live? What is your husband or wife’s
immigration status? Have you ever filed a petition for him or her?
Why not?
2. If not married but living with someone, why haven’t you gotten
married? Have you ever made plans to marry this person that you
live with? How long have you lived together?
3. Do you have children? When were they born (know dates!!!)? How
old are your kids? Who do they live with? What immigration status
do they have?
4. Are your parents still living? Where do they live? What is their
immigration status?
5. Do you have any other relatives or family in the United States? What
is their immigration status?
17
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6. Do you have any relatives or family living in your country of origin?
Could you go live with them if you are removed? Why not?
7. The Judge will also want to know about your involvement and the
quality of your relationship with all of the people mentioned above:
How often do you speak to each other?
How often do you see each other?
How is your relationship with this person?
How involved are you with your kids?
Hardship
1. Will your wife or kids go with you if you are deported? Why not?
2. Do you have any medical conditions? Do you take any
medication?
3. Do any of your relatives have medical conditions? What? Do you
take care of them? How?
4. What will you do if you are deported? Where will you go? Who
will you live with? How will you get your medicine? How will you
work?
Employment, Education, Community Involvement
1. How far did you get with your schooling?
2. What was the last job you had? How much were you making per
week? How long were you working there?
3. The judge will want to get a sense of your employment history for at
least the last 5 to 10 years, if not the entire time that you have lived
in the United States.
4. If you have had long periods of unemployment, be prepared to
discuss what you were doing during that time and why.
18
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5. Where will you work or how will you support yourself if you win
your case?
6. Have you done volunteer work or community service? Was it court
ordered or of your own choice?
7. Do you go to church or participate in any other types of community
organizations? Which ones? How often?
8. Have you always filed taxes? If not, why not?
9. Have you ever received public assistance or benefits? For how long?
Why?
10. If you are a man who lived in the United States between ages 18
and 25, did you register for the Selective Service? (Note: if you did
not know that you were required to register, make sure to tell the
judge that rather than try to make up a reason).
Property
1. Do you own a house? A car? Other property?
Criminal Record and Other Negatives
1. Have you had any incident reports while in detention? What for?
2. What has been your most recent offense (the conviction that
brought you to immigration’s attention and custody)? What
happened?
3. Do you have any other convictions? (List them all! Let the judge
know if you can’t remember all of them and why you have trouble
remembering!)
4. What happened in each of those incidents?
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5. Do you have any other arrests? What were those for? What
happened in each of those incidents?
6. Make sure to explain your criminal record in a way that is honest
and reflective:
a. First, explain exactly what happened and focus on the facts.
b. Second, explain what you did wrong in the situation.
c. Third, explain what you would do differently if you were in
that situation again.
d. Fourth, explain you plan to do to make sure that you are
never in that kind of situation again.
e. Fifth, explain to the judge what you have learned from this
process.
f. Sixth, explain to the judge if you have changed, how you
have changed, and why you have changed.
Drug or Alcohol use:
1. Do or did you have a drug or alcohol problem?
2. What drugs have you tried? How often do you use?
3. When did you first begin to use or consume drugs or alcohol?
4. Did you consume or use in front of your kids? While pregnant?
5. Do you drive while under the influence?
6. When did you stop using? Why did you stop?
7. What do you plan to do if you are out and feel the urge to consume
drugs or alcohol again?
8. What is your plan to stay away from drugs or alcohol in the
future?
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9. Have you ever participated in a drug or alcohol program before?
How far did you get in the program? Name some steps in AA or
NA.
10.

What’s different this time? Why didn’t it work before?

Assault, Battery, Domestic Violence, Restraining orders:
1. What do you plan to do next time you get in an argument with
your spouse or someone else?
2. Who was the victim of your acts? Did you hit him or her?
3. Have you hit or beat this victim or others before? How many
times?
4. Please describe in detail how you hit the victim (punched? pulled?
slapped? open fist? any scars left? who was there? who called the
police?)
5. Do you believe you have problems with your spouse or with
managing your anger?
6. How have you solved these problems? How?
7. Is your victim here to testify on your behalf? Has he or she written
a letter of support? Why not? Is he or she afraid of you?
8. Is there a restraining order? Have you violated it?
9. If the victim is a relative, what is his or her immigration status?
Future
1. What do you plan to do if you win your case and get out?
2. How will you stay out of trouble?
3. Where will you live?
21
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4. Where do you plan to work? What will you study?

Appendix 3. Checklist of Documents
We recommend that you try to obtain as many of the following types of
documents as possible, BUT please do not become discouraged or feel
that you have no chance if you do not have a lot of documents to submit
or if you don’t have many family or friends. There are many ways to
explain why these people are missing, to supplement your application in
other ways, and to win your case even with a packet of evidence that is
small.
Received
Letters of support from as many family members as possible
(including drawings from children)
Letters of support from friends
Letters from people who know me (neighbors, landlord, etc.)
Letters showing community involvement (church, volunteering)
Proof of financial support my family (rent receipt, child support)
Letters from past employers
Letters from religious organizations I belong to
Photos of family (birthday parties, holidays, pets, babies, etc.)
Certificates from Rehabilitation Programs
Informational Pamphlets on rehabilitation programs in my area
(domestic violence, alcohol or drug abuse, anger management)
Letter to my probation/parole officer explaining that I am in
ICE custody
Tax Records
Pay Stubs
Social Security Records
Letter showing that I have a job when I get out of detention
Proof of English Language Training, GED, college, etc.
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Certificates and diplomas
Copies of children’s school records, including letters from
teachers about my children’s classroom performance.
Copies of my medical records and my close relatives
Copies of my children’s birth certificates
A copy of my green card
Copy of my marriage certificate
Proof of any debt that I have (mortgage, car loans, medical, etc.)
Proof of insurance (car, medical, etc.)
Proof of Property that I own in the U.S.
Articles about the situation in my country of origin (eg. poor
medical care, war and violence, unemployment, poverty)
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Appendix 4. Certificate of Service
Use the following certificate if you will give the documents to the
government attorney and the judge in court.
I, ________________________(your name here), hereby certify that I handdelivered a copy of this document to a representative of ICE Litigation
on the date below.
Signed:
Date:
Use the following certificate if you will mail the documents to the
ICE attorney and judge before the hearing.
I, ________________________(your name here), hereby certify that I placed a
copy of this document in the mail to ICE Litigation at
_________________________________
(list address for the ICE office at the detention center where you are
staying) on the date below.
Signed:
Date:

24

©FIRRP – last update May 2013

Page 151 of 327

PART 1

VIII. APPENDIX

Appendix 5. Sample Certificate of Translation
I, ________________________(name of translator), certify that I am competent
to translate this document from its original language into English and
that the translation is true and accurate to the best of my abilities.
Signature of translator
Date
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IX. APPENDIX – Sample documents and forms from
government entities; includes the application for LPR
Cancellation of Removal from EOIR
Below you will find the applicable government forms. Please note that these forms can
be revised; thus, the practitioner should check the government website for the latest
edition of the following materials.
From the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), Forms 189
Page 154 Advice to Applicant: Application for Cancellation of Removal for
Certain Permanent Residents
Page 156 Instructions: Application for Cancellation of Removal for Certain
Permanent Residents
Page 159 Form EOIR 42A: Application for Cancellation of Removal for Certain
Permanent Residents
Page 166 Form EOIR 28: Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or
Representative Before the Immigration Court
From the EOIR, Immigration Court Practice Manual190
Page 168 Sample Cover Page
Page 169 Sample Written Pleading
Page 173 Sample Proof of Service
From the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)191
Page 175 Form G-325A: Biographic Information

189

United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review (follow "Form EOIR42A" hyperlink and "Form EOIR-28 hyperlink) available at www.justice.gov/eoir/formslist.htm (last
visited May 12, 2016).
190
United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Immigration Court
Practice Manual, available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-chief-immigration-judge-0 (follow
"Appendices" hyperlink), (last visited May 12, 2016).
191
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, available at www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis
(follow "Forms" hyperlink; then follow " follow "Form G-325A" hyperlink), (last visited May 12, 2016).
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OMB#ll25-0001
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review

Application for Cancellation of Removal for
Certain Permanent Residents
ADVICE TO APPLICANT

PLEASE READ CAREFULLY. FEES WILL NOT BE RETURNED.

I.

Permanent Resident Aliens Eligible for Cancellation of Removal: You may be eligible to have your
removal cancelled under section 240A(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). To qualify for this
benefit, you must establish in a hearing before an Immigration Judge that:
A.

You have been a permanent resident for at least five (5) years;

B.

Prior to service of the Notice to Appear, or prior to committing a criminal or related offense referred
to in sections 212(a)(2) and 237(a)(2) of the INA, or prior to committing a security or related offense
referred to in section 237(a)(4) of the INA;
-- you have at least seven (7)years continuous residence in the United States after having been
lawfully admitted in any status; and

C.

You have not been convicted of an aggravated felony.

NOTE: If you have served on active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States for at least 24 months, you do
not have to meet the requirements of continuous residence in the United States. You must, however, have
been in the United States when you entered the Armed Forces. If you are no longer in the Armed Forces,
you must have been separated under honorable conditions.
II.

Permanent Resident Aliens NOT Eligible for Cancellation of Removal: You are not eligible to have
your removal cancelled under section 240A(a) of the INA if you:
A.

Entered the United States as a crewman after June 30, 1964;

B.

Were admitted to the United States as, or later became, a nonimmigrant exchange alien as defined in
section 101(a)(15)(J) of the INA in order to receive a graduate medical education or training,
regardless of whether you are subject to or have fulfilled the 2-year foreign residence
requirement of section 212(e) of the INA;

C.

Were admitted to the United States as, or later became, a nonimmigrant exchange alien as defined in
section 101(a)(15)(J) of the INA, other than to receive graduate medical education or training, and
are subject to the 2-year foreign residence requirement of section 212(e) of the INA but have
neither fulfilled nor obtained a waiver of that requirement;

D.

Are an alien who is either inadmissible under section 212(a)(3) of the INA or deportable under
section 237(a)(4) of the INA;

E.

Are an alien who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of an
individual because of the individual's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion; or

F.

Are an alien who was previously granted relief under section 212(c) of the INA, or section 244(a) of
the INA as such sections were in effect prior to the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, or whose removal has previously been cancelled under section
240A of the INA.

Form EOIR-42A
Revised July 2015

OMB#ll25-0001
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review

III.

Application for Cancellation of Removal for
Certain Permanent Residents

How Permanent Resident Aliens Can Apply for Cancellation of Removal
If you believe that you have met all the requirements for cancellation of removal, you must answer all the
questions on the attached Form EOIR-42A fully and accurately. You must pay the filing and biometrics fees
and comply with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) instructions for providing biometric and
biographic information to USCIS [available at http://uscis.gov]. You must also serve a copy of your application on
the Assistant Chief Counsel for the DHS, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) as required in the
proof of service on page 7 of this application, and you must file your application with the appropriate
Immigration Court. Please read the following instructions carefully before completing your application.

Form EOIR-42A
Revised July 2015

OMB#ll25-0001
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review

Application for Cancellation of Removal for
Certain Permanent Residents
INSTRUCTIONS

1. PREPARATION OF APPLICATION.
To apply for cancellation of removal as a permanent resident alien under section 240A(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), you must fully and accurately answer all questions on the attached Form EOIR-42A. You must
also comply with all of the instructions on this form. These instructions have the force of law. A separate application
must be prepared and executed for each person applying for cancellation of removal. An application on behalf of an
alien who is mentally incompetent or is a child under 14 years of age shall be executed by a parent or guardian.
Your responses must be typed or printed legibly in ink. Do not leave any questions unanswered or blank. If any
questions do not apply to you, write "none" or "not applicable" in the appropriate space.
To the extent possible, answer all questions directly on the form. If there is insufficient room to respond fully to a
question, please continue your response on an additional sheet of paper. Please indicate the number of the question being
answered next to your response on the additional sheet, write your alien registration number, print your name, and sign,
date, and securely attach each additional sheet to the Form EOIR-42A.

2. BURDEN OF PROOF.
The burden of proof is on you to prove that you meet all of the statutory requirements for cancellation of removal for
certain permanent resident aliens under section 240A(a) of the INA and that you are entitled to such relief as a matter of
discretion. To meet this burden, your responses to the questions on the application should be as detailed and complete as
possible. You should also attach to your application any documents that demonstrate your eligibility for relief
(see "SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS" below).

3. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS.
You should submit with your application copies of any documents which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service, issued to you. You should also submit all documents related to your
criminal history, including all conviction records. The Immigration Judge may require you to submit additional records
relating to your request for cancellation of removal.
The original of all supporting documents must be available for inspection at the hearing. If you wish to have the original
documents returned to you, you should also present reproductions.

4. REQUIRED BIOMETRIC AND BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION.
Each applicant 14 years of age or older must also comply with the requirement to supply biometric and biographic information. You will be given instructions on how to complete this requirement. You will be notified in writing of the location of the Application Support Center (ASC) or the designated Law Enforcement Agency where you must go to provide
biometric and biographic information. You will also be given a date and time for the appointment. It is important to furnish all the required information. Failure to comply with this requirement may result in a delay in your appointment or in
your application being deemed abandoned and dismissed by the Immigration Court.

5. TRANSLATIONS.
Any document in a foreign language must be accompanied by an English language translation and a certificate signed by
the translator stating that he/she is competent to translate the document and that the translation is true and accurate to the
best of the translator's abilities. Such certification must be printed legibly or typed.
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6. FEES.
Before you file your Form EOIR-42A with the Immigration Court, you must pay the required $100 filing fee and the
biometrics fee to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Evidence of payment of these fees in the form of a copy
of the DHS, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) ASC notice of fee receipt and biometrics appointment
instructions must accompany your Form EOIR-42A. These fees will not be refunded, regardless of the action taken on
your application. Therefore, it is important that you read the advice, instructions, and application carefully before
responding. If you are unable to pay the filing fee, you may ask the Immigration Judge to permit you to file your
Form EOIR-42A without fee (fee waiver).

DO NOT SEND CASH. All fees must be submitted in the exact amount. Remittance may be made by personal check,
cashier's check, certified bank check, bank international money order, or foreign draft drawn on a financial institution in
the United States and payable to the "Department of Homeland Security'' in United States currency. If the applicant
resides in the Virgin Islands, the check or money order must be payable to the "Commissioner of Finance of the Virgin
Islands." If the applicant resides in Guam, the check or money order must be made payable to the "Treasurer, Guam."
Personal checks are accepted subject to collectibility. An uncollectible check will render the application and any documents issued pursuant thereto invalid. A charge of $30.00 will be imposed if a check in payment of a fee is not honored
by the bank on which it is drawn. When the check is drawn on an account of a person other than the applicant, the name
and alien registration number of the applicant must be entered on the face of the check. All checks must be drawn on a
bank located in the United States.

7. SERVING & FILING YOUR APPLICATION.
A.

You must first comply with the DHS instructions for providing biometric and biographic information to
USCIS, which involves sending a copy of the application to the appropriate USCIS Service Center. The
DHS instructions also address payment of the application fees.

B.

You must then serve the following documents on the Assistant Chief Counsel for DHS, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE):
- a copy of your Form EOIR-42A, Application for Cancellation of Removal, with all supporting documents and additional sheets;
- a copy of the USCIS ASC notice of fee receipt and biometrics appointment instructions; and
- the original Biographical Information Form G-325A.
You must file the following documents with the appropriate Immigration Court:
- the original Form EOIR-42A with all supporting documents and additional sheets;
- a copy of the USCIS ASC notice of fee receipt and biometrics appointment instructions;
- a copy of the Biographical Information Form G-325A; and
- a completed certificate showing service of these documents (See Part 10 of the Application on page 7)
on the ICE Assistant Chief Counsel, unless service is made on the record at the hearing.
Retain your USCIS ASC biometrics confirmation document or a copy of your Fingerprint Card, FD-258,
if applicable, as proof that your biometrics were taken, and bring it to your future Immigration Court hearings.

8. PENALTIES.
You must answer all questions on Form EOIR-42A truthfully and submit only genuine documents in support of your
application. You will be required to swear or affirm that the contents of your application and the supporting documents are true to the best of your knowledge. Your answer to the questions on this form and the supporting documents
you present will be used to determine whether your removal should be cancelled and whether you should be permitted to
retain your permanent resident status. Any answer you give and any supporting document you present may also be used as
evidence in any proceeding to determine your right to be admitted or readmitted, re-enter, pass through, or reside in the
United States. Your application may be denied if any of your answers or supporting documents are found to be false.
Form EOIR-42A
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Presenting false answers or false documents may also subject you to criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. section 1546
and/or subject you to civil penalties under 8 U.S.C. section 1324c if you submit your application knowing that the application, or any supporting document, contains any false statement with respect to a material fact, or if you swear or affirm
that the contents of your application and the supporting documents are true, knowing that the application or any supporting documents contain any false statement with respect to a material fact. If convicted, you could be fined up to
$250,000, imprisoned for up to ten (10) years, or both. 18 U.S.C. sections 1546(a), 3559(a)(4), 3571(b)(3). If it is determined you have violated the prohibition against document fraud and a final order is entered against you, you could be
subject to a civil penalty up to $2,000 for each document used or created for the first offense, and up to $5,000 for any
second, or subsequent offense. In addition, if you are the subject of a final order for violating 8 U.S.C. section 1324c,
relating to civil penalties for document fraud, you will be removable from the United States.

9. PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT NOTICE.
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act, a person is not required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays
a currently valid OMB control number. We try to create forms and instructions that are accurate, can easily be understood, and which impose the least possible burden on you to provide us with information. Often, this process is difficult
because some immigration laws are very complex. The reporting burden for this collection of information is computed
as follows: (1) learning about the form, 50 minutes, (2) completing the form, 2 hours, and (3) assembling and filing the
form, 3 hours, for an average of 5 hours, 50 minutes per application. If you have comments regarding the accuracy of
this burden estimate, or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, you may write to the U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Office of the General
Counsel, 5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2600, Falls Church, Virginia 22041.
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PLEASE READ ADVICE AND INSTRUCTIONS
BEFORE FILLING IN FORM

Fee Stamp (Official Use Only)

PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT
PART 1 - INFORMATION ABOUT YOURSELF
1) My present true name is: (Last, First, Middle)

2) Alien Registration (or “A”) Number(s):

3) My name given at birth was: (Last, First, Middle)

4) Birth Place: (City and Country)
7) Height:

5) Date of Birth: (Month, Day, Year)

6) Gender:
❏ Male

10) Current Nationality and Citizenship:

11) Social Security Number:

❏ Female

14) I currently reside at:

8) Hair Color:

12) Home Phone Number:

(

)

9) Eye Color:

13) Work Phone Number:

(

)

15) I have been known by these additional name(s):

Apt. number and/or in care of
Number and Street
City or Town

State

Zip Code

16) I have resided in the following locations in the United States: (List PRESENT ADDRESS FIRST, and work back in time for at least 7 years.)
Street and Number - Apt. or Room # - City or Town - State - Zip Code

Resided From:

Resided To:

(Month, Day, Year)

(Month, Day, Year)

PRESENT

PART 2 - INFORMATION ABOUT THIS APPLICATION
17) I, the undersigned, hereby request that my removal be cancelled under the provisions of section 240A(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA). I believe that I am eligible for this relief because I have been a lawful permanent resident alien for 5 or more
years, have 7 years of continuous residence in the United States, and have not been convicted of an aggravated felony. I was
admitted as or adjusted to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence on
(Date)

at

(Place)

Please continue answers on a separate sheet as needed.
(1)

.
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PART 3 - INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
18) My first arrival into the United States was under the name of: (Last, First, Middle)

19) My first arrival to the United States was on: (Month, Day, Year)

20) Place or port of first arrival: (Place or Port, City, and State)

21) I:

❏

was inspected and admitted.
❏ I entered using my Lawful Permanent Resident card which is valid until

❏
❏

(Specify Type of Visa)

visa which is valid until

.

(Month, Day, Year)

was not inspected and admitted.
❏ I entered without documents. Explain:

❏
❏

I entered using a

.

(Month, Day, Year)

.

I entered without inspection. Explain:

.

Other. Explain:

22) I applied on

.
for additional time to stay and it was

(Month, Day, Year)

and valid until

, or ❏ denied on

(Month, Day, Year)

❏

granted on

(Month, Day, Year)

(Month, Day, Year)

.

23) Since the date of my first entry, I departed from and returned to the United States at the following places and on the following dates:
(Please list all departures regardless of how briefly you were absent from the United States.)
If you have never departed from the United States since your original date of entry, please mark an X in this box: ❏
1

Port of Departure (Place or Port, City and State)

Departure Date (Month, Day, Year)

Purpose of Travel

Destination

Port of Return (Place or Port, City and State)

Return Date (Month, Day, Year)

Manner of Return

Inspected and Admitted?

Port of Departure (Place or Port, City and State)

Departure Date (Month, Day, Year)

Purpose of Travel

Yes
Destination

Port of Return (Place or Port, City and State)

Return Date (Month, Day, Year)

Manner of Return

Inspected and Admitted?

❏

2

24) Have you ever departed the United States:

❏

❏ Yes ❏

No

No

a) under an order of deportation, exclusion, or removal?......................................❏ Yes

❏ No
b) pursuant to a grant of voluntary departure?...................................................... ❏ Yes ❏ No

PART 4 - INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR MARITAL STATUS AND SPOUSE (Continued on page 3)
25) I am not married:
I am married:

❏
❏

26) If married, the name of my spouse is: (Last, First, Middle)

27) My spouse’s name before marriage was:

28) The marriage took place in: (City and Country)

29) Date of marriage: (Month, Day, Year)

30) My spouse currently resides at:

31) Place and date of birth of my spouse: (City & Country; Month, Day, Year)

Apt. number and/or in care of

32) My spouse is a citizen of: (Country)

Number and Street
City or Town

State/Country

Zip Code

33) If your spouse is other than a native born United States citizen, answer the following:
He/she arrived in the United States at: (Place or Port, City and State)

.

He/she arrived in the United States on: (Month, Day, Year)

.

His/her alien registration number(s) is: A#
He/she was naturalized on: (Month, Day, Year)
34) My spouse

❏

- is

❏

.
at

.

(City and State)

- is not employed. If employed, please give salary and the name and address of the place(s) of employment.

Full Name and Address of Employer

Earnings Per Week
(Approximate)

$
$
$
Please continue answers on a separate sheet as needed.
(2)
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PART 4 - INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR MARITAL STATUS AND SPOUSE (Continued)
35) I ❏ - have ❏ - have not been previously married: (If previously married, list the name of each prior spouse, the dates on which each
marriage began and ended, the place where the marriage terminated, and describe how each marriage ended.)
Name of prior spouse: (Last, First, Middle)

Name of prior spouse: (Last, First, Middle)

Date marriage began:
Date marriage ended:

Place marriage ended:

Date marriage began:
Date marriage ended:

Place marriage ended:

(City and Country)

(City and Country)

Description or manner of how marriage was
terminated or ended:

Description or manner of how marriage was
terminated or ended:

36) Have you been ordered by any court, or are otherwise under any legal obligation, to provide child support and/or spousal maintenance as a
result of a separation and/or divorce? ❏ - Yes ❏ - No

PART 5 - INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR EMPLOYMENT AND FINANCIAL STATUS
37) Since my arrival into the United States, I have been employed by the following named persons or firms: (Please begin with present employment and
work back in time. Any periods of unemployment or school attendance should be specified. Attach a separate sheet for additional entries if necessary .)
Full Name and Address of Employer

Earnings Per Week
(Approximate)

Type of Work
Performed

Employed From:

Employed To:

(Month, Day, Year)

(Month, Day, Year)

PRESENT

$
$
$
38) If self-employed, describe the nature of the business, the name of the business, its address, and net income derived therefrom:

39) My assets (and if married, my spouse’s assets) in the United States and other countries, not including clothing and household necessities, are:
Self
Cash, Stocks, and Bonds................................ $
Real Estate...................................................... $
Auto (dollar value minus amount owed) ....... $
Other (describe on line below)....................... $
TOTAL $

Jointly Owned With Spouse
Cash, Stocks, and Bonds................................ $
Real Estate...................................................... $
Auto (dollar value minus amount owed)........ $
Other (describe on line below)....................... $
TOTAL $

40) I ❏ - have ❏ - have not received public or private relief or assistance (e.g. Welfare, Unemployment Benefits, Medicaid, TANF, AFDC, etc.).
If you have, please give full details including the type of relief or assistance received, date for which relief or assistance was received, place, and
total amount received during this time:

41) Please list each of the years in which you have filed an income tax return with the Internal Revenue Service:

Please continue answers on a separate sheet as needed.
(3)
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PART 6 - INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR FAMILY (Continued on page 5)
42) I have
(Number of) children. Please list information for each child below, include assets and earnings information for
children over the age of 16 who have separate incomes:
Name of Child: (Last, First, Middle)
Child’s Alien Registration Number:

Citizen of What Country:
Birth Date: (Month, Day, Year)

Now Residing At: (City and Country)
Birth Date: (City and Country)

A#:
Estimated Total of Assets: $

Estimated Average Weekly Earnings: $

A#:
Estimated Total of Assets: $

Estimated Average Weekly Earnings: $

A#:
Estimated Total of Assets: $

Estimated Average Weekly Earnings: $

Immigration Status
of Child

43) If your application is denied, would your spouse and all of your children accompany you to your:
Country of Birth -

❏ Yes ❏ No

Country of Nationality -

❏ Yes ❏ No

Country of Last Residence -

❏ Yes ❏ No

If you answered “No” to any of the
responses, please explain:

44) Members of my family, including my spouse and/or child(ren) ❏ - have ❏ - have not received public or private relief or assistance (e.g.,
Welfare, Unemployment Benefits, Medicaid, TANF, AFDC, etc.). If any member of your immediate family has received such relief or assistance, please
give full details including identity of person(s) receiving relief or assistance, dates for which relief or assistance was received, place, and
total amount received during this time:

45) Please give the requested information about your parents, brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, and grandparents, living or deceased. As to residence,
show street address, city, and state, if in the United States; otherwise show only country:
Name: (Last, First, Middle)
Alien Registration Number:

Citizen of What Country:
Birth Date: (Month, Day, Year)

Relationship to Me:
Birth Date: (City and Country)

Immigration Status
of Listed Relative

A#:
Complete Address of Current Residence, if Living:

A#:
Complete Address of Current Residence, if Living:

Please continue answers on a separate sheet as needed.
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PART 7 - MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION (Continued on page 6)
46) I

❏ - have ❏ - have not entered the United States as a crewman after June 30, 1964.

47) I

❏ - have ❏ - have not been admitted as, or after arrival in the United States acquired the status of, an exchange alien.

❏ - have ❏ - have not submitted address reports as required by section 265 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
49) I ❏ - have ❏ - have never (either in the United States or in any foreign country) been arrested, summoned into court as a defendant, convicted, fined,

48) I

imprisoned, placed on probation, or forfeited collateral for an act involving a felony, misdemeanor, or breach of any public law or ordinance (including, but
not limited to, traffic violations or driving incidents involving alcohol). (If answer is in the affirmative, please give a brief description of each offense
including the name and location of the offense, date of conviction, any penalty imposed, any sentence imposed, and the time actually served. You are
required to submit documentation of any such occurrences.)

50) Have you ever served in the Armed Forces of the United States?
service number:

❏ - Yes ❏ - No.

If “Yes” please state branch (Army, Navy, etc.) and

Place of entry on duty: (City and State)
Date of entry on duty: (Month, Day, Year)

Date of discharge: (Month, Day, Year)

Type of discharge: (Honorable, Dishonorable, etc.)
I served in active duty status from: (Month, Day, Year)

to

(Month, Day, Year)

.

51) Have you ever left the United States or the jurisdiction of the district where you registered for the draft to avoid being drafted into the military
or naval forces of the United States?
❏ Yes ❏ No
52) Have you ever deserted from the military or naval forces of the United States while the United States was at war?
53) If male, did you register under the Military Selective Service Act or any applicable previous Selective Service (Draft) Laws?
If “Yes,” please give date, Selective Service number, local draft board number, and your last draft classification:

54) Were you ever exempted from service because of conscientious objection, alienage, or any other reason?

❏ Yes ❏ No
❏ Yes ❏ No

❏ Yes ❏

No

55) Please list your present or past membership in or affiliation with every political organization, association, fund, foundation, party, club, society,
or similar group in the United States or any other place since your 16th birthday. Include any foreign military service in this part. If none, write
“None.” Include the name of the organization, location, nature of the organization, and the dates of membership.
Name of Organization

Location of Organization

Nature of Organization

Please continue answers on a separate sheet as needed.
(5)
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PART 7 - MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION (Continued)
56) Have you ever:

❏
❏

Yes

No

been ordered deported, excluded, or removed?

Yes

❏
❏

No

overstayed a grant of voluntary departure from an Immigration Judge or the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)?

❏

Yes

❏

No

failed to appear for deportation or removal?

57) Have you ever been:

❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏

No

a habitual drunkard?

No

one whose income is derived principally from illegal gambling?

No

one who has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining immigration benefits?

No

one who has engaged in prostitution or unlawful commercialized vice?

No

involved in a serious criminal offense and asserted immunity from prosecution?

No

a polygamist?

No

one who brought in or attempted to bring in another to the United States illegally?

No

a trafficker of a controlled substance, or a knowing assister, abettor, conspirator, or colluder with others in any such controlled
substance offense (not including a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana)?

❏
❏

Yes
Yes

❏
❏

No

inadmissible or deportable on security-related grounds under sections 212(a)(3) or 237(a)(4) of the INA?

No

one who has ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of an individual on account of his
or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion?

❏

Yes

❏

No

a person previously granted relief under sections 212(c) or 244(a) of the INA or whose removal has previously been
cancelled under section 240A of the INA?

If you answered “Yes” to any of the above questions, explain:

58) The following certificates or other supporting documents are attached hereto as a part of this application: (Refer to the Instructions for
documents which should be attached.)

Please continue answers on a separate sheet as needed.
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PART 8 - SIGNATURE OF PERSON PREPARING FORM, IF OTHER THAN APPLICANT
(Read the following information and sign below)
I declare that I have prepared this application at the request of the person named in Part 1, that the responses provided are based
on all information of which I have knowledge, or which was provided to me by the applicant, and that the completed application was read to the applicant in a language the applicant speaks fluently for verification before he or she signed the application in my presence. I am aware that the knowing placement of false information on the Form EOIR-42A may subject me to
civil penalties under 8 U.S.C. 1324c.

Signature of Preparer:
Daytime Telephone #:
(

Print Name:

Date:

Address of Preparer: (Number and Street, City, State, Zip Code)

)

PART 9 - SIGNATURE
APPLICATION NOT TO BE SIGNED BELOW UNTIL APPLICANT APPEARS BEFORE
AN IMMIGRATION JUDGE
I swear or affirm that I know the contents of this application that I am signing, including the attached documents and supplements, and that they
are all true to the best of my knowledge, taking into account the correction(s) numbered
to
, if any, that were made by me or at
my request.

(Signature of Applicant or Parent or Guardian)

Subscribed and sworn to before me by the above-named applicant at

Immigration Judge

Date: (Month, Day, Year)

PART 10 - PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Form EOIR-42A was:
on
at

(Month, Day, Year)

❏

- delivered in person

❏

- mailed first class, postage prepaid

to the Assistant Chief Counsel for the DHS (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement-ICE)

(Number and Street, City, State, Zip Code)

Signature of Applicant (or Attorney or Representative)

Please continue answers on a separate sheet as needed.
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OMB#1125-0006

U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Immigration Court

Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or
Representative Before the Immigration Court

(Type or Print)

ALIEN (“A”) NUMBER

NAME AND ADDRESS OF REPRESENTED PARTY

(Provide A-number of the party
represented in this case.)

______________________________________________________
(First)

(Middle Initial)

(Last)

______________________________________________________
(Number and Street)

Entry of appearance for
(please check one of the following):

(Apt. No.)

All proceedings

______________________________________________________
(City)

(State)

(Zip Code)

Custody and bond proceedings only
All proceedings other than custody
and bond proceedings

Attorney or Representative (please check one of the following):
I am an attorney eligible to practice law in, and a member in good standing of, the bar of the highest court(s) of the following
states(s), possession(s), territory(ies), commonwealth(s), or the District of Columbia (use additional space on reverse side if
necessary) and I am not subject to any order disbarring, suspending, enjoining, restraining or otherwise restricting me in the
practice of law in any jurisdiction (if subject to such an order, do not check this box and explain on reverse).
Full Name of Court __________________________________ Bar Number (if applicable) __________________________
I am a representative accredited to appear before the Executive Office for Immigration Review as defined in 8 C.F.R. §
1292.1(a)(4) with the following recognized organization:

____________________________________________________________________
I am a law student or law graduate of an accredited U.S. law school as defined in 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a)(2).
I am a reputable individual as defined in 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a)(3).
I am an accredited foreign government official, as defined in 8 C.F.R. § 1291.1(a)(5), from _____________________ (country).
I am a person who was authorized to practice on December 23, 1952, under 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(b).

Attorney or Representative (please check one of the following):
I hereby enter my appearance as attorney or representative for, and at the request of, the party named above.
EOIR has ordered the provision of a Qualified Representative for the party named above and I appear in that capacity.
I have read and understand the statements provided on the reverse side of this form that set forth the regulations and conditions
governing appearances and representations before the Immigration Court. By signing this form, I consent to publication of my name
and any findings of misconduct by EOIR, should I become subject to any public discipline by EOIR pursuant to the rules and
procedures at 8 C.F.R. 1003.101 et seq. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the
foregoing is true and correct.
SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OR REPRESENTATIVE

EOIR ID NUMBER

DATE

X __________________________________________________________________________________________________
NAME OF ATTORNEY OR REPRESENTATIVE, ADDRESS, FAX & PHONE NUMBERS, & EMAIL ADDRESS
Name: ____________________________________________________________________________________________________
(First)
(Middle Initial)
(Last)
Address: __________________________________________________________________________________________________
(Number and Street)
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
(City)
(State)
(Zip Code)
Telephone: _________________ Facsimile: _________________ Email: ______________________________________________
Check here if new address
Form EOIR - 28
Rev. Dec. 2015

Indicate Type of Appearance:
Primary Attorney/Representative

Non-Primary Attorney/Representative

On behalf of ______________________________ (Attorney’s Name) for the following hearing: _________________ (Date)
I am providing pro bono representation. Check one:

yes

no

Proof of Service
I (Name) _____________________________ mailed or delivered a copy of this Form EOIR-28 on (Date) __________________
to the DHS (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement – ICE) at _________________________________________________

X ___________________________________________________________
Signature of Person Serving
APPEARANCES - An attorney or Accredited Representative (with full accreditation) must register with the EOIR eRegistry in
order to practice before the Immigration Court (see 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(f)). Registration must be completed online on the EOIR
website at www.justice.gov/eoir. An appearance shall be filed on a Form EOIR-28 by the attorney or representative appearing in
each case before an Immigration Judge (see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.17). A Form EOIR-28 shall be filed either as an electronic form, or as
a paper form, as appropriate (for further information, please see the Immigration Court Practice Manual, which is available on the
EOIR website at www.justice.gov/eoir). The attorney or representative must check the box indicating whether the entry of
appearance is for custody and bond proceedings only, for all proceedings other than custody and bond, or for all proceedings
including custody and bond. When an appearance is made by a person acting in a representative capacity, his/her personal
appearance or signature constitutes a representation that, under the provisions of 8 C.F.R. part 1003, he/she is authorized and
qualified to represent individuals and will comply with the EOIR Rules of Professional Conduct in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102. Thereafter,
substitution or withdrawal may be permitted upon the approval of the Immigration Judge of a request by the attorney or
representative of record in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.17(b). Please note that although separate appearances in custody and
non-custody proceedings are permitted, appearances for limited purposes within those proceedings are not permitted. See Matter of
Velasquez, 19 I&N Dec. 377, 384 (BIA 1986). A separate appearance form (Form EOIR-27) must be filed with an appeal to the
Board of Immigration Appeals (see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(g)). Attorneys and Accredited Representatives (with full accreditation) must
first update their address in eRegistry before filing a Form EOIR-28 that reflects a new address.
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT - This form may not be used to request records under the Freedom of Information Act or
the Privacy Act. The manner of requesting such records is in 28 C.F.R. §§ 16.1-16.11 and appendices. For further information about
requesting records from EOIR under the Freedom of Information Act, see How to File a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
Request With the Executive Office for Immigration Review, available on EOIR's website at http://www.justice.gov/eoir.
PRIVACY ACT NOTICE - The information requested on this form is authorized by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229(a), 1362 and 8 C.F.R. §
1003.17 in order to enter an appearance to represent a party before the Immigration Court. The information you provide is
mandatory and required to enter an appearance. Failure to provide the requested information will result in an inability to represent a
party or receive notice of actions in a proceeding. EOIR may share this information with others in accordance with approved routine
uses described in EOIR's system of records notice, EOIR-001, Records and Management Information System, 69 Fed. Reg. 26,179
(May 11, 2004), or its successors and EOIR-003, Practitioner Complaint-Disciplinary Files, 64 Fed. Reg. 49237 (September 1999).
Furthermore, the submission of this form acknowledges that an attorney or representative will be subject to the disciplinary rules
and procedures at 8 C.F.R. 1003.101et seq., including, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 292.3(h)(3), 1003.108(c), publication of the name of
the attorney or representative and findings of misconduct should the attorney or representative be subject to any public discipline by
EOIR.
CASES BEFORE EOIR - Automated information about cases before EOIR is available by calling (800) 898-7180 or (240) 314-1500.
FURTHER INFORMATION - For further information, please see the Immigration Court Practice Manual, which is available on
the EOIR website at www.justice.gov/eoir.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Under the Paperwork Reduction Act, a person is not required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control
number. We try to create forms and instructions that are accurate, can be easily understood, and which impose the least possible burden on you
to provide us with information. The estimated average time to complete this form is six (6) minutes. If you have comments regarding the
accuracy of this estimate, or suggestions for making this form simpler, you can write to the Executive Office for Immigration Review, Office of
the General Counsel, 5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2600, Falls Church, Virginia 22041.
Form EOIR - 28
Rev. Dec. 2015
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Sample Cover Page
A. Tourney, Esquire
1234 Center Street
Anytown, ST 99999

DETAINED

Filing party. If pro se, the alien should provide his or her own name
and address in this location. If a representative, the representative
should provide his or her name and complete business address.

Detention status. If the alien is detained,
the word “DETAINED” should appear
prominently in the top right corner,
preferably highlighted.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
IMMIGRATION COURT
ANYTOWN, STATE

In the Matters of:
Jane Smith
John Smith
Jill Smith
In removal proceedings

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Court. The Immigration Court location (city or
town) and state should be provided.

File Nos.: A 012 345 678
A 012 345 679
A 012 345 680
A numbers. The alien registration number of every person
included in the submission should be listed.

Name and type of proceeding. The full name of every person included in the submission should be listed.

Immigration Judge Susan Jones

Next Hearing: September 22, 2008 at 1:00 p.m.

Name of the Immigration Judge and the date and time of the next hearing. This information should
always be listed.

RESPONDENT’S PRE-HEARING BRIEF

Filing title. The title of the submission should be placed in the middle and bottom of the page.
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APPENDIX L – Sample Written Pleading

Sample Written Pleading
Prior to entering a pleading, parties are expected to have reviewed the pertinent regulations,
as well as Chapter 4 of the Immigration Court Practice Manual (Hearings before Immigration Judges).

[name and address of attorney or representative]
United States Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Immigration Court
[the court’s location (city or town) and state]

In the Matter of:
[the respondent’s name]
In removal proceedings

)
)
)
)
)
)

File No.: [the respondent’s A number]

)
RESPONDENT’S WRITTEN PLEADING
On behalf of my client, I make the following representations:
1.

The respondent concedes proper service of the Notice to Appear, dated

2.

I have explained to the respondent (through an interpreter, if necessary):
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

.

the rights set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a);
the consequences of failing to appear in court as set forth in INA § 240(b)(5);
the limitation on discretionary relief for failure to appear set forth in INA § 240(b)(7);
the consequences of knowingly filing or making a frivolous application as set forth in
INA § 208(d)(6);
the requirement to notify the court within five days of any change of address or
telephone number, using Form EOIR-33/IC pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.15(d).

updates: www.justice.gov/eoir
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3.

The respondent concedes the following allegation(s)
the following allegation(s) ______________________ _.

4.

The respondent concedes the following charge(s) of removability
and denies the following charge(s) of removability

5.

, and denies

,
.

In the event of removal, the respondent;

□

names

as the country to which removal should be

directed;
OR

□ declines to designate a country of removal.
6.

The respondent will be applying for the following forms of relief from removal:

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
7.

Termination of Proceedings
Asylum
Withholding of Removal (Restriction on Removal)
Adjustment of Status
Cancellation of Removal pursuant to INA §
Waiver of Inadmissibility pursuant to INA §
Voluntary Departure
Other (specify)
None

If the relief from removal requires an application, the respondent will file the application (other than
asylum), no later than fifteen (15) days before the date of the individual calendar hearing, unless
otherwise directed by the court. The respondent acknowledges that, if the application(s) are not
timely filed, the application(s) will be deemed waived and abandoned under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c).
If the respondent is filing a defensive asylum application, the asylum application will be filed in
open court at the next master calendar hearing.

8.

If background and security investigations are required, the respondent has received the DHS
biometrics instructions and will timely comply with the instructions. I have explained the
instructions to the respondent (through an interpreter, if necessary). In addition, I have explained to
the respondent (through an interpreter, if necessary), that, under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(d), failure to
provide biometrics or other biographical information within the time allowed will constitute
abandonment of the application unless the respondent demonstrates that such failure was the result
of good cause.
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9.

The respondent estimates that

10.

□

hours will be required for the respondent to present the case.

It is requested that the Immigration Court order an interpreter proficient in the
language,

dialect;

OR
‘□

The respondent speaks English and does not require the services of an interpreter.

Date

Attorney or Representative for the Respondent

RESPONDENT’S PLEADING DECLARATION
I,
, have been advised of my rights in these proceedings by my attorney or
representative. I understand those rights. I waive a further explanation of those rights by this court.
I have been advised by my attorney or representative of the consequences of failing to appear for a hearing. I
have also been advised by my attorney of the consequences of failing to appear for a scheduled date of
departure or deportation. I understand those consequences.
I have been advised by my attorney or representative of the consequences of knowingly filing a frivolous
asylum application. I understand those consequences.
I have been advised by my attorney or representative of the consequences of failing to follow the DHS
biometrics instructions within the time allowed. I understand those consequences.
I understand that if my mailing address changes I must notify the court within 5 days of such change by
completing an Alien’s Change of Address Form (Form EOIR-33/IC) and filing it with this court.
Finally, my attorney or representative has explained to me what this Written Pleading says. I understand it, I
agree with it, and I request that the court accept it as my pleading.

Date
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CERTIFICATE OF INTERPRETATION

I,

, am competent to translate and interpret from
(name of interpreter)
into English, and I certify that I have read this entire document to the
(name of language)

respondent in

, and that the respondent stated that he or she understood
(name of language)

the document before he or she signed the Pleading Declaration above.

(signature of interpreter)

(typed/printed name of interpreter)

OR
I,
(name of attorney or representative)

, certify that
(name of interpreter)

, a telephonic

interpreter who is competent to translate and interpret from

into English, read
(name of language)

this entire document to the respondent in

and that the respondent stated
(name of language)

that he or she understood the document before he or she signed the Pleading Declaration above.

(signature of attorney or representative)

(typed/printed name of attorney or representative)
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APPENDIX G – Sample Proof of Service
Sample Proof of Service
Instructions:
By law, all submissions to the Immigration Court must be filed with a “Proof of Service” (or
“Certificate of Service”). See Chapter 3.2 (Service on the Opposing Party). This Appendix provides
guidelines on how to satisfy this requirement.
What is required.
following:

To satisfy the law, you must do both of the

1. Serve the opposing party. Every time you file a submission with the Immigration Court,
you must give, or “serve,” a copy on the opposing party. If you are an alien in
proceedings, the opposing party is the Department of Homeland Security.
2. Give the Immigration Court a completed Proof of Service. You must submit a signed
“Proof of Service” to the Immigration Court along with your document(s). The Proof of
Service tells the Immigration Court that you have given a copy of the document(s) to the
opposing party.
Sample Proof of Service. You do not have to use the sample contained in this Appendix. You may
write up your own Proof of Service if you like. However, if you use this sample, you will satisfy the
Proof of Service requirement.
Sending the Proof of Service. When you have to supply a Proof of Service, be sure to staple or
otherwise attach it to the document(s) that you are serving.
Forms that contain a Proof of Service. Some forms, such as the Application for Cancellation of
Removal for Certain Permanent Residents (Form EOIR-42A), contain a Certificate of Service,
which functions as a Proof of Service for the form. You must complete the Certificate of Service to
satisfy the Proof of Service requirement for that form. Such a Certificate of Service only functions
as a Proof of Service for the form on which it appears, not for any supporting documents that you
file with the form. If you are filing supporting documents with a form that contains a Certificate of
Service, you must file a separate Proof of Service for those documents.
Forms that do not contain a Proof of Service. Forms that do not contain a Certificate of Service
are treated like any other document. Therefore, you must supply the Proof of Service for those
forms.
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Sample Proof of Service

(Name of alien or aliens)

(“A number” of alien or aliens)

PROOF OF SERVICE
On

, I,
(date)

,
(printed name of person signing below)

served a copy of this
(name of document)
and any attached pages to
(name of party served)
at the following address:
(address of party served)

(address of party served)
by

.
(method of service, for example overnight courier, hand-delivery, first class mail)

(signature)

updates: www.justice.gov/eoir
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Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

Family Name

G-325, Biographic Information

First Name

Date of Birth
(mm/dd/yyyy)

Male

Middle Name

Citizenship/Nationality File Number

Female
All Other Names Used (include names by previous marriages)

Family Name
Father
Mother
(Maiden Name)
Current Husband or Wife (If none, so state)
Family Name (For wife, give maiden name)

Former Husbands or Wives (If none, so state)
Family Name (For wife, give maiden name)

U.S. Social Security No. (if any)

City and Country of Birth

Date of Birth
(mm/dd/yyyy)

First Name

A

Date of Birth
(mm/dd/yyyy)

First Name

First Name

City, and Country of Birth (if known)

Date of Birth
(mm/dd/yyyy)

City and Country of Birth

City and Country of Residence

Date of Marriage Place of Marriage
(mm/dd/yyyy)

City and Country of Birth Date of Termination of Place of Termination
Marriage (mm/dd/yyyy) of Marriage

Applicant's residence last five years. List present address first.
Street Name and Number

City

Province or State

Country

From
Month
Year

To
Month

Year

Present Time

Applicant's last address outside the United States of more than one year.
Street Name and Number

City

Province or State

Country

From
Month
Year

To
Month

Year

Applicant's employment last five years. (If none, so state.) List present employment first.
Full Name and Address of Employer

Occupation (Specify)

From
To
Month
Year Month
Year
Present Time

Last occupation abroad if not shown above. (Include all information requested above.)
This form is submitted in connection with an application for:
Naturalization

Date

Signature of Applicant

Other (Specify):

Status as Permanent Resident
If your native alphabet is in other than Roman letters, write your name in your native alphabet below:

Penalties: Severe penalties are provided by law for knowingly and willfully falsifying or concealing a material fact.

Applicant: Print your name and Alien Registration Number in the box outlined by heavy border below.
Complete This Box (Family Name)

(Given Name)

(Middle Name)

(Alien Registration Number)

A
Form G-325 (Rev. 02/07/13) Y

Instructions
What Is the Purpose of This Form?
USCIS will use the information you provide on this form to process your application or petition.
Complete this biographical information form and include it with the application or petition you are submitting to U.S.Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS).
If you have any questions on how to complete the form, call our National Customer Service Center at 1-800-375-5283. For TDD
(hearing impaired) call: 1-800-767-1833.

Privacy Act Notice
We ask for the information on this form, and associated evidence, to determine if you have established eligibility for the immigration
benefit for which you are filing. Our legal right to ask for this information can be found in the Immigration and Nationality Act, as
amended. We may provide this information to other government agencies. Failure to provide this information, and any requested
evidence, may delay a final decision or result in denial of your immigration benefit.

Paperwork Reduction Act
An agency may not conduct or sponsor an information collection and a person is not required to respond to a collection of information
unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number. The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated at
15 minutes per response, including the time for reviewing instructions and completing and submitting the form. Send comments
regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to:
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Regulatory Coordination Division, Office of Policy and Strategy, 20 Massachusetts
Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20529-2140, OMB No. 1615-0008. Do not mail your completed Form G-325 to this address.

Form G-325 (Rev. 02/07/13) Y Page 2
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X. APPENDIX – Citation Guidelines from EOIR
Immigration Court Practice Manual
The following manual provides guidelines for writing citations in compliance with the
Board of Immigration Appeals within the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(EOIR). An attorney should note that the Board generally follows A Uniform System of
Citation, also known as the Blue Book, but digresses from that convention in certain
ways192. The Board appreciates but does not require citations that follow the examples
used in the following manual. An attorney should adhere to the manual when writing
citations but will not be penalized for doing otherwise.

192

United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Immigration Court
Practice
Manual,
Appendix
J:
Citation
Guidelines,
188-207,
available
at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/02/04/practice_manual_-_02-082016_update.pdf (last visited May 12, 2016).
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APPENDIX J – Citation Guidelines

Citation Guidelines*
When filing papers with the Immigration Court, parties should keep in mind that accurate and
complete legal citations strengthen the argument made in the submission. This Appendix provides
guidelines for frequently cited sources of law.
The Immigration Court generally follows A Uniform System of Citation (also known as the “Blue
Book”), but diverges from that convention in certain instances. The Immigration Court appreciates
but does not require citations that follow the examples used in this Appendix. The citation
categories are:
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.

Cases
Regulations
Statutes/laws
Legislative history
Treaties and international materials
Publications and communications by governmental agencies,
and
Commonly cited commercial publications

Note that, for the convenience of filing parties, some of the citation formats in this Appendix are
less formal than those used in the published cases of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Once a
source has been cited in full, the objective is brevity without compromising clarity.
This Appendix concerns the citation of legal authority. For guidance on citing to the record and
other sources, see Chapter 3.3(e) (Source materials) and Chapter 4.18(d) (Citation).
As a practice, the Immigration Court prefers italics in case names and publication titles, but
underlining is an acceptable alternative.
□□□□□

*

This appendix is substantially based on Appendix J (Citation Guidelines) in the Board of Immigration Appeals
Practice Manual. The Office of the Chief Immigration Judge wishes to acknowledge the efforts of all those involved
in the preparation of that appendix.
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I. Decisions, Briefs, and Exhibits
General guidance:

Abbreviations in case names.
As a general rule, well-known agency
abbreviations (e.g., DHS, INS, FBI, Dep’t of Justice) may be used in a case
name, but without periods. If an agency name includes reference to the “United
States,” it is acceptable to abbreviate it to “U.S.” However, when the “United
States” is named as a party in the case, do not abbreviate “United States.” For
example:
DHS v. Smith

.....

not D.H.S. v. Smith

U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Smith

.....

not United States Department of
Justice v. Smith

United States v. Smith

.....

not U.S. v. Smith

Short form of case names. After a case has been cited in full, a shortened
form of the name may be used thereafter. For example:
full:

INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984)

short:

Phinpathya, 464 U.S. at 185

full:

Matter of Nolasco, 22 I&N Dec. 632 (BIA 1999)

short:

Nolasco, 22 I&N Dec. at 635

Citations to a specific point. Citations to a specific point should include the
precise page number(s) on which the point appears. For example:
Matter of Artigas, 23 I&N Dec. 99, 100 (BIA 2001)

Citations to a dissent or concurrence. If citing to a dissent or concurrence, this
should be indicated in a parenthetical notation. For example:
Matter of Artigas, 23 I&N Dec. 99, 109-110 (BIA 2001) (dissent)

Board decisions:

Published decisions. Precedent decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“Board”) are binding on the Immigration Court, unless modified or overruled by
the Attorney General or a federal court. All precedent Board decisions are
available on the Executive Office for Immigration Review website
at www.justice.gov/eoir. Precedent decisions should be cited in the “I&N Dec.”
form illustrated below. The citation must identify the adjudicator (BIA, A.G.,
etc.) and the year of the decision. Note that there are no spaces in “I&N” and
that only “Dec.” has a period.
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For example:
Matter of Balsillie, 20 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 1992)

Unpublished decisions. Citation to unpublished decisions is discouraged
because these decisions are not binding on the Immigration Court in other
cases. When reference to an unpublished case is necessary, a copy of the
decision should be provided, and the citation should include the alien’s full
name, the alien registration number, the adjudicator, and the precise date of
the decision. Italics, underlining, and “Matter of” should not be used. For
example:
Jane Smith, A 012 345 678 (BIA July 1, 1999)

“Interim Decision.” In the past, the Board issued precedent decisions in slip
opinion or “Interim Decision” form. Because all published cases are now
available in final form (as “I&N Decisions”), citations to “Interim Decisions” are
no longer appropriate and are disfavored.
“Matter of,” not “In re.” All precedent decisions should be cited as “Matter of.”
The use of “In re” is disfavored. For example: Matter of Yanez, not In re Yanez.
For a detailed description of the Board’s publication process, see Board
Practice Manual, which is available on the Executive Office for Immigration
Review website at www.justice.gov/eoir.

IJ decisions:

If referring to an earlier decision in the case by the Immigration Judge, the
decision should be cited. This applies whether the decision was issued orally
or in writing. Citations to decisions of Immigration Judges should state the
nature of the proceedings, the page number, and the date. For example:
IJ Bond Proceedings Decision at 5 (Dec. 12, 2008)

AG decisions:

Precedent decisions by the Attorney General are binding on the Immigration
Court, and should be cited in accordance with the rules for precedent decisions
by the Board of Immigration Appeals. All precedent decisions by the Attorney
General are available on the Executive Office for Immigration Review website
at www.justice.gov/eoir.
Matter of Y-L-, 23 I&N Dec. 270 (AG 2002)
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DHS decisions:

Precedent decisions by the Department of Homeland Security and the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service should be cited in accordance with the
rules for precedent decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Federal & state
courts:

Genera l l y. F ederal and s t ate court decisions should generally be cited
according to the standard legal convention, as set out in the latest edition of
A Uniform System of Citation (also known as the “Blue Book”). For example:
INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984)
Saakian v. INS, 252 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2001)
McDaniel v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 2d 219 (D. Conn. 2001)

U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court Reporter citation (“S.Ct.”) should be
used only when the case has not yet been published in the United States
Reports (“U.S.”).
Unpublished cases. Citation to unpublished state and federal court cases is
discouraged. When citation to an unpublished decision is necessary, a copy of
the decision should be provided, and the citation should include the docket
number, court, and precise date. Parties are also encouraged to provide the
LexisNexis or Westlaw number. For example:
Bratco v. Mukasey, No. 04-726367, 2007 WL 4201263 (9th Cir. Nov. 29,
2007) (unpublished)

Precedent cases not yet published. When citing to recent precedent cases that
have not yet been published in the Federal Reporter or other print format,
parties should provide the docket number, court, and year. Parties are also
encouraged to provide the LexisNexis or Westlaw number. For example:
Grullon v. Mukasey, __ F.3d __, No. 05-4622, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 27325 (2d
Cir. 2007)

Briefs & exhibits:

Text from briefs. If referring to text from a brief, the brief should be cited. The
citation should state the filing party’s identity, the nature of proceedings, the
page number, and the date. For example:
Respondent’s Bond Appeal Brief at 5 (Dec. 12, 2008)
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Exhibits. Exhibits designated during a hearing should be cited as they were
designated by the Immigration Judge. For example:
Exh. 3

Exhibits accompanying a brief should be cited by alphabetic tab or page
number. For example:
Respondent’s Pre-Hearing Brief, Tab A
□□□□□

updates: www.justice.gov/eoir

J-5

Version released on
February 4, 2016

Page 182 of 327

PART 1

XI. APPENDIX-

Immigration Court
Practice Manual

Appendix J

II. Regulations
General guidance:

Regulations generally. There are two kinds of postings in the Federal Register:
those that are simply informative in nature (such as “notices” of public
meetings) and those that are regulatory in nature (referred to as “rules”). There
are different types of “rules,” including “proposed,” “interim,” and “final.” The
type of rule will determine whether or not (and for how long) the regulatory
language contained in that rule will be in effect. Generally speaking, proposed
rules are not law and do not have any effect on any case, while interim and
final rules do have the force of law and, depending on timing, may affect a
given case.
Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations. Regulations appear first in
the Federal Register (Fed. Reg.) and then in the Code of Federal Regulations
(C.F.R.). Once regulations appear in a volume of the C.F.R., do not cite to the
Federal Register unless there is a specific reason to do so (discussed below).

C.F.R.:

Fed. Reg.:

For the Code of Federal Regulations, always identify the volume, the section
number, and the year. The year need not be given after the first citation, unless
a subsequent citation refers to a regulation published in a different year.
Always use periods in the abbreviation “C.F.R.” For example:
full:

8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2002)

short:

8 C.F.R. § 1003.1

Citations to regulatory material in the Federal Register should be used only
when:

updates: www.justice.gov/eoir
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the citation is to information that will never appear in the C.F.R.,
such as a public notice or announcement

o

the rule contains regulatory language that will be, but is not yet,
in the C.F.R.

o

the citation is to information associated with the rule, but which
will not appear in the C.F.R. (e.g., a preamble or introduction to
a rule)

o

the rule contains proposed or past language of a regulation that
is pertinent in some way to the filing or argument
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The first citation to the Federal Register should always include (i) the volume,
(ii) the abbreviated form “Fed. Reg.”, (iii) the page number, (iv) the date, and
(v) important identifying information such as “proposed rule,” “interim rule,”
“supplementary information,” or the citation where the rule will appear. For
example:
full:

67 Fed. Reg. 52627 (Aug. 13, 2002) (proposed rule)

full:

67 Fed. Reg. 38341 (June 4, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R.
§§ 100, 103, 236, 245a, 274a, and 299)

short:

67 Fed. Reg. at 52627-28; 67 Fed. Reg. at 38343

Since the Federal Register does not use commas in its page numbers, do not
use a comma in page numbers. Use abbreviations for the month.
When citing the preamble to a rule, identify it exactly as it is titled in the Federal
Register, e.g., 67 Fed. Reg. 54878 (Aug. 26, 2002) (supplementary
information).
□□□□□

updates: www.justice.gov/eoir

J-7

Version released on
February 4, 2016

Page 184 of 327

PART 1

XI. APPENDIX-

Immigration Court
Practice Manual

Appendix J

III. Statutes / Laws
General guidance:

Full citations. Whenever citing a statute for the first time, be certain to include
all the pertinent information, including the name of the statute, its public law
number, statutory cite, and a parenthetical identifying where the statute was
codified (if applicable). The only exception is the Immigration and Nationality
Act, which is illustrated below.
Short citations. The use of short citations is encouraged, but only after the full
citation has been used.
Special rule for U.S.C. and C.F.R. There are two abbreviations that never need
to be spelled out: “U.S.C.” for the U.S. Code and the “C.F.R.” for the Code of
Federal Regulations. Always use periods with these abbreviations.
Special rule for the INA. Given the regularity with which the Immigration and
Nationality Act is cited before the Immigration Court, there is generally no need
to provide the Public Law Number, the Stat. citation, or U.S.C. citation. The
Immigration Court will presume INA citations refer to the current language of
the Act unless the year is provided.
State statutes. State statutes should be cited as provided in A Uniform
System of Citation (also known as the “Blue Book”).
Sections of law. Full citations are often lengthy, and filing parties are
sometimes uncertain where to put the section number in the citation. For the
sake of simplicity, use the word “section” and give the section number in front
of the full citation to the statute. Once a full citation has been given, use the
short citation form with a section symbol “§.” This practice applies whether the
citation is used in a sentence or after it. For example:
The definition of the term “alien” in section 101(a)(3) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act applies to persons who are not citizens or nationals of
the United States. The term “national of the United States” is expressly
defined in INA § 101(a)(22), but the term “citizen” is more complex. See
INA §§ 301-309, 316, 320.
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Citations to the United States Code, always identify the volume, the section
number, and the year. The year need not be given after the first citation,
unless a subsequent citation refers to a section published in a different year.
Always use periods in the abbreviation “U.S.C.” For example:
full:

18 U.S.C. § 16 (2006)

short:

18 U.S.C. § 16

full:

section xxx of Immigration and Nationality Act

short:

INA § xxx

full:

section xxx of Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272

short:

LIFE:

CCA:

NACARA:

USA PATRIOT Act § xxx

full:

section xxx of Legal Immigration and Family Equity Act, Pub. L. No. 106553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763
(2000)

short:

LIFE Act § xxx

full:

section xxx of Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat.
1631

short:

CCA § xxx

full: section xxx of Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, Pub.
L. No. 105-100, tit. II, 111 Stat. 2193 (1997), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-139,
111 Stat. 2644 (1997)
short:

updates: www.justice.gov/eoir
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full: section xxx of Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546
IIRIRA § xxx

short:

AEDPA:

full:

section xxx of Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
AEDPA § xxx

short:

INTCA:

MTINA:

IMMACT90:

ADAA:

IMFA:

full:

section xxx of Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat. 4305, amended by Pub. L. No. 105-38, 11
Stat. 1115 (1997)

short:

INTCA § xxx

full:

section xxx of Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and
Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232, 105 Stat. 1733

short:

MTINA § xxx

full:

section xxx of Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978

short:

IMMACT90 § xxx

full:

section xxx of Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat.
4181

short:

ADAA § xxx

full:

section xxx of Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537

short:

IMFA § xxx
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full:

section xxx of Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-603, 100 Stat. 3359

short:

IRCA § xxx

full:

section xxx of International Religious Freedom Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
105-292, 112 Stat. 2787

short:

IRFA § xxx
□□□□□
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IV. Legislative History
General guidance:

Difficult to locate. Because sources of legislative history are often difficult to
locate, err on the side of providing more information, rather than less. If a
source is difficult to locate, include a copy of the source with your filing (or an
Internet address for it) and make clear reference to that source in your filing.
Sources. To locate legislative history, try the Library of Congress website
(www.thomas.loc.gov) or commercial services. Citation to common electronic
sources is encouraged.

Bills:

Reports:

Provide the following information the first time a bill is cited: (i) the bill number,
(ii) the number of the Congress, (iii) the session of that Congress, (iv) the
section number of the bill, if you are referring to a specific section, (v) the
Congressional Record volume, (vi) the Congressional Record page or pages,
(vii) the date of that Congressional Record, and (viii) the edition of the
Congressional Record, if known. For example:
full:

S. 2104, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 102, 134 Cong. Rec. 2216 (daily ed.
Mar. 15, 1988)

short:

134 Cong. Rec. at 2218

Provide the following information the first time a report is cited: (i)
whether it is a Senate or House report, (ii) the report number, (iii) the year, and
(iv) where it is reprinted (a reference to where the document is available
electronically is acceptable). The short form may refer either to the page
numbers of the report or the page numbers where the report is reprinted. For
example:
full:

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828 (1996), available in 1996 WL 563320

short:

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828, at 5

full:

S. Rep. No. 98-225 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182

short:

1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3183

Many committee reports are available on-line through the Library of Congress
web site (www.thomas.loc.gov) or commercial services. Copies of the U.S.
Code Congressional & Administrative News (U.S.C.C.A.N.), which compiles
many legislative documents, are available in some public libraries.
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Provide the following information the first time a hearing is cited: (i) name of the
hearing, (ii) the committee or subcommittee that held it, (iii) the number of the
Congress, (iv) the session of that Congress, (v) the page or pages of the
hearing, (vi) the date or year of the hearing, and (vii) information about what is
being cited (such as the identity of the person testifying and context for the
testimony). For example:
Operations of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR):
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (2002) (testimony of EOIR
Director)
□□□□□

updates: www.justice.gov/eoir

J-13

Version released on
February 4, 2016

Page 190 of 327

PART 1

XI. APPENDIX-

Immigration Court
Practice Manual

Appendix J

V. Treaties and International Materials
CAT:

Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988)

full:

short:

UNHCR Handbook:

full:

short:

U.N. Protocol
on Refugees:

full:
short:

Convention Against Torture, art. 3
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees (Geneva 1992)
UNHCR Handbook ¶ xxx
[use paragraph symbol “¶” or abbreviation “para.”]

Article xxx of the United Natio n s Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, [1968] 19 U.S.T. 6223
U.N. Refugee Protocol, art. xxx
□□□□□

updates: www.justice.gov/eoir

J-14

Version released on
February 4, 2016

Page 191 of 327

PART 1

XI. APPENDIX-

Immigration Court
Practice Manual

Appendix J

VI. Publications and Communications by Governmental
Agencies
General guidance:

No universal citation form. In immigration proceedings, parties cite to a wide
variety of administrative agency publications and communications, and there is
no one format that fits all such documents. For that reason, use common sense
when citing agency documents, and err on the side of more information, rather
than less.
Difficult to locate material. If the document may be difficult for the Immigration
Court to locate, include a copy of the document with your filing.
Internet material. If a document is posted on the Internet, identify the website
where the document can be found or include a copy of the document with a
legible Internet address.

Practice Manual:

Forms:

The Immigration Court Practice Manual is not legal authority. However, if there
is reason to cite it, the preferred form is to identify the specific provision by
chapter and section along with the date at the bottom of the page on which the
cited section appears. For example:
full:

Immigration Court Practice Manual, Chapter 8.5(a)(iii) (January
xx, xxxx)

short:

Practice Manual, Chap. 8.5(a)(iii)

Forms should first be cited according to their full name and number. A short
citation form may be used thereafter. See Appendix E (Forms) for a list of
common immigration forms. For example:
full:

short:

Notice of Appeal from a Decision of an Immigration Judge (Form
EOIR-26)
Notice of Appeal or Form EOIR-26

If a form does not have a name, use the form number as the citation.

Country reports:

State Department country reports appear both as compilations in
Congressional committee prints and as separate reports and profiles. Citations
to country reports should always contain the publication date and the specific
page numbers (if available). Provide an Internet address when available. The
first citation to any country report should contain all identifying
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information, and a short citation form may be used thereafter. For example:

Visa Bulletin:

Internal
documents:

full:

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Dep’t of
State, Nigeria Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2001
(Mar. 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2001/af/8397.htm

short:

2001 Nigeria Country Reports

full:

Committees on Foreign Relations and International
Relations, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices for 1994 xxx (Joint Comm Print 1995)

short:

1994 Country Reports at page xxx

full:

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Dep’t of
State, The Philippines – Profile of Asylum Claims and Country
Conditions xxx (June 1995)

short:

1995 Philippines Profile at page xxx

Citations to the State Department’s Visa Bulletin should include the volume,
number, month, and year of the specific issue being cited. For example:
full:

U.S. Dep’t of State Visa Bulletin, Vol. VIII, No. 55 (March 2003)

short:

Visa Bulletin (March 2003)

A citation to an internal government document, such as a memo or
cable, should contain as much identifying information as possible. Be sure
to include any identifying heading (e.g., the “re” line in a memo) and the
precise date of the document being cited. Include a copy of the document with
the filing or indicate where it has been reprinted publicly. For example:
Dep’t of State cable (no. 97-State-174342) (Sept. 17, 1997) (copy
attached)
Office of the General Counsel, INS, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Compliance with
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture in cases of removable aliens
(May 14, 1997), reprinted in 75 Interpreter Releases 375 (Mar. 16, 1998)
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Religious Freedom The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) mandates that the
Reports:
Department of State issue an Annual Report on International Religious
Freedom (State Department Report). IRFA further authorizes Immigration
Judges to use the State Department Report as a resource
in asylum
adjudications. The State Department Report should be cited as follows:
full:

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep’t of
State, Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (Sept. 2007)

short:

2007 Religious Freedom Report at page xxx

IRFA also mandates the issuance of an Annual Report by the United States
Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF Report). The
USCIRF is a government body that is independent of the executive branch.
Citations to the USCIRF Report should be distinguishable from citations to the
Department of State report:
full:

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom,
Annual Report of the United States Commission on International
Religious Freedom, xxx (May 2007)

short:

2007 USCIRF Annual Report at page xxx
□□□□□
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VII. Commonly Cited Commercial Publications
General guidance: No universal citation form. In immigration proceedings, parties cite to a
wide variety of commercial texts and publications. Use common sense when
citing these documents. If a document is difficult to locate, include a copy of the
document with your filing (or an Internet address for it) and make clear
reference to that document in your filing.
No endorsements or disparagements. The following list contains citations to
specific publications that are frequently cited in filings before the Immigration
Court. Their inclusion in the list is not an endorsement of the publication, nor is
omission from this list a disparagement of any other publication.
Use of quotation marks, italics or underlining, and first initials. For all filings,
parties should use a single format for all publications – quotation marks around
any article title (whether in a book, law review, or periodical), italics or
underlining for the name of any publication (whether a book, treatise, or
periodical), and reference to authors’ last names only (although use of first
initials is appropriate where there are multiple authors with the same last
name).
Shortened names. Many publications have long titles. It is acceptable to use a
shortened form of the title after the full title has been used. Be certain to use a
short form that clearly refers back to the full citation. Page and/or section
numbers should always be used, whether the publication is cited in full or in
shortened form.
Articles in Books:

Articles in books should identify the author (by last name only), title of the
article, and the publication that contains that article (including the editor and
year). For example:

updates: www.justice.gov/eoir

full:

Massimino, "Relief from Deportation Under Article 3 of the
United Nations Convention Against Torture,” in 2 1997-98
Immigration & Nationality Law Handbook 467 (American
Immigration Lawyers Association, ed., 1997)
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Massimino at 469
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Bender’s Immigration Bulletin should be cited by author (last name only),
article, volume, publication, month, and year. For example:
full:

Sullivan, “When Representations Cross the Line,” 1 Bender’s
Immigration Bulletin (Oct. 1996)

short:

Sullivan at 3

This publication should be cited by author (last name only), article,
volume, publication, month, and year. For example:

full:

Elliot, ”Relief From Deportation: Part I,” 88-8 Immigration
Briefings (Aug. 1988)

short:

Elliot at 18

Citations to treatises require particular attention because their pagination is
often complex. The first citation to this treatise must be in full and contain the
volume number, the section number, the page number, the edition, and
year. For example:

full:

2 Gordon, Mailman & Yale-Loehr, Immigration Law and
Procedure § 51.01(1)(a), at 51-3 (rev. ed. 1997)

short:

2 Immigration Law and Procedure § 51.01(1)(a), at 51-3

Citations should state the volume, t it l e, page num ber(s), and precise
date. Provide a parenthetical explanation for the citation when appropriate. For
example:

updates: www.justice.gov/eoir

full:

75 Interpreter Releases 275-76 (Feb. 23, 1998) (regarding INS
guidelines on when to consent to reopening of proceedings)

short:

75 Interpreter Releases at 276
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If an article has a title and named author, provide that information. For
example:

Law Reviews:

Sutherland:

full:

Wettstein, “Lawful Domicile for Purposes of INA § 212(c): Can
It Begin with Temporary Residence,” in 71 Interpreter Releases
1273 (Sept. 26, 1994)

short:

Wettstein at 1274

Law review articles should identify the author (by last name) and the title of
the article, followed by the volume, name, page number(s), and year of the
publication. For example:
full:

Hurwitz, “Motions Practice Before the Board of Immigration
Appeals,” 20 San Diego L. Rev. 79 (1982)

short:

Hurwitz, 20 San Diego L. Rev. at 80

Citations to this treatise should include the volume number, author, name of
the publication, section number, page number(s), and edition. For example:
full:

2A Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.11, at 144
(4th ed. 1984)

short:

2A Sutherland § 47.11, at 144
□□□□□
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Federal Statutes Cited
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B) (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A) (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1226a (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c) (2016)
8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(3)(A) (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c) (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d) (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(B) (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B) (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (2016)
8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1) (2016)
18 U.S.C. §16(a) (2016)
18 U.S.C. §16(b) (2016)

INA § 101(a)(13)
INA § 101(a)(20)
INA § 101(a)(42)(A)
INA § 101(a)(43)
INA § 101(a)(48)(B)
INA § 208
INA § 212(a)(6)(A)
INA § 212(c)
INA § 212(h)
INA § 236
INA § 236(a)
INA § 236(c)
INA § 236(c)(2)
INA § 236A
INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii)
INA § 240(c)
INA § 240(c)(3)(A)
INA § 240A(a)
INA § 240A(a)(3)
INA § 240A(b)(1)
INA § 240A(c)
INA § 240A(d)
INA § 240A(d)(1)(B)
INA § 240B
INA § 241(a)(1)(A);
INA § 241(b)(3)(A)
INA § 242(b)(3)(B)
INA § 242(c)
INA § 242(d)
INA § 244(b)(1)
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Federal Regulations Citied
8 C.F.R. § 103.7 (2016)
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (2016)
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(1) (2016)
8 C.F.R. §§ (1)208.16 (2016)
8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c) (2016)
8 C.F.R. §§ (1)208.17 (2016)
8 C.F.R. §§ (1)208.18 (2016)
8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a) (2016)
8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(10) (2016)
8 C.F.R. § 1003 (2016)
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 (2016)
8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(c)(3) (2016)
8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(b) (2016)
8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1)(l) (2016)
8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(2) (2016)
8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3) (2016)
8 C.F.R. § 1003.33 (2016)
8 C.F.R. § 1003.38 (2016)
8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(d) (2016)
8 C.F.R. § 1212 (2016)
8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(2) (2016)
8 C.F.R. § 1240 (2016)
8 C.F.R. § 1240.11 (2016)
8 C.F.R. § 1240.20(a) (2016)
8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(a) (2016)
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Public Laws
• Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, title
IV; 110 Stat. 1214, 1258-81, §440(e) (1996).
• Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. The CAT was
incorporated into United States law by the Foreign Affairs Reform and
Reconstructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA), Pub. L. No. 105-277 (1987).
• Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Pub. L.
No. 104-208, div. C; 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-46 to 724 (1996); H.R. Rep. 104-863
(1996). 104th Cong. 2d Sess,; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828, 104th Cong. 2d See.
(1996); S. Rep. 104- 249, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. (1996); 142 Cong. Rec. S473001, §150 (1996); 142 Cong. Rec. H2378-05, § 309 (1996).
• REAL ID Act of 2005- Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, the
Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, PL 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat.
231, 302-23 (May 11, 2005); H.R. Cong. Rep. 109-72 at 173-75, 151 Cong. Rec.
H.R. 2813, 2386-77 (2005).

Federal Agency Documents Cited
• Executive Office for Immigration Review, Freedom of Immigration Act: How to
Submit a FOIA/PA Request, available at, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/foia-facts
(last visited, May 12, 2016).
• Federal Bureau of Investigation, Application Information Form, available at,
https://forms.fbi.gov/identity-history-summary-checksreview/q384893984839334.pdf (last visited, May 12, 2016).
• Federal Bureau of Investigation, Form FD-258, see, https://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks/fd-258-1 (last visited, May 12, 2016).
• Federal Bureau of Investigation, The Vault, available at https://vault.fbi.gov/fdps1/@@search-fdps (last visited May 12, 2016).
• Form FD-258, see, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summarychecks/fd-258-1 (last visited May 12, 2016).
• Identity History Summary Request Checklist, available at,
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks/identityhistory-summary-request-checklist-1 (last visited, May 12, 2016).
• Manuel, Kate M. & Garvey, Todd. Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration
Enforcement: Legal Issues https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42924.pdf (last
visited, May 12, 2016).
• Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, R. Gil
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Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Protection, Leon Rodriguez, Dir., U.S.
Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Alan D. Bersin, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Policy 2
(Nov. 20, 2014)
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutori
al_discretion.pdf (last visited, May 12, 2016).
• United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, available at
www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (follow "Forms" hyperlink; then follow " follow
"Form G-325A" hyperlink), (last visited May 12, 2016)
• United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, How to File a FOIA/PA Request,
available at https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/freedom-information-and-privacyact-foia/how-file-foia-privacy-act-request/how-file-foiapa-request (last visited, May
12, 2016).
• United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, available at
http://www.uscis.gov (locate “Other Services”; select “Humanitarian” hyperlink;
choose "Temporary Protected Status" hyperlink), (last visited, May 12, 2016).
• United States Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services, Immigration Benefits in EOIR Removal Proceedings, 2,
available at
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/article/PreOrderInstr.pdf (last
visited, May 12, 2016).
• United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review,
Application for Cancellation of Removal for Certain Permanent Residents,
Instructions, available at www.justice.gov/eoir/formslist.htm (last visited, May 12,
2016).
• United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review,
Immigration Court Practice Manual, available at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/02/04/practi
ce_manual_-_02-08-2016_update.pdf (last visited, May 12, 2016).
• United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review
(follow "Form EOIR-28” hyperlink) available at www.justice.gov/eoir/formslist.htm
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